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Privacy in Pandemic: Law, Technology, and Public
Health in the COVID-19 Crisis
Tiffany C. Li*
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused millions of deaths and disastrous
consequences around the world, with lasting repercussions for every field of
law, including privacy and technology. The unique characteristics of this
pandemic have precipitated an increase in use of new technologies,
including remote communications platforms, healthcare robots, and medical
AI. Public and private actors alike are using new technologies, like heat
sensing, and technologically influenced programs, like contact tracing,
leading to a rise in government and corporate surveillance in sectors like
healthcare, employment, education, and commerce. Advocates have raised
the alarm for privacy and civil liberties violations, but the emergency nature
of the pandemic has drowned out many concerns.
This Article is the first comprehensive account of privacy in pandemic that
maps the terrain of privacy impacts related to technology and public health
responses to the COVID-19 crisis. Many have written on the general need
for better health privacy protections, education privacy protections,
consumer privacy protections, and protections against government and
corporate surveillance. However, this Article is the first comprehensive
article to examine these problems of privacy and technology specifically in
light of the pandemic, arguing that the lens of the pandemic exposes the need
for both wide-scale and small-scale reform of privacy law. This Article
approaches these problems with a focus on technical realities and social
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salience, and with a critical awareness of digital and political inequities,
crafting normative recommendations with these concepts in mind.
Understanding privacy in this time of pandemic is critical for law and
policymaking in the near future and for the long-term goals of creating a
future society that protects both civil liberties and public health. It is also
important to create a contemporary scholarly understanding of privacy in
pandemic at this moment in time, as a matter of historical record. By
examining privacy in pandemic, in the midst of pandemic, this Article seeks
to create a holistic scholarly foundation for future work on privacy,
technology, public health, and legal responses to global crises.
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INTRODUCTION
Alison Schwartz, 29 years old, a People Magazine staffer in New York
City.
Adolph “T.J.” Mendez, 44 years old, a father of six in New Braunfels,
Texas.
Nashom Wooden, 50 years old, a drag queen in New York City.
Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy, 87 years old, a federal judge for the
Southern District of New York.
Skylar Herbert, 5 years old, the daughter of two essential workers in
Detroit, Michigan.
These1 are just five of the 2.7 million people2 who have died of the
global COVID-19 pandemic. Millions more have been infected and
recovered,3 some with lasting health ramifications and some, particularly
in countries like the United States, with staggering hospital bills.4 The
pandemic has caused untold damage to people all around the world and
has spurred small to drastic shifts in the use of technology across sectors.
This Article explores the privacy aspect of new technologies and new
technologically influenced initiatives deployed as part of the COVID-19
response by both public and private actors.
COVID-19 is the disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus
(previously known as the 2019 novel coronavirus).5 SARS-CoV-2 is a
highly contagious virus that causes a range of symptoms in humans, often

1. From Buzzfeed’s moving collection of profiles, at The Victims of COVID-19, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2020, 12:38 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/buzzfeednews/thevictims-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/78DK-HS69].
2. Coronavirus Tracker: The Latest Figures as Countries Fight the COVID-19 Resurgence, FIN.
TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441
[https://perma.cc/8VLC-2923] (last visited March 27, 2021).
3. As of March 25, 2021, over 100 million people have recovered. John Elflein, Number of
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Cases, Recoveries, and Deaths Worldwide as of Mar. 25, 2021, statista
(Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1087466/covid19-cases-recoveries-deathsworldwide/ [https://perma.cc/423L-6PZT].
4. Abigail Abrams, America’s Health System Will Likely Make the Coronavirus Outbreak
Worse, TIME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5794672/health-insurance-deductibles-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/5PSB-9P27]; see Abigail Abrams, Total Cost of Her COVID-19 Treatment:
$34,927.43, TIME (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:19 PM), https://time.com/5806312/coronavirus-treatment-cost
[https://perma.cc/29LN-K3TN] (analogizing the experience and medical bill of one COVID-19
patient with other Americans afflicted by the disease).
5. Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technicalguidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it
[https://perma.cc/W9S2-HMYE] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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primarily attacking the respiratory system.6 There are a few unique
characteristics of COVID-19 that are important to note when examining
the use of technology in the public health, government, and corporate
response to the virus. First, the virus is fast-moving, with global reach.
Though the outbreak was first declared a Public Health Emergency by
the World Health Organization on January 30, 2020,7 the virus quickly
reached most parts of the world in a matter of months. Second, the virus
is deadly. As of March 2021, the virus has killed over 2,780,000
worldwide,8 including 549,000 in the United States alone.9 Third, the
virus is highly contagious. The virus spreads from human to human
through tiny virus particles released from infected individuals, including
through coughs, sneezes, talking, breathing,10 and even through the
particles that linger in the air.11 Fourth, the virus can be invisible.
Individuals infected with the virus may take up to two weeks12 to develop
symptoms, and many may be completely asymptomatic.13
These four factors (fast-moving spread, contagiousness, deadliness,
and potential for invisible, asymptomatic transmission) have led to severe
measures to help stem or stop viral transmission. Social distancing 14 has
become the rule for many regions, including entire nations. The concept
behind social distancing is that the virus will spread more slowly if
6. See Neel V. Patel, How Does the Coronavirus Work?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/15/999476/explainer-how-does-the-coronaviruswork [https://perma.cc/Z2HV-CJ5M] (providing an overview of the biology of SARS-CoV-2 and
how it affects humans).
7. Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen
[https://perma.cc/D6MM-GY4P] (July 31, 2020).
8. See JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. OF MED.: CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/
[https://perma.cc/73GU-5FHC] (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
9. Id.
10. How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.
[https://perma.cc/JJP5-P2WD] (Oct. 28, 2020).
11. See Lisa Lockerd Maragakis, Coronavirus Disease 2019 vs. the Flu, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirusdisease-2019-vs-the-flu. [https://perma.cc/U9TK-LYWC] (suggesting that small particles or
droplets may linger in the air, and contain enough of the virus for other individuals to be infected).
12. How COVID-19 Spreads, supra 10.
13. Bianca Nogrady, What the Data Say About Asymptomatic COVID Infections, NATURE
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03141-3 [https://perma.cc/7APE6GGX] (finding that asymptomatic individuals are less infectious, but still able to transmit the virus
to other people).
14. See Josiah Bates, What Is ‘Social Distancing?’ Here’s How to Best Practice It as
Coronavirus Spreads, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://time.com/5800442/socialdistancing-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/GLL5-TRMJ] (distinguishing social distancing from
other methods to restrict the virus’ transmission such as self-quarantining or isolation).
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humans do not get close enough to each other to be in range of virus
particles released from breath,15 touch, and so on. To support social
distancing, governments have shut down schools, businesses, retail,
restaurants, and more.16 The shutdowns have contributed to mass
unemployment.17 Over 11 million Americans lost their jobs in the month
of March 2020 alone.18 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), as well as many states, have also encouraged people
to wear masks at all times when outside or near the presence of others.19
Vaccinations for the virus only began in December of 2020, and
precautions are expected to stay in place through the summer of 2021.20
15. David Williams, How Coronavirus Spread from One Member to 87% of the Singers at a
Washington
Choir
Practice,
CNN
(May
13,
2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/13/us/coronavirus-washington-choir-outbreak-trnd/index.html;
Neel V. Patel, Loud Talking Could Leave Coronavirus in the Air for Up to 14 Minutes, MIT TECH.
REV. (May 13, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/13/1001696/loud-talkingcould-leave-coronavirus-in-the-air-for-up-to-14-minutes [https://perma.cc/YTZ7-PNFC].
16. See, e.g., Irina Ivanova & Thom Craver, Closed Due to Coronavirus: List of Activities and
State Shutdowns over COVID-19 Outbreak Concerns, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/closed-due-to-coronavirus-list-of-activities-and-state-shutdownsover-covid-19-outbreak-concerns [https://perma.cc/66HH-W4UP] (summarizing how cities, states,
sport leagues, and businesses restricted public gatherings due to COVID-19); see also Lauren Camera, Mass Nationwide School Closures Loom as Coronavirus Cases Spike, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 17,
2020, 3:16 PM), https://usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2020-11-17/mass-nationwideschool-closures-loom-as-coronavirus-cases-spike [https://perma.cc/2GPZ-8KQL] (chronicling the
second wave of school shutdowns in the fall of 2020).
17. Sylvan Lane, More Than 11 Million Laid Off in March as Coronavirus Spread Through US,
THE HILL (May 15, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/498005-more-than-11-million-laid-off-in-march-as-coronavirus-spread-through-us [https://perma.cc/6LPG-Z8BS].
18. Id.
19. Guidance for Wearing Masks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover.html
[https://perma.cc/L3LL-T44A] (Feb. 18, 2021).
20. As of December 2020, there were two vaccines that had been approved by the FDA for
COVID-19, in February 2021 a third vaccine was approved. Public health experts expect that the
administration of the vaccine to the U.S. population could take months. Additionally, a significant
portion of the American public has expressed a reluctance to take the vaccine due to concerns regarding safety and efficacy given the vaccine’s record-breaking time to market. See, e.g., Max
Matza, Covid Vaccine: When Will Americans Be Vaccinated?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55149138 [https://perma.cc/F8A4-B77G] (discussing vaccination status in the United States, which began with a New York City nurse on December
14, 2020); FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for Third COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2021) https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-issuesemergency-use-authorization-third-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/2X7Y-ZF3C] (discussing
the approval of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine in February 2021, making it the third vaccine available in the United States); Frequently Asked Questions About COVID-19 Vaccination, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/faq.html [https://perma.cc/LRJ3-UA2U] (Feb. 15, 2021) (indicating that vaccine supply is
limited); Hilary Brueck & Aria Bendix, When Can I Get a Coronavirus Vaccine?, BUS. INSIDER
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States have attempted to respond to the crisis by using technological
solutions to try to stop or slow the spread of the novel coronavirus. Many
of these solutions have been data-driven, with few if any guarantees for
individual data privacy. These technology-influenced solutions include
Bluetooth tracking, cell phone location data tracking, various types of
testing (including antigen and antibody testing), immunity passports or
certification, human and digital contact tracing, and more.21 Public health
responses have included increased use of telemedicine and telehealth
(often through remote communication technologies), as well as use of
medical artificial intelligence (AI) and healthcare robots.22 Governments
have used surveillance technologies, like facial recognition and remote
heat sensing, as part of response efforts as well.23 As always, with new
surveillance comes new risks and dangers to civil liberties and privacy,
particularly for marginalized populations.24
Corporations, too, have developed and implemented new
technological programs in response to this pandemic. Consumer
technologies, including remote communication technologies, have risen
to the forefront. These technologies have also been used in the workplace
setting, as many white-collar workers have moved to remote offices. All
of these programs come with their own risks to security and privacy.
(Dec. 21, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/when-can-i-get-a-coronavirus-vaccine-timeline-2020-11 [https://perma.cc/GE29-NHEV] (hypothesizing that most Americans will
have the opportunity to get vaccinated by the end of September 2021, meaning precautions will
continue through summer 2021); see also P.R. Lockhart, Experts Warn of Low Covid Vaccine Trust
Among Black Americans, NBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/experts-warn-low-covid-vaccine-trust-among-black-americans-n1250743 [https://perma.cc/YLC4LZBN] (noting that less than half of Black Americans surveyed would be willing to get the vaccine
as of December 2020).
21. See Matt Richtel, Contact Tracing with Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/health/coronavirus-contact-tracing-apps.html
[https://perma.cc/4YJN-BK2M] (Jan. 28, 2021) (addressing the time-consuming process of contact
tracing with which technology can assist).
22. Sonu Bhaskar et al., Designing Futuristic Telemedicine Using Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics in the COVID-19 Era, FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2020.556789/full [https://perma.cc/Z3N7-JDU4].
23. Meredith Van Natta et al., The Rise and Regulation of Thermal Facial Recognition Technology During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 1 (2020) (summarizing public
health emergency laws which serve to empower a state’s governor to respond to a crisis like
COVID-19).
24. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 4–8 (2014) (discussing the
development of harassment through the internet); see also Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 441–450 (2017) (reflecting on the degree in which “Black Bodies,” “Poor Bodies,” “Female Bodies,” and “Bodies At the Intersection” have each been surveilled
and criminalized); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673,
1686–87 (2017); see also Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. REV.
2051, 2065–66, 73 (2018) [hereinafter Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards] (discussing the issues of privacy tort law’s ability to deal with today’s technologies).
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Corporate surveillance also extends to the physical realm, as companies
have instituted privacy-invasive measures like temperature checks for
employees.25
Outside of government public health response and corporate employee
surveillance, individuals have seen changes in the use of technologies and
privacy protections in the education and social sectors as well. Many
corporate surveillance technologies are being used in the education
sector, putting the privacy of students and educators at risk. At the same
time, the social distancing measures necessary for life in a pandemic have
led to an increase in the use of remote communication technologies in
private life, changing the way individuals experience technology in the
workplace, in education, and in the social world more generally.26
This Article maps the terrain of privacy impacts related to the
pandemic by examining privacy aspects of new technologies and
technologically influenced public health responses that have risen to the
forefront as a result of the pandemic. Understanding privacy in this time
of pandemic is critical, both for our near future and for the long-term
goals of creating a society that protects both civil liberties and public
health. Certainly, with the benefit of hindsight, future scholars will likely
find that many of the technological solutions proposed and implemented
now were actually unhelpful or perhaps even harmful. However,
examining how privacy was considered and understood during the
pandemic will aid future scholarship and support the efforts of others
tasked with shaping laws that deal with privacy in future global crises, in
addition to adding to the longitudinal study of our society’s everchanging relationship with data and technology over time.
The Article first looks at public health programs that have developed
as part of pandemic response. These programs include COVID-19 testing
programs, contact tracing programs, immunity passports, and novel uses
of technology in medicine and healthcare, including medical AI and
healthcare robots. Next, the Article explores the privacy impacts of new
technologies through a variety of sectors: government surveillance,
25. See Jeffrey Dastin & Krystal Hu, Exclusive: Amazon Deploys Thermal Cameras at Warehouses to Scan for Fevers Faster, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2020, 6:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-amazon-com-cameras/exclusive-amazon-deploys-thermal-cameras-atwarehouses-to-scan-for-fevers-faster-idUSKBN2200HT [https://perma.cc/83KD-Z3VX] (discussing Amazon warehouses use of cameras to check employees’ temperature, however debating how
widely they would be implemented given the surge in demand of cameras).
26. See, e.g., Kate O’Flaherty, Zoom: Here’s When to Use It, and When You Should Avoid It,
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2020, 6:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/04/15/
zoom-during-covid-19-heres-when-you-should-use-it-and-when-to-avoid-it/?sh=4d3d3e94376e
[https://perma.cc/WNE7-TEB5] (explaining the surging number of users for video conference apps
such as Zoom, which has grown to over 200 million users from 10 million in 2019).
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employee surveillance, educational privacy, and consumer privacy.
Finally, the Article offers normative recommendations for protecting
privacy while also supporting public health.
While a growing body of scholarship is rapidly developing on legal
issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic,27 this Article provides the first
and most comprehensive analysis of privacy, technology, and public
health responses across sectors. Furthermore, this Article is unique in
explaining the technical and scientific components of each of these
privacy-affecting technological solutions, as well as focusing on the
societal changes that have pushed the use of these technologies and have
come about as a result of these technological changes. Most of the
technologies being deployed as COVID-19 responses are not new. As
Jack M. Balkin has opined, the novelty of new technologies is not what
matters for understanding how the law should regulate. Rather, it is what
has changed in society that has driven the rise in certain technologies that
we should seek to understand. In creating new laws for new technologies
(or new crises), we should look to salience, not novelty.28
Finally, this article is unique in shedding light on critical dimensions
of privacy in times of pandemic, particularly the impacts on marginalized
groups, including intersectional analysis of disparate harms, reflecting on
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on understanding the
intersection of race, gender, and other identities in law, politics, and
theory.29 Understanding the impact race, gender, and other dimensions
have on public health, privacy, and technology is critical, as the pandemic
has highlighted inequalities throughout society.
Much further study is needed on this subject, including empirical work
on privacy practices and responses, as well as research on disparate
impact and comparative research on the vastly different privacy-related
programs that nations and regions have developed—influenced in no
small part by their unique legal and regulatory regimes. This Article
focuses primarily on U.S. privacy law and related developments. The
Article does not claim to provide an exhaustive study of all potential
27. See, e.g., Special Pandemic Issue of the Journal of Law and the Biosciences, PETRIE-FLOM
CTR. HARV. L. SCH., https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/09/pandemic-issue-journalof-law-and-the-biosciences/ [https://perma.cc/CP3B-ZXRS] (comprising a compilation of
academic articles on legal implications related to COVID-19, such as data privacy, interstate travel
restrictions and state-enforced vaccination).
28. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2004) (commenting on the ways
in which digital technologies expand and diminish free expression).
29. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139 (1989).

776

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

privacy implications of all pandemic-related interventions, but rather
serves to lay the groundwork for future scholarship on these issues.
I. TECH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 virus is fast-moving, highly contagious, deadly, and
often invisible. These factors have led to increased use of technologies
allowing for the replacement of some in-person human contact in
government and corporate functions. Additionally, the need to protect
against the spread of the disease has led to increased use of both
healthcare-related and non-healthcare-related technologies, sometimes in
novel ways. Finally, social isolation and the shutdowns of many public
and private spaces have led to an increased use of technologies for social
connection.
Government surveillance, be it for national security, intelligence, law
enforcement, or pandemic-response purposes, is important to understand
and important to limit, in the interest of protecting individual freedom
from government overreach. However, in the age of surveillance
capitalism,30 surveillance by private actors has emerged as an equally
important phenomenon to study for privacy impacts. While employers,
consumer-facing corporations, and education providers have used
technology in different ways during the pandemic, it can be useful to
understand this class of surveillance as distinct from government
surveillance conducted under traditional surveillance powers and through
traditional surveillance means. The following is a non-exhaustive
exploration of different ways the pandemic has changed privacy and
technology in these sectors: government, employment, education, and
consumer technology in the social world.
A. Government Surveillance
Governments worldwide have proposed different surveillance
initiatives dedicated to pandemic response. These include testing and
contact tracing, the use of new technologies like facial recognition and
drones, and increased video and other forms of surveillance (including to
enforce such measures as social distancing and mask wearing).31 The
privacy risks of facial recognition and drones32 have been much studied,
30. SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 16 (2018) (explaining the
concept of surveillance capitalism).
31. Jared Newman, Smart Cameras Will Soon Check if You’re Social Distancing and Wearing
a Mask, FAST CO. (May 13, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90503911/smart-cameras-willsoon-check-if-youre-social-distancing-and-wearing-a-mask [https://perma.cc/B8WP-P2Z6].
32. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2011);
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as has been the rise of government surveillance generally and
correspondent harms to privacy. Robots have also been deployed as part
of government COVID-19 response, including for monitoring, crowd
dispersal, enforcing social distancing, identifying infected people, and
giving public information.33
The technologies are not new. For example, one could easily draw a
line from the use of heat-sensing surveillance in Kyllo v. United States34
to the use of heat-sensing robots in COVID-19 surveillance today.35 What
has changed is the use of the public health rationale behind deploying
these technologies at a greater scale and in more intrusive fashion.
Government surveillance has used technological tools,36 but this is
perhaps the first time many of these tools have been used at a large scale,
specifically for the stated purpose of protecting public health.
Public health as a rationale for privacy invasion is relatively new for
many of the technologies under discussion, though public safety has long
been a fallback excuse for any number of civil liberties violations.37
Public health has also been used as an excuse for violating privacy and
civil rights in the past. For example, Mary Mallon, a poor woman
believed to have infected dozens of people with typhoid fever, was
publicly sanctioned and subsequently institutionalized in the early

Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4 CALIF. L.
REV. CIR. 57, 61–64 (2013) (discussing first amendment concerns).
33. How Robots Are Being Used for COVID-19 (as of 15 Jan 21), ROBOTICS FOR INFECTIOUS
DISEASES,
https://roboticsforinfectiousdiseases.org/how-robots-are-being-used.html
[https://perma.cc/NEA3-BTKV].
34. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (“[The] use of sense-enhancing technology
to gather any information regarding interior of home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical intrusion into constitutionally protected area constitutes a ‘search,’ and use of
thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from home was search.”).
35. David Yaffe-Bellany, ‘Thermometer Guns’ on Coronavirus Front Lines Are ‘Notoriously
Not Accurate,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/
business/coronavirus-temperature-sensor-guns.html [https://perma.cc/PW8M-4955] (discussing
the prevalence of the “thermometer guns” but ultimately how ineffective they are).
36. See, e.g., Courtney Linder, All the Insane Surveillance Tools the Government (Maybe) Has,
POPULAR MECHS. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/g30469505/government-surveillance-tools [https://perma.cc/83ZA-JR85] (discussing that security vendors in the United States have “a ‘Black Book’ catalog of secret surveillance tools . . . .”).
37. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (“When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious.”);
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (finding the governmental interest in
ensuring public safety on sidewalks outside abortion clinics justified the restrictions on speech and
assembly in those locations); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (holding that public
safety concerns justified requiring licenses for parades or processions and such a policy did not
violate the right to peaceful assembly).
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twentieth century.38 Mallon, an asymptomatic typhoid carrier, was
forcibly quarantined twice and repeatedly subjected to unwanted medical
tests.39 She became the subject of public ridicule and died alone in forced
isolation.40 Public health can be an excuse governments use for any
number of wrongs, and laws should take care to prevent such harms.
What is different now is specifically the use of the public health rationale
for government surveillance using data-driven, connected, and
autonomous technologies.
It is important to note that the privacy-invasive programs that have
been used elsewhere have also been used as pandemic response, with
public health taking the place of other purposes, including public safety
and controlling extremism. For example, U.S. government agencies have
considered or adopted contracts with Clearview AI41 and Palantir42 for
pandemic response. Clearview AI is the embattled facial recognition
company that scraped millions of photographs from social media to
develop facial recognition systems it then sold to both governments and
corporations,43 potentially including countries like Saudi Arabia that are
not particularly known for protecting human rights.44 Previously, law
enforcement agencies across America had been relying on public safety
and criminal justice as the primary rationales for implementing facial
recognition surveillance, as well as related technological developments,
38. Filio Marineli et al., Mary Mallon (1869-1938) and the History of Typhoid Fever, 26
ANNALS GASTROENTEROLOGY 132, 132–33 (2013).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Controversial Tech Company Pitches Facial Recognition to Track COVID-19, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/now/video/controversial-tech-company-pitches-facialrecognition-to-track-covid-19-82638917537 [https://perma.cc/V7UK-7FNS]. This led to a
response letter from Senator Ed Markey. See Carrie Mihalcik, Senator Questions Clearview AI
Over
Coronavirus
Tracking
Plans,
CNET
(May
1,
2020,
7:12
AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/senator-questions-clearview-ai-over-coronavirus-tracking-plans.
[https://perma.cc/L7BY-BLX8] (reporting that Senator Markey expressed concerns about accuracy
and bias in the technology, and how the widespread use to fight coronavirus may increase threats
to the public’s privacy).
42. Nick Statt, Peter Thiel’s Controversial Palantir Is Helping Build a Coronavirus Tracking
Tool
for
the
Trump
Admin,
VERGE
(Apr.
21,
2020,
8:36
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/21/21230453/palantir-coronavirus-trump-contract-peter-thieltracking-hhs-protect-now [https://perma.cc/6XZR-QZPB].
43. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facialrecognition.html [https://perma.cc/WB44-MWPL] (discussing the variety of privacy concerns that
may arise with the use of Clearview).
44. Ryan Mac et al., Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used by the Justice
Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:43 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/N97H-MDTG].
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like drones, robots, and algorithmic processing.45 Many of these
surveillance tactics are not new, but the new and increased uses of
government surveillance during the pandemic merits attention.
Government surveillance in a pandemic raises interesting concerns for
privacy. First, future privacy legislation should take note of the public
health rationale for privacy-invasive technologies and protect against
abuse of that moral justification. Second, more attention should be paid
to the portability of data collected for one crisis response and used in
another. Or, more generally, the law should address the current lack of
strict purpose limitation in collection of data and transfer to, access by,
and use by government.
Further, potentially invasive programs should be undertaken only if
they can be developed in privacy-preserving ways and only if they can be
shown to be actually effective from a practical, technical standpoint. It is
too easy to allow for unchecked use of surveillance technologies that have
no link to actual improvements in public health, leading to both a
degradation in privacy and civil liberties norms, as well as a loss of faith
on the part of the public in their governmental institutions.
Finally, it is likely that future crises will allow governments to exploit
public health, public safety, or other rationales to justify increasing
amounts of surveillance and use of privacy-invasive technologies.46 It
will be difficult to limit the onward sharing and downstream harms of
data collected during these crises. Thus, future privacy legislation should
create protections for downstream, distributed harms. This could include
shifting to a data-protection framework,47 with rights including the right
to request deletion of one’s own data, as well as algorithmic
accountability rights,48 including the right to contest results of an
45. Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Privacy Experts Fear a Boom in Coronavirus
Surveillance,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
14,
2020,
6:25
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2020/04/14/thecybersecurity-202-privacy-experts-fear-a-boom-in-coronavirussurveillance/5e94901988e0fa101a7615be [https://perma.cc/UX3Z-NC48] (noting concern that
massive surveillance will be put into place out of desperation, that likely will not accomplish the
goals it sets out to achieve).
46. See Bert-Jaap Koops, The Concept of Function Creep, 13 LAW, INNOVATION & TECH.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7) (discussing how systems originally intended to perform
narrowly specified functions are expanded to react to new political circumstances, thereby
sidestepping the limits of legal frameworks meant to protect issues of privacy and data protection).
47. See Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR, 98 DENV.
L. REV. 93, 96 (2021) (discussing how the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) could be a model because it offers protections that follow the data and imposes governance
duties on companies regardless of whether individuals invoke their rights).
48. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to
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algorithmically derived decision.49 Additionally, the law must solve for
the compound privacy harms raised by data aggregators, as we have seen
commercial data aggregators sell or share data that then contributes to or
worsens privacy incursions caused by government surveillance
programs.
B. Employer Surveillance
Similar to the privacy concerns with government surveillance, the
technology used in corporate employer surveillance was already used in
employment settings prior to the pandemic. Employers have used new
technologies to track their employees in many forms for years, 50 and
scholars have called for greater protections of employee privacy,
particularly in the time of digital technologies that make surveillance
simple.51 However, the pandemic has necessitated renewed conversations
surrounding (1) the scale at which employers have used these
technologies to track employees and (2) the use of a public health
rationale to justify employee monitoring.
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (2019) (noting that without some form
of public and stakeholder accountability, collaborative public-private approaches to systemic governance of algorithms will fail); Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving
Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243,
1255 (2017) (discussing how algorithms are critically important features of our information society
which demand immediate attention from regulators); Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics
in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1221 (2017) (advocating for greater regulation in
the emerging Algorithmic Society); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1265, 1265 (2020) (promoting algorithmic accountability and transparency); Sonia K. Katyal,
Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 54 (2019) (discussing various tools to help eliminate the opacity of AI, including codes of conduct, impact statements, and whistleblower protection); Alex Rosenblat et al., Algorithmic Accountability, DATA &
SOC’Y RSCH. INST. 3 (2014), https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/6yh62 [https://perma.cc/AC9QYAQ5] (noting that determining algorithmic accountability has real consequences for understanding and regulating who or which entities control flows of information in public and private spheres);
David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State,
37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 800, 800 (2020) (arguing that the next generation of work will need to engage with the broader terrain of administrative law, which is far more likely to modulate use of
algorithmic governance tools going forward).
49. Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189,
198 (2019); Gabriel Nicholas, Explaining Algorithmic Decisions, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 711, 730
(2020).
50. Steve Lohr, Unblinking Eyes Track Employees, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-good-andbad.html [https://perma.cc/CBC5-ZK2B] (going back to 2014, surveillance of employees via technology was already a concern); Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know.
(And Amazon Has a Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/7EMB-EQQW] (discussing Amazon’s surveillance of their employees, and the
potential implementation of a wristband to track productivity).
51. Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 776 (2017).
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1. Remote Work Surveillance
One of the most widely practiced methods of pandemic response has
been for governments to encourage their residents to practice social
distancing while shutting down many businesses and public and private
spaces. Social distancing in this context describes measures taken to
maintain physical distance between humans, with the goal of preventing
spread of disease.52 Many states and municipalities in the United States
enforced orders that shut down nonessential businesses, defined
differently in each location.
For many white-collar workers, the pandemic has resulted in a switch
to working from home, using remote technologies. An early MIT study
found that an estimated 34.1% of Americans newly transitioned to
working remotely from home by early April 2020.53 In fact, one factor
possibly aiding Seattle’s public health response was early partnership
with local technology companies in shifting much of their workforce to
remote.54 In contrast, some workplaces have remained open and
functioning, utilizing new privacy-invasive programs in a purported
attempt to safeguard employees and consumers from the virus.55
Workers working from home have relied on technologies, including
distributed work software and services like Microsoft SharePoint and
Dropbox. Many of these technologies come with their own privacy
risks,56 from the ever-present risk of data breach to the risks of companies
selling or sharing behavioral and user data to data brokers or other parties
for use in marketing or other purposes users would not appreciate.
Additionally, some employers have implemented privacy-invasive
software choices, including requiring employees to keep cameras on

52. Kaitlyn Tiffany, The Dos and Don’ts of ‘Social Distancing’, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-what-does-social-distancingmean/607927 [https://perma.cc/DP3D-PZLY].
53. Erik Brynjolfsson et al., COVID-19 and Remote Work: An Early Look at US Data (Apr. 8,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://john-joseph-horton.com/papers/remote_work.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK7F-6L7L].
54. Mary Harris, What Seattle Did Right, and Where New York Went Wrong, SLATE (May 1,
2020, 11:09 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/coronavirus-covid19-seattle-new-yorkresponses.html [https://perma.cc/8A4P-RQUX].
55. Sarah O’Connor, Workplace Surveillance May Hurt Us More Than It Helps, FIN. TIMES
(Jan.
11,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/27faa953-1723-4597-a5a0-2ff9e617feab
[https://perma.cc/ZG59-VBSK] (discussing Amazon’s implementation of technology to ensure that
employees are adhering to social distancing rules).
56. Rachel Connolly, The Pandemic Has Taken Surveillance of Workers to the Next Level,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2020, 5:23 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/14/pandemic-workers-surveillance-monitor-jobs [https://perma.cc/2RPD-2RYY].
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through all working hours,57 as well as using software that tracks every
single thing employees are doing on their computers during the workday
(including browser search terms and email text).58 Companies such as
ActivTrak, Time Doctor, Hubstaff, Interguard, and Teramind that
provide employee-monitoring services reported huge increases in
customer base and revenue.59 Some have called this range of technologies
“tattleware.”60
In lieu of in-person meetings, many have turned to using
teleconferencing and videoconferencing solutions, including Zoom,
Microsoft Teams,61 Google Hangout,62 WebEx,63 and more.64 Many of
these technologies came with their own privacy problems. Zoom in
particular gained an early lead as the videoconferencing software of
choice for many, leading to increased scrutiny from privacy and security

57. Drew Harwell, Managers Turn to Surveillance Software, Always-On Webcams to Ensure
Employees Are (Really) Working From Home, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:24 AM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/30/work-from-home-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/4QUY-S6MK] (highlighting one company’s use of a program that creates a
“digital office”, with the requirement for the employees to have their cameras and microphones on
at all times).
58. Id.; Adam Satariano, How My Boss Monitors Me While I Work From Home, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/technology/employee-monitoring-workfrom-home-virus.html [https://perma.cc/B4LK-G43H].
59. Harwell, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. Mark Hachman, Microsoft’s Solution for COVID-19 Is a Free Teams Subscription for Six
Months, PCWORLD (Mar. 4, 2020, 3:45 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/3530374/
microsofts-solution-for-covid-19-is-a-free-teams-subscription-for-six-months.html
[https://perma.cc/6SGT-8MFS].
62. Igor Bonifacic, Google Makes Hangouts Meet Features Free in the Wake of Coronavirus,
ENGADGET (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/2020-03-03-google-makes-hangouts-meetfeatures-free-in-the-wake-of-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/9N95-9TC6].
63. Jordan Novet, Cisco Says Webex Video-Calling Service Is Seeing Record Usage Too, Even
as Competitor Zoom Draws All the Attention, CNBC (Mar. 17, 2020, 2:49 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/17/cisco-webex-sees-record-usage-during-coronavirusexpansion-like-zoom.html [https://perma.cc/F5X6-JS6G].
64. Allen St. John, It’s Not Just Zoom. Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, and Webex Have Privacy
Issues, Too., YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/not-just-zoom-googlemeet-180813488.html [https://perma.cc/4T5C-FKN9] (discussing the variety of video meeting
platforms, along with the privacy issues they pose).
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advocates and researchers,65 as well as legal and regulatory inquiry.66
These platforms likely struggled to protect privacy concerns due in part
to the sudden increase in scale and shift in user base.
The increased use of remote working technology has also increased
potential for abuse of technologies. In the unfortunate #PoorJennifer case,
a person was recorded on a group Zoom call and filmed taking her laptop
into the restroom with her—and then using the toilet while unknowingly
recording herself on camera.67 This video was then shared on social
media, without anonymization of names on the call, likely to significant
harm for the individual pictured. This particular invasion of privacy could
not have happened if employees were not using remote communications
technologies, and it is possible that the freshness of these technologies to
some workers increased the chance of privacy-violating accidents.
Increased use of videoconferencing technology during the pandemic
caused a privacy harm to many workers, as those who were forced to
work from home did so with increased risk of unknowingly exposing
information about themselves, such as through items in the backgrounds
of their home videos or the potentially location-identifying views through
their home windows.68 This may have been particularly the case, as many
people shifted to remote work without much prior notice, due to the fast65. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of
COVID-19, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civilrights-in-the-time-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/HB9Z-UXR8] (arguing that the administrators of
our virtual schools, workplaces, and public accommodations must take measures to prohibit and
prevent discrimination and abuse in their spaces); Marks, supra note 45 (noting that experts are
urging companies and government officials to make a series of technology and policy commitments
regarding any surveillance programs).
66. Maggie Miller, Zoom to Expand Security, Privacy Safeguards as Part of Agreement with
New York AG, HILL (May 7, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/496664zooms-to-expand-security-privacy-safeguards-as-part-of-agreement-with [https://perma.cc/P3GFGB9C]; FTC Requires Zoom to Enhance its Security Practices as Part of Settlement, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/11/ftc-requireszoom-enhance-its-security-practices-part-settlement [https://perma.cc/6PCS-QXZM].
67. Deborah Hastings, Zoom Blunders in the Age of COVID-19: Shirtless Lawyers, Flatulence
and
Naked
Spouses,
INSIDE
EDITION
(Apr.
14,
2020,
2:19
PM),
https://www.insideedition.com/zoom-blunders-in-the-age-of-covid-19-shirtless-lawyersflatulence-and-naked-spouses-59065 [https://perma.cc/LNV5-9EDS].
68. See, e.g., Kayla Miller, Reasons Online Students Should Be Able to Keep Webcam Off,
MLIVE (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.mlive.com/news/2020/09/reasons-online-students-shouldbe-able-to-keep-webcam-off.html [https://perma.cc/GH2R-8GCT] (noting that a concern exists regarding the ability for children to screenshot or record their classmates on video and later bully
them about their home environment or appearance); Vincent Nicandro et al., Please, Let Students
Turn Their Videos Off in Class, STAN. DAILY (June 1, 2020), https://www.stanforddaily.com/2020/06/01/please-let-students-turn-their-videos-off-in-class/
[https://perma.cc/TT6L-BZBW] (“When asked [about the survey, students] said they were selfconscious about being seen in class, weren’t in private spaces, and/or didn’t want to show their
current living situations.”).
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moving emergency nature of the pandemic. It is likely that many workers
did not have time to prepare workspaces at home, a problem that
disproportionately affected people with less financial means, as well as
people with small children or other caretaking responsibilities. The
increased use of remote working technologies that include photo, audio,
or video also create greater content moderation, speech regulation, and
online harassment concerns for tech platforms.69
On a theoretical level, some amount of privacy is lost when the social
norm is for individuals to open up their private homes to view for others
in a work context. The pandemic has forced many workers to experience
a sort of context collapse. Context collapse occurs when individuals face
a collision or collapse between boundaries of two or more previously
segmented social spaces, for which they previously presented or
performed their own identities in different manners, often due to the
differing norms and natures of the social spaces.70 The context collapse
of work and home, writ large across the world, will cause a fundamental
shift in our understanding of public and private spaces,71 as the office has
traditionally been a semi-public space, while the home is among our most
private of places.72 The shift to remote work, aided by omnipresent
monitoring and the use of video chat software, has eroded the line
between office and home and changed the way people present themselves
in these contexts. This shift in contextual understanding may change the
way we understand privacy in both work and home contexts even past the
pandemic.73 As society’s reasonable expectations of privacy shift, so too
will our legal interpretation of such understandings and how the law
should regulate technology and privacy.

69. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392-99 (2009) (advocating for taking cyber gender
harassment seriously as its societal prevalence increases).
70. See, e.g., danah boyd, Faceted Id/entity: Managing Representation in a Digital World, (Sept.
2002) (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (available at https://www.danah.org/papers/Thesis.FacetedIdentity.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR4Q-EKBW]).
71. See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 210 (2007)
(discussing the emergence of a new sense of social space and the ways in which these development
disrupt geographies of power); Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1537,
1542 (2019) (noting that the emergence of technosocial spaces leave users unprotected and
vulnerable to invasions of privacy and online harassment).
72. Anita L. Allen, The Declining Significance of Home: Privacy “Whilst Quiet” and of No Use
to Artists or Anyone, 4 J. HANNAH ARENDT CTR. FOR POL. & HUMANS. BARD COLL. 84, 85 (2016).
73. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 16 (2009) (discussing how this contextual understanding is affected by
scientific breakthroughs and historical contingencies).
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2. In-Person Corporate Surveillance
For workers not privileged enough to work safely indoors during the
pandemic, a mess of privacy problems have arisen during the pandemic.
Even as the pandemic subsides, some of these in-person surveillance
measures may continue, at least for a period of time. For example, we
may continue to see temperature checks or COVID-19 testing
enforcement for employees as businesses return to physical office spaces.
Companies have used digital technologies to surveil employees inperson for many years.74 For example, Amazon has been tracking
employee movement through mandatory digital-connected wristbands
since at least 2014.75 In response to pandemic concerns, companies have
also rolled out similar wearables to track employees and enforce social
distancing in the workplace.76
Factories and warehouses have become hot spots for infection and viral
transmission.77 In response, many corporations have instituted privacyinvasive programs in an attempt to ensure the safety of their workers,
products, and consumers. Some have required temperature testing before
entering the workspace, surveys asking employees for symptoms, and
contact tracing for any infected employees. In April 2020, the EEOC
released new guidance on employer responsibilities concerning COVID19 and ADA protections, suggesting that employers should be allowed to
administer COVID-19 testing to employees before they enter the
workplace to determine if they have the virus.78 While some employers

74. Lohr, supra note 50.
75. Yeginsu, supra note 50.
76. Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Buzzing Bracelets Could Become a Workplace
Accessory in the Coronavirus Era, WASH. POST (May 14, 2020, 8:15 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2020/05/14/thetechnology-202-buzzing-bracelets-could-become-a-workplace-accessory-in-the-coronavirusera/5ebc46fd88e0fa17cddfa4c0 [https://perma.cc/LLS8-HF74].
77. Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, South Dakota Meat Plant Is Now Country’s Biggest
Coronavirus Hot Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/us/
coronavirus-south-dakota-meat-plant-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/NU3V-CGLT]; Hannah
Dreier, ‘A Recipe For Disaster’: American Prison Factories Becoming Incubators for Coronavirus,
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-recipe-fordisaster-american-prison-factories-becoming-incubators-for-coronavirus/2020/04/21/071062d283f3-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html [https://perma.cc/7MN9-SJXQ]; Annie Palmer, As
Coronavirus Kills Another Amazon Worker, the Company’s Response Is Adding to Employees’
Fears, CNBC (May 6, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/amazon-worker-inillinois-dies-of-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/WP8U-YSKG].
78. What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other
EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-youshould-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws
[https://perma.cc/BQ69-CXXN] (Dec. 16, 2020).
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may have also considered the use of antibody tests or immunity passports,
neither type of program has emerged as a leading trend yet.
3. Digital Inequities
It is also important to note the disparate impact of employee
surveillance on different groups. For example, women may face more
negative consequences from abuse of their photos or video content
recorded in remote work settings.79 Privacy harms related to the
unwanted exposure of revealing or explicit personal content, in particular,
may have worse consequences for women.80 This may be more likely to
occur with greater use of remote work technologies. Home computing
devices and remote devices are likely less secure than devices routinely
maintained and updated on secure office networks in the workplace,
creating cybersecurity risks. Women, people of color, LGBT people, and
other people from marginalized groups also may face greater harassment
through remote work technologies, as they often face greater online
harassment through communication platforms.81 People from
marginalized groups already face discrimination in the workplace,82 so
they may be less able to fight back against encroaching employer privacy
invasions as well.
While white-collar workers may face digital surveillance through
remote work, it is possible that some of these surveillance methods will
decrease when workers return to the office. However, workers in different
settings, including factories and warehouses, are unlikely to see a change,
as they will continue to work in the same settings pre- and post-pandemic.
These workers are also likely to have less power in fighting back against
employer surveillance. Many of the people doing these jobs may belong
79. Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2000);
Citron, supra note 69, at 373.
80. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1870
(2019).
81. See Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, supra note 24, at 2058 (overviewing
a trend of public disclosure tort cases demonstrating that privacy law is often applied in a way that
has disparate negative impacts on certain marginalized populations); see also CITRON, supra note
24, at 11 (citing a national study of middle and high school students that found 45% of LGBT youth
who experienced cyber harassment felt depressed and more than 25% wrestled with suicidal
thoughts); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay
Online Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987, 987 (2019) (citing a study in which 15% of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual internet users reported that someone has threatened to share explicit
images of them online, and 7% say someone has actually done it).
82. Maryam Jameel & Joe Yerardi, Workplace Discrimination Is Illegal. But Our Data Shows
It’s Still a Huge Problem., VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/28/18241973/
workplace-discrimination-cpi-investigation-eeoc [https://perma. cc/K8ZR-8W5W] (Feb. 28, 2019,
8:29 AM).
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to lower income, rural, undocumented, formerly incarcerated, or other
marginalized groups in society. Low-income workers, contract workers,
and gig-economy workers often have to face greater privacy violations in
the course of business, with less power to fight against employer abuses.
Effectively, pandemic-driven employer surveillance may create even
greater inequalities in employee privacy, with higher-income and whitecollar workers suffering fewer privacy harms for potentially shorter time
periods.
Not only will people from already marginalized segments of society
face greater privacy harms related to technology uses by employers in a
public health emergency, but these privacy and labor harms are
compounded in complex ways for those who face discrimination and
disparate impacts due to more than one of their identities, creating
intersectional privacy harms that are often not considered in privacy laws.
Additionally, increased corporate surveillance, while worrisome for
employees, may also be harmful for corporations. Individuals need
privacy to be able to innovate,83 to produce the creative insights and work
that corporations need to be economically successful.
Gig-economy workers will also face disparate harms, as most are
considered independent contractors, without the benefits and protections
given to employees.84 The drastic fall in the economy in 2020 caused
millions of Americans to lose their jobs or face cuts in job hours,85
perhaps leading some to venture into gig-economy positions that may still
be functioning as “essential” work. Instacart, a gig-economy platform
that connects consumers with workers who shop and then deliver
groceries and other items from stores, saw an explosion in their workforce
and profits. In early May 2020, the company announced that it had
recruited 300,000 new workers in a month, with plans to hire 250,000; at
the same time the company also announced it had hit its sales goals
through 2022.86
83. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013) (“Privacy
incursions in the name of progress, innovation, and ordered liberty jeopardize the continuing
vitality of the political and intellectual culture that we say we value.”).
84. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1626 (2017).
85. Rachel Siegel & Andrew Van Dam, 3.8 Million Americans Sought Jobless Benefits Last
Week, Extending Pandemic’s Grip on the National Workforce, WASH. POST
(Apr. 30, 2020, 5:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/30/weekly-joblessclaims-unemployment [https://perma.cc/UX52-M2TW].
86. Tyler Sonnemaker, Instacart’s Army of Shoppers Has Exploded from 180,000 to 500,000
Since the Start of the Pandemic—And Some Workers Say It’s Making the Job More Difficult for
Everyone, MSN (May 8, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/instacarts-army-of-
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Gig-economy or sharing companies like Instacart often already
operated on an information asymmetry, profiting from the data gathered
on consumers and gig-economy workers alike, with their independentcontractor workers unable to fight against privacy invasions.87 Gigeconomy workers already have few privacy protections and are often
subject to surveillance and data collection and tracking from companies.
Many gig-economy workers are uniquely vulnerable, as they often have
difficulty finding other employment,88 so they have less ability to fight
against corporate privacy invasions. These privacy harms likely were
exacerbated or at least continued at a greater scale during the pandemic.
There is little incentive for these companies to increase privacy
protections, particularly as they are not treating gig-economy workers as
employees but rather as independent contractors. Gig-economy workers
often also face some of the same vulnerabilities as blue-collar workers,
and depending on the job, the groups often intersect, creating
intersectional harms that multiply for workers who experience
overlapping forms of vulnerability in the workplace.
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Employee Privacy
With employer surveillance as with government surveillance, we have
not necessarily seen new technologies develop in reaction to pandemic
needs. Rather, what has happened is a change in scale and rationale:
greater use of existing technologies for digital surveillance and a new
justification for use of these privacy-invasive technologies—a
phenomenon we already saw with government surveillance. Before the
pandemic, digital employee surveillance was often justified for economic
and efficiency reasons.89 Now, during the pandemic, employers are
justifying digital surveillance for reasons related to public health
(including the social health benefits of keeping remote coworkers
connected).90
shoppers-has-exploded-from-180000-to-500000-since-the-start-of-the-pandemic-and-someworkers-say-its-making-the-job-more-difficult-for-everyone/ar-BB13O564
[https://perma.cc/YY5Y-75XD].
87. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 84, at 1627, 1652–53 (positing that the “sharing
economy” is distinct from other, more traditional invasions of privacy in the marketplace, in part
because it gathers data on both customers and service providers and in turn creates more control of
the market).
88. See U.C. Santa Cruz, Already Vulnerable, Gig Economy Workers in SF Suffer During
Pandemic, Survey Finds, PHYS ORG (May 5, 2020), https://phys.org/news/2020-05-vulnerable-gigeconomy-workers-sf.html [https://perma.cc/65E4-BUE6] (discussing the finding that half of the
participants in a study of gig workers worked more than forty hours per week at an app-based job,
and that approximately one-fifth were making no profit or were losing money).
89. Ajunwa et al., supra note 51, at 743.
90. Harwell, supra note 57.
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Scholars have called for greater legal protections for employees
against corporate surveillance. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Jason Schultz, and Kate
Crawford jointly proposed three solutions: (1) an omnibus federal
information-privacy law that would include employee protections; (2) a
sector-specific Employee Privacy Protection Act; or (3) a more limited,
sector-specific and context-specific Employee Health Information
Privacy Act.91 For Ajunwa et al., “the protection of workers’ privacy is a
civil rights issue: both for the protection of human dignity rights and
because privacy invasions can serve as vehicles for unlawful
discrimination.”92 Employee health information is particularly important
to protect in the midst of a public health emergency, but generally, the
privacy rights of employees are something the law should take pains to
protect, given the power asymmetry between employers and employees.
It appears likely that employee surveillance will continue. If anything,
the rise in employee surveillance during this pandemic will likely raise
the floor for employee surveillance after the pandemic is over. Thus, it
will become even more important for privacy law to protect workers.
Lawmakers in the United States should include specific employee-centric
provisions in future national privacy regulation. Additionally, laws like
HIPAA and GINA93 can be amended to strengthen protections employees
have against employer collection, use, and sharing of their health and
genetic data.
While many advocates have called for greater privacy protections of
employees, employers now have new justification for digital surveillance
programs. With the public health crisis still in full swing, it is likely that
public health rationales will prove persuasive, allowing employers to
expand surveillance programs. Even after the pandemic subsides, these
changes in employment-surveillance norms will likely have long-term
effects. Privacy norms and societal expectations of privacy will shift,
paving the way for even more employee surveillance in the future.
C. Education Privacy in Pandemic
In response to the pandemic, both public and private schools in many
states and municipalities have shut down, including K–12 schools as well
as higher-education settings.94 In early March 2020, ABC News
91. Ajunwa et al., supra note 51, at 772–73.
92. Id. at 740.
93. Infra notes 192 and 194 and accompanying text.
94. See Education and COVID-19: Focusing on the Long-Term Impact of School Closures,
OECD (June 29, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/education-and-covid19-focusing-on-the-long-term-impact-of-school-closures-2cea926e/
[https://perma.cc/A8KS-
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estimated more than 290 million students worldwide have had school
disrupted due to COVID-19.95 As schools have closed physical, in-person
spaces, many have shifted to remote, online teaching. With that shift has
come a natural change in relationships with privacy and technology on
the part of students, parents and guardians of younger students, educators,
and educational institutions.
Student privacy has long been an issue in an era of digital learning and
connected tools. From the ill-fated One Laptop per Child program96 to
more successful efforts to innovate in the classroom, technology has
changed the face of education in modern society. Changes in society at
large have also changed education technology. For example, the rise of
wireless and broadband access to the internet, as well as increased access
to mobile devices, has allowed for education services to proliferate
online. Technology-fueled educational trends include learning apps like
Duolingo, massive open online courses (MOOCs) and other “virtual
learning environments,”97 as well as free, open-knowledge resources like
Wikipedia. All of these new technological innovations come with their
own privacy issues.
Additionally, many students have faced a loss of physical education
privacy, as many have been forced to move home or stay home, losing
the physical privacy a school or library may have provided.
The primary laws protecting student privacy in the United States
include the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),98 which
protects children’s online privacy, and the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA),99 which protects student records held by public
institutions. These laws generally target privacy protection to specifically
protect the privacy of a class of users (children), a type of data (student
records), or a setting (educational institutions receiving federal funding).
However, these and other privacy laws do not protect a broader
conception of educational privacy, which includes protection of the social

ZW65] (“The COVID-19 crisis has forced school closures in 188 countries, heavily disrupting the
learning process of more than 1.7 billion children, youth, and their families.”).
95. Kelly McCarthy, The Global Impact of Coronavirus on Education, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2020, 1:54 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/global-impact-coronaviruseducation/story?id=69411738 [https://perma.cc/FA2V-3S2Z].
96. See generally MORGAN AMES, THE CHARISMA MACHINE (2019).
97. Elana Zeide & Helen Nissenbaum, Learner Privacy in MOOCs and Virtual Education, 16
THEORY & RSCH. EDUC. 280, 280 (2018).
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
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space (physical or virtual) necessary for students and educators to freely
engage in the pursuit of knowledge.100
Julie E. Cohen has argued for privacy as a right that protects the ability
for individuals to creatively explore and develop their identities.101 Neil
Richards has identified the right to intellectual privacy, the privacy
necessary to safeguard our intellectual thoughts and develop new ideas
freely.102 Ari Ezra Waldman has called for privacy law to protect “safe
social spaces,” defined as “environments of information exchange in
which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by norms of trust backed
endogenously by design and exogenously by law.”103 Building on these
concepts, we ought to understand educational privacy as a distinct
privacy right that safeguards the ability for students to safely explore
ideas and knowledge and to develop their intellectual and personal selves,
as well as the ability for educators and researchers to facilitate and
participate in intellectual endeavors in the education context. This
educational privacy right should be linked to the essential purpose for
education to provide social space for students to learn and grow through
learning, for educators to impart knowledge and foster intellectual
growth, and for researchers to produce and disseminate knowledge.
During the pandemic, privacy issues with remote learning technologies
and innovations have only increased,104 as more students and learners are
pushed to take learning from the physical to digital realm. Students have
lost much of their educational privacy interest, harms sometimes
aggravated and sometimes ameliorated by use of technologies.
1. Education Technology
Shifting education to remote, online spaces has led to an explosion in
the use of education-surveillance technology, including software
installed on school-sanctioned devices that can track the activity of
students using the device. This category of privacy-violating technology
also includes exam-proctoring software,105 like Proctorio, a program that
100. See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 189–90 (2008) (arguing that an exclusive focus on the privacy threat of being watched ignores
the danger that certain spaces will become privacy-free zones through other means).
101. Cohen, supra note 83, at 1906.
102. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (2008).
103. Waldman, supra note 71, at 1541.
104. Jane Bailey et al., Children’s Privacy Is at Risk with Rapid Shifts to Online Schooling
Under
Coronavirus,
CONVERSATION
(Apr.
21,
2020,
10:08
AM),
https://theconversation.com/childrens-privacy-is-at-risk-with-rapid-shifts-to-online-schoolingunder-coronavirus-135787 [https://perma.cc/ZBB5-M4RY].
105. Monica Chin, Exam Anxiety: How Remote Test-Proctoring Is Creeping Students Out,
VERGE (Apr. 29, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/29/21232777/examityremote-test-proctoring-online-class-education [https://perma.cc/W93U-KDAN].
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uses facial-detection software to monitor students taking an exam online
by tracking eye movements, background activity, and noise—all through
access to the student’s camera and microphone.106 These programs can
collect many forms of data from students, including photos, video
recordings of students at their computers, voice data, browsing history,
keystroke data, and more.107
The increased use and reliance on digital-education technology tools
has raised concerns for privacy. Many of these programs have come
under fire in the early phases of the pandemic for a wide variety of
privacy and security concerns. Zoom, a remote videoconferencing
application, found itself the subject of investigation by the New York
Attorney General’s Office for privacy concerns,108 and the city of New
York temporarily stopped use of Zoom for all public schools.109 Some of
the privacy harms from this shift to online learning could be ameliorated
by focusing more attention on asynchronous learning as opposed to live
sessions where students must log in and potentially have video and audio
on. Asynchronous learning could also aid in lessening unequal access to
education in times of public health crisis and the effects of the digital
divide.110
106. Jake Evans, ANU to Use Facial Detection Software on Student Computers in Response to
Coronavirus Remote Exams, ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-0420/coronavirus-anu-to-use-ai-spying-software-on-student-computers/12164324
[https://perma.cc/FKB7-SH37].
107. See Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding Classroom: Surveillance in K–12
Public Schools, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1673, 1673 (2019) (describing the many ways in which K–12
students are subjected to surveillance, and the uninformed and largely nonconsensual data
collection).
108. Danny Hakim & Natasha Singer, New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/technology/newyork-attorney-general-zoom-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/JXG5-45HK]; Lauren Feiner, Zoom
Strikes a Deal with NY AG Office, Closing the Inquiry Into Its Security Problems, CNBC (May 7,
2020, 3:54 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/zoom-strikes-a-deal-with-ny-ag-officeclosing-security-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/F2TM-WC9S].
109. Valerie Strauss, School Districts, Including New York City’s, Start Banning Zoom Because
of
Online
Security
Issues,
WASH. POST
(Apr.
4,
2020,
12:31
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/04/04/school-districts-including-new-yorkcitys-start-banning-zoom-because-online-security-issues [https://perma.cc/ALQ2-S2TZ].
110. See, e.g., Kelly A. Hogan & Viji Sathy, 8 Ways to Be More Inclusive in Your Zoom
Teaching, CHRONICLE (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/8-Ways-to-Be-MoreInclusive-in/248460 [https://perma.cc/3AJH-XDVF] (suggesting the use of asynchronous materials
such as recorded lectures to accommodate and welcome students who may have unstable internet
access or living situations); see also Hannah Natanson, Live vs. Tape-Delayed: How Two
Approaches to Online Learning Change Life for Teachers and Students, WASH. POST (Apr. 28,
2020, 5:34 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/live-vs-tape-delayed-how-twoapproaches-to-online-learning-change-life-for-teachers-and-students/2020/04/25/250fb7d0-7bfe11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html [https://perma.cc/3JKU-8ABH] (profiling two neighboring
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Additionally, using digital platforms for learning comes with potential
for harassment and abuse. Early in the pandemic, the phenomenon known
as “Zoombombing” emerged, as bad actors began to use Zoom as a venue
for harassment and disruption.111 A Connecticut teen was charged with
computer crime for Zoombombing—in this case, entering a high school’s
online classes and disrupting them with obscene language and hand
gestures.112 Harmful activity on Zoom and other online videoconferencing platforms reached a high enough threshold that the FBI
released an article113 on defending against these attacks, and the
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Critical
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published guidance on this issue
as well.114
Just as the shift to remote online work has changed the boundaries
between work and home, affecting the way society understands these two
separate contexts and the corresponding expectations of privacy in
each,115 so has the shift to remote education changed the boundaries
between school and home. Students have certain expectations of privacy
in the educational setting. At the very least, there is an expectation,
especially among older K–12 students and higher-education students, that
schools offer spaces for private exploration of ideas and identities and
learning without undue interference from family.116 For college students,
school districts that chose two different approaches to remote learning—synchronous and
asynchronous—to attempt to address inequities).
111. David Z. Morris, Zoom Meetings Keep Getting Hacked. Here’s How to Prevent ‘Zoom
Bombing’ on Your Video Chats, FORTUNE (Apr. 2, 2020, 2:45 PM),
https://fortune.com/2020/04/02/zoom-bombing-what-is-meeting-hacked-how-to-preventvulnerability-is-zoom-safe-video-chats [https://perma.cc/X5DF-BVGT]; see, e.g., Hannah Sparks,
Trolls Crash Zoom Alcoholics Anonymous Meetings: ‘Alcohol Is Soooo Good’, N.Y. POST (Apr. 2,
2020, 11:55 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/04/02/trolls-crash-zoom-aa-meetings-alcohol-issoooo-good [https://perma.cc/2NVX-7393] (describing a rash of incursions on Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings held via Zoom).
112. Teen Arrested After ‘Zoom Bombing’ High School Classes, N.Y. POST (Apr. 8, 2020,
9:41 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/04/08/teen-arrested-after-zoom-bombing-high-school-classes
[https://perma.cc/EPD6-X9AV].
113. Press Release, Kristen Setera, FBI Boston, FBI Warns of Teleconferencing and Online
Classroom Hijacking During COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-teleconferencing-and-online-classroomhijacking-during-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2SQ8-QWU8].
114. FBI Releases Guidance on Defending Against VTC Hijacking and Zoom-Bombing,
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Sec. Agency (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/currentactivity/2020/04/02/fbi-releases-guidance-defending-against-vtc-hijacking-and-zoom
[https://perma.cc/WRC7-KPS6].
115. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 73, at 3 (arguing that privacy is not an absolute but is contextspecific and related to norms around certain societal settings).
116. See Cohen, supra note 82, at 1905 (“Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity from
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this often meant an entirely separate physical surrounding for the many
who lived in school dorms or on their own in college towns.
Even for those living at home, schools provided spaces where students
could expect to listen to lectures with a certain sense of privacy from
some parties (namely, family). On the verso, students previously had an
expectation of privacy regarding the separation of their home from their
schools. They could reasonably expect that they would be able to protect
information about their homes from the eyes of their fellow students or
educators. However, now, the pandemic has changed our society’s
understanding of schools and homes as spaces117 and has blurred the
divide between school and home, resulting in new understandings of what
should be a reasonable expectation of privacy in either context.118
Education technologies like Zoom are not new, but the scale at which
they are being used is new, as most schools around the world shut down
physical campuses for some period of time during the pandemic. It is
possible that more schools will rely on distance education in the future,
perhaps due to familiarity gained by faculty, staff, and students during
the pandemic. As such, these technologies—and their impact on
privacy—will become even more important in the future.
2. In-Person Campus Surveillance
As schools attempt to reopen in full or in part, a number have proposed
in-person testing requirements, such as temperature scanning, COVID19 virus testing, or possibly immunity passports or other verification.119
The purported goals are to help recreate or retain the benefits of having
the efforts of commercial and government actors to render individuals and communities fixed,
transparent, and predictable. It protects the situated practices of boundary management through
which the capacity for self-determination develops.”).
117. See Cohen, supra note 71, at 211 (exploring theories about the nature of “cyberspace,”
including the theory that it is essentially different from “real spaces”); Waldman, supra note 71, at
1540 (“Spaces become social when they are constructed by persons engaged in information
exchange.”).
118. See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 73.
119. See, e.g., Jenna Zibton, Virginia Schools Preparing for a Variety of Scenarios When
Students Return in the Fall, WSLS 10 NEWS, https://www.wsls.com/news/local/2020/05/12/
virginia-schools-preparing-for-many-scenarios-when-students-return-in-the-fall
[https://perma.cc/7GM4-S7RK] (July 24, 2020, 11:23 AM) (interviewing educators contemplating
when and how to take students’ temperatures before they go to class); Screening K–12 Students for
Symptoms of COVID-19: Limitations and Considerations, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/schoolschildcare/symptom-screening.html [https://perma.cc/ZX5C-TT43] (Mar. 17, 2021); Interim
Guidance for SARS-CoV-2 Testing and Screening at Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs), CTR.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/colleges-universities/ihe-testing.html [https://perma.cc/9D4E-F6DG] (Mar. 17,
2021).
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physical school spaces, including reducing the disparate impact on
marginalized students who are harmed more by the shutting down of
schools.
However, increased testing and data collection on campus can have a
harmful impact on privacy rights for students and staff in educational
institutions. First, any new collection of data will create risks of data
exposure, including to hackers and bad actors. Second, testing on campus
would come with the same issues related to COVID-19 testing in general,
as would immunity passports or other forms of COVID-related medical
verification used on campus. This increase in health data collection would
be in addition to existing collection of health data in schools, including
some schools’ requirements for students to submit vaccination
information.
What would differentiate these privacy-invasive measures from other,
perhaps more controversial, forms of surveillance and data collection
would be the educational context and the educational institution as the
primary data controller and possibly the primary physical point of data
collection. This narrows the field for regulatory solutions slightly, as
some of the privacy harms can be stemmed solely by regulating
educational instructions and educational privacy rights. Here, laws like
FERPA and HIPAA may apply in only a limited manner.
Increasing surveillance in person on campus could lead to a loss in
students’ expectations of privacy. Students may feel like they have less
privacy on campus due to an increased surveillance apparatus present
throughout the campus experience. This could lead to a loss in perceived
educational privacy protections, making students less willing or able to
pursue their intellectual interests and develop their knowledge and skills.
While the law does not address the educational privacy of faculty or staff
(preferring instead to protect their privacy through employee privacy
laws), individuals working at educational institutions also may suffer
privacy loss from increased surveillance as well. The privacy harms
incurred may be distinct from general employee privacy harms, as they
could relate specifically to the educational enterprise—the pursuit of
intellectual interests and the creation and dissemination of knowledge.
3. Digital Inequities
Distance learning produces a potentially discriminatory impact on
some individuals. The shift to online learning exposes in even starker
terms the digital divide, highlighting those who live in “digital poverty,”
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with less or no access to the internet or computing devices.120 An
estimated 17% of students nationwide lack access to a computer at home,
and 18% lack access to broadband internet at home.121 Before the
pandemic, many of these students could have taken classes in person and
relied on libraries, cafes, and other spaces for free or low-cost access to
the internet and computers. During the pandemic, these options
evaporated, worsening the already-problematic digital divide.122
The shift to remote education has also caused unequal privacy harms
that have impacted groups in disparate ways. Privacy-invasive education
surveillance systems often require access to devices and the internet,
which can further exacerbate digital inequalities. Students who lack
stable internet access (e.g., students without stable housing) have not
been able to participate in school and related education activities that now
moved online, effectively cutting them off from both education and the
social benefits of schooling. Similar problems have faced students who
do not have access to their own computer or mobile device, some of
whom must share limited remote-computing equipment with multiple
family members. Privacy-invasive software that scans activities and files
on devices will thus harm the privacy both of the student as well as
anyone else using the device, creating disparate privacy harms for lowincome families who share devices.

120. See Deborah Brown, Closing the ‘Digital Divide’ Critical in COVID-19 Response, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/25/closing-digitaldivide-critical-covid-19-response [https://perma.cc/S267-3U98] (“One in five school aged children
in the United States don’t have access to a computer or high-speed internet at home.”); Dana
Goldstein et al., As School Moves Online, Many Students Stay Logged Out, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/coronavirus-schools-attendance-absent.html
[https://perma.cc/5XQQ-LKEQ] (Apr. 8, 2020) (reporting that pandemic absence rates have been
highest in schools with large numbers of low-income students); Nicole Gaudiano, Coronavirus
Quarantines Could Rob Poor, Rural Students of Access to Education, POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2020,
1:49 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/10/coronavirus-quarantines-rural-students125048 [https://perma.cc/3UFK-Z783] (referring to a “homework gap” caused by differences in
internet access, starting prior to the pandemic); AFP, Poor U.S. Students Miss Out As Virtual
Learning
Sharpens
Divide,
BANGKOK
POST
(Apr.
18,
2020),
https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1902430/poor-us-students-miss-out-as-virtual-learningsharpens-divide [https://perma.cc/8QT9-NWCZ] (reporting that in mid-April, 7,400 Los Angeles
students had not logged on once to remote learning platforms); Shoshana Wodinsky, Not Everyone
Can Go to School Online, GIZMODO (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://gizmodo.com/not-everyonecan-go-to-school-online-1842726588 [https://perma.cc/4YV4-EQLY] (“[T]he absentee-rate gap
between high-poverty and low-poverty students has never been higher.”).
121. Millions of Kids Are Struggling in School Because They Don’t Have Internet Access at
Home, MKT. WATCH (June 10, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nearly-3million-students-in-the-us-struggle-to-keep-up-in-school-due-to-lack-of-home-internet-2019-0610 [https://perma.cc/QCP9-4F42].
122. Goldstein et al., supra note 120.
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Not only does a rapid, unplanned shift to online learning
disproportionately harm the privacy interests of some students, but the
loss of a private educational space may also impact some students more
than others. Students who may have been able to pursue study of subjects
independent of family considerations now lose the privacy of having
separate educational spaces. Consider the closeted gay teen studying
LGBT history in defiance of religious conservative parents. Now, the
student must do all his research and classes from home, on shared
devices, forcing him to risk unintended exposure to his family and the
accompanying social consequences in order to explore his intellectual
interests and identity.
With the shift to online learning, students are unable to protect the
divide between their home and school spaces. Students must face the
context collapse of school and family spaces blending together, which
could disadvantage some students more than others. Students in families
facing more financial stress in this time are at a disadvantage. 123 Older
students may be pressed to take on more work hours to make up for lost
wages from other family members. Younger students may lack the
parental supervision necessary for setting up and engaging in remote
education.124 For example, someone has to make sure to turn on the
computer and connect to the online video session at the right times every
day. Parents of neurodiverse children may have even more
responsibilities with online learning.125 All of these personal financial
circumstances may now be made public, or at least become visible to
fellow students and educators, as the privacy-invasive nature of education

123. See Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Ruth Igielnik, Most Parents of K–12 Students Learning
Online Worry About Them Falling Behind, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/10/29/most-parents-of-k-12-students-learning-online-worry-about-them-falling-behind/ [https://perma.cc/JLV7-7H8B] (showing that about two-thirds of parents of K–12 students have an adult in their household providing additional instruction or resources to their child,
but only 7 to 8% of lower-income families have been able to hire this additional person, compared
to 19% of upper-income families).
124. See New Survey Shows Parents' Top Challenges with Online Learning, CISION PR
NEWSWIRE (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-survey-shows-parents-top-challenges-with-online-learning-301049124.html [https://perma.cc/3Q9A-5F5J] (reporting the survey results from a study conducted by the education platform, Canvas, including that
“[p]arents of young children disproportionately report that they struggle balancing their work/daytime responsibilities and their child(ren)’s schooling (51% for kindergarteners and 46% for elementary schoolers, compared to 38% for all respondents).”).
125. See Carrie Goldman, Distance Learning Not Working? Here Are Strategies to Try, WASH.
POST (Dec. 1, 2020, 8:00 AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2020/12/01/remotelearning-strategies-covid-parenting/ [https://perma.cc/8XU5-KVYF] (reporting how families with
neurodiverse children have had to compromise their own employment pursuits in order to ensure
their child was adequately supported).
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technologies exposes situational factors like whether a parent is
consistently able to help a younger student during class.
The increased use of remote communication technologies in education
also creates disadvantages for some students, based on income and
socioeconomic status.126 Consider the student living in a
multigenerational household with parents, grandparents, and multiple
siblings all in one small apartment, where it may be difficult to find any
space quiet and isolated enough to participate fully in online classes or to
do online study, even during the times the student is able to wrangle the
family’s single computer for use. This student might not have steady WiFi access or may be defaulting to a limited mobile data plan for accessing
the internet. This student would be at a profound disadvantage compared
to a classmate who had access to better technology and home support.
The sudden move to online learning has also forced many students to
suffer privacy harms due to context collapse. Students learning online
through video communications technologies must now allow their fellow
students and teachers into the privacy of their homes, including (for
some) whatever objects are in viewing distance of their computers.
Students who live in physical settings without the space and quiet
necessary for learning via distance education have been placed at a
disadvantage. Some students may feel a sense of shame about showing
photos or videos of their home environments to other students. Consider
the lower-income scholarship student at a private school who must now
virtually invite their wealthier peers to view their home. This student may
previously have been able to nurture an identity independent of family in
the educational space. However, due to the pandemic context collapse,
this student no longer has that ability—a privacy harm that may
disproportionately affect those students who previously relied on hiding
their home lives from peers and teachers in school. Fortunately,
technology can also be used to help ameliorate some of these harms. For
example, students have taken to using Zoom virtual backgrounds to keep
their homes from public view even while on video chat.127
Many students will suffer disparate harms in this time of pandemic.
Not only will lower income students face financial stresses with less
ability to fight against privacy invasions,128 but students who are
126. See Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389,
1403-04 (2012) (detailing the disparity between high- and middle-income Americans, and lowincome Americans with respect to privacy and the negative effects of violations of privacy).
127. Zita Fontaine, Zoom’s Virtual Backgrounds Help Fight Inequality, MEDIUM (Apr. 12,
2020), https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/zooms-virtual-backgrounds-help-fight-inequality624da895634e [https://perma.cc/LMY7-UWHC].
128. Gilman, supra note 126, at 1403–04.
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themselves parents will face greater burdens as they attempt to navigate
their studies (and sometimes work) at the same time as handling
childcare. Even in households where both parents work from home,
women have still been doing more childcare and more household work
during the pandemic era.129 This means disproportionate harm to female
students,130 as they will have less time to keep up with schoolwork
compared to their male peers. This sharp inequality will also be reflected
in more burdens on women who must parent children as they navigate
new education technologies when schools are shut down.131 Women may
be found to be less productive than their peers as both students and
workers who happen to be parents of students.132 Women likely will bear
the bulk of the burden in supporting their children in transitioning to
remote learning technologies and will likely then suffer unique and
disproportionate privacy harms133 related to the use of such
technologies.134
Students, parents, and educators may all face disparate harms due to
COVID-19 as well as the push to online learning aided by new
technologies. These harms may fall upon those who belong to lowincome, rural, undocumented, disabled, or other groups. An additional
harm may simply be that students will be pressed to disclose their
conditions to educators, fellow students, and administrators during this
time. For example, students with some “hidden” disabilities may be
forced to ask for accommodations, if their disabilities make remote
distance learning difficult.135 This disclosure can lead to a loss of privacy

129. Claire Cain Miller, Nearly Half of Men Say They Do Most of the Home Schooling. Three
Percent
of
Women
Agree.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/upshot/pandemic-chores-homeschooling-gender.html
[https://perma.cc/N9WG-FGPC].
130. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina & Lisa Lerer, When Mom’s Zoom Meeting Is the One That Has
to Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/womencoronavirus-2020.html [https://perma.cc/M55F-ZFQL] (discussing the common phenomenon of
women being expected to handle childcare, household organization, and emotional labor in addition
to their professional duties while working or attending school remotely).
131. Miller, supra note 129.
132. Colleen Flaherty, No Room of One’s Own, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/04/21/early-journal-submission-data-suggest-covid19-tanking-womens-research-productivity [https://perma.cc/KHU8-5RVP].
133. ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 123–25
(1988).
134. CITRON, supra note 24, at 14–15; Allen, supra note 79, at 1177–79.
135. Johnathan Custodio, Disabled Students Already Faced Learning Barriers. Then
Coronavirus Forced an Abrupt Shift to Online Classes., CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Disabled-Students-Already/248444 [https://perma.cc/VNQ4ZEXS].
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and a sense of lack of control over one’s own personal health information,
financial information, or more.
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Education Privacy
a. Existing Protections Are Not Enough
The educational privacy interests of students are particularly important
to safeguard in a public health emergency. As Elana Zeide writes,
students may themselves be an especially vulnerable population when it
comes to privacy.136 Many students are children, a class the law has
consistently recognized as deserving of particular protections, including
within U.S. privacy jurisprudence.137 Students often have little choice
regarding the educational-privacy practices of their schools.138 As Zeide
notes, FERPA and similar state laws “were designed for a world of paper
records, not networked, cloud-based platforms that collect information
automatically”139—i.e., the very platforms being utilized at great scale by
educational institutions during this shift to online learning.
Only public educational institutions, or institutions that receive public
funding, are subject to FERPA.140 FERPA imposes certain obligations on
public and private educational institutions that receive federal funding, as
well as (by proxy) institutions that receive data from them.141 FERPA
imposes restrictions on access and transfer of student data and allows
students and parents certain rights regarding student data. However,
FERPA only applies to institutions receiving federal funding.142 During
the pandemic, most schools, public and private, transitioned to online
learning. Many schools, public or private, have also relied on private
education-technology companies.143 While the data collected and
transmitted by the institution would be protected under FERPA, public

136. Elana Zeide, Education Technology and Student Privacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
CONSUMER PRIVACY 70, 70 (Evan Selinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene eds., 2018)
(“[S]tudent privacy protects particularly vulnerable individuals—maturing children and developing
learners.”).
137. See The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505
(outlining the privacy protections due to children).
138. Zeide, supra note 136, at 70.
139. Id. at 79–80.
140. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2021).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Tony Wan, US Edtech Raises $803M in First Half of 2020 As COVID-19 Forces
Learning Online, EDSURGE (July 29, 2020), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2020-07-29-usedtech-raises-803m-in-first-half-of-2020-as-covid-19-forces-learning-online
[https://perma.cc/GT4T-HWZU] (discussing the growth of online educational services during the
pandemic).
OF
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institutions may still be encouraging use of private companies’
technologies, which would not necessarily be covered, depending on how
data is collected from students. Zeide notes that the institutional reliance
on FERPA creates undue burden for students, parents, and educators, and
fails to protect the privacy of students.144
Second, FERPA only applies to certain educational student records and
not all student data collected in the course of educational experience. For
example, while student grades would be considered data covered under
FERPA, photos of students taken during exam monitoring might not.145
Third, FERPA allows for a variety of permitted disclosures of student
records, including to other organizations acting on behalf of the school
for legitimate purposes. With more parties having access to student data,
it is more difficult to safeguard the privacy of students. Additionally, new
forms of data are being generated that may or may not be considered
protectable under FERPA. Consider, for example, screenshots of Zoom
sessions that include small profile photos or live camera of students.
While school photographs can be protectable under FERPA, this new
class of content or data may not be. FERPA is rather limited in scope and
does rather little to protect students or their parents and guardians from
the privacy impacts of the pandemic-fueled shifts in use of technology.146
Many education technology companies will have to comply with
privacy laws and general consumer protection laws. In the United States,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has regulatory authority over
privacy practices, related to the commission’s section 5 authority to
enforce against unfair and deceptive practices.147 FTC authority would
extend to companies and services like Zoom, WebEx, Google
Classrooms, and exam-monitoring companies. For these education
companies and platforms, the FTC could still enforce similar privacy
protections as it would in other sectors. Education technology companies
thus have to adhere to similar standards as all companies regarding
privacy, including posting privacy notices and (importantly) not violating
any of the terms that they set out in their privacy notices or terms of
service. If a company were found to have not upheld the representations

144. Elana Zeide, Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond FERPA
and FIPPs, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 344 (2016).
145. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4).
146. Zeide, supra note 144, at 362–64 (discussing the lack of language giving protection to
students regarding technology).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 45; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 n.2 (2014).
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they made out to consumers in their terms, the FTC would have authority
to enforce judgments against them.148
Additionally, for education settings involving children, additional
federal and state legal protections would apply for children’s privacy. The
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) protects the privacy
of children under thirteen. Under COPPA, companies must adhere to a
set of standards, including posting visible privacy policies149 and
obtaining verifiable parental consent before collecting the data of
children under thirteen.150 Parents and guardians of children under
thirteen also have special rights under COPPA, including a right to revoke
consent at any time and request that a company delete their child’s data.
Some states also have special protections for children’s privacy.151 For
example, California’s “eraser law” allows children under eighteen to
request companies delete their data, among other rights.152
However, even with existing protections, privacy laws in the United
States are insufficient to protect privacy, for consumers as students and
as individuals. Private-sector privacy laws do not sufficiently protect
against the harms of Big Data and the downstream harms of data that may
be abused or used against a person after sale, transfer, aggregation,
reidentification, or more.153 U.S. privacy law must safeguard civil
liberties against the threat of data brokers and the data economy.
Individuals need a way to legally seek recourse for distributed
downstream data harms, including harms compounded by biased or faulty
algorithmic systems.154 One way to do this is to create better laws
addressing algorithmic harms, allowing individuals to seek redress for
incorrectly made algorithmic decisions that impact fundamental rights,
for example. Algorithmic accountability laws could impose transparency,
accountability, and privacy obligations on companies or agencies
operating in particular sectors, particularly those in which decisions could
impact civil rights or civil liberties, including housing and employment.

148. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
150. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
151. § 6504.
152. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–22582 (West 2020).
153. Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1127–
28 (2015).
154. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 674 (2016).
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b. A Right to Educational Privacy
Current laws dealing with education and privacy protect privacy rights
based on types of data subjects: students, consumers, and so on. However,
these laws do not protect the right of an individual to have the
environmental privacy necessary for pursuing a path of education. The
laws do not protect the privacy provided by the specific context or social
space of education—the physical presence of a school or education
institution, or an educational platform that allows for individualized
learning. Education privacy laws generally also do not protect the
educational privacy rights of educators or researchers, who also benefit
from the privacy of physical education spaces.
The use of education technologies in times of pandemic has exposed
the need for an updated right to educational privacy. The increased use of
new education technologies, the public-private hybrid nature of many
education technology platforms, and the unique vulnerabilities of the
student population give rise to the need for a new right to educational
privacy, a right the law should protect in addition to protections for
children and existing protections for student privacy in public institutions.
Some, including Khalilah Barnes, have even called for the creation of a
Students’ Bill of Rights,155 protecting key rights like privacy.
The heightened sensitivities of the pandemic era expose a number of
gaps in the legal protections for students. First, there should be more legal
limitations on private educational institutions collecting, using, and
sharing student data. FERPA protections do not apply to most collection
of student data done by private platforms. In addition to relevant privacy
obligations under COPPA and general privacy laws, educational
institutions (public or private) should be held to a higher standard. The
law should recognize the school or the educational institution as a specific
place and context, with specific privacy expectations that are different
from other business contexts.
Additionally, the increased use of educational technologies has
exposed the necessity of addressing the disparate harms suffered by
people from various marginalized communities as a result of reliance on
new technologies. New privacy laws should take care to address the
special needs of different students—for example, protecting against
online harassment, which disproportionately affects some groups.
Students from marginalized populations may have special needs when it
155. Valerie Strauss, Why a “Student Privacy Bill of Rights” Is Desperately Needed, WASH.
POST (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2014/03/06/why-a-student-privacy-bill-of-rights-is-desperately-needed
[https://perma.cc/L3GQ-H9K4].
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comes to educational privacy, including the need to have private space—
digital or offline—when private space is at a premium at home.
Laws narrowly tailored to address the space necessary for educational
privacy should allow for innovation across education sectors, including
private-sector educational platforms. The law should recognize the
educational-privacy interests that students have in protecting the privacy
of their educational paths and learning processes, to aid in independent
exploration of ideas and personal and educational development.156
Protecting educational privacy as a distinct right would acknowledge that
students of all ages, in public and private institutions, have a privacy
interest linked specifically to the concept of education as requiring
intellectual freedom.
Furthermore, educational privacy should encompass privacy
protection for educators and researchers as well, as all are part of the
larger knowledge production system. To protect the social space of
education, we should honor and protect the privacy necessary for
students, educators, and researchers to teach, learn, create, discover, and
share knowledge.
D. Technologies in the Social Sphere
Remote-communication technologies have been used to a great extent
in employment and education settings in response to the changes in
society caused by the pandemic. However, technologies like Zoom,
Google Hangouts, and other remote-communication technologies have
also been used to increased effect by ordinary human beings outside of
their roles as employees or students, outside of the contexts of work or
school.157 All of these technologies come with privacy and security
issues,158 some of which have been discussed above. It is important to
discuss the impact the pandemic has had on society’s relationship with
privacy and technology, on an individual, human level.
1. Remote-Connection Technologies
As the pandemic has enforced social distancing conditions, humans
have turned to technologies to stay in touch and maintain social
relationships. This has included use of mobile phones and connected

156. Cohen, supra note 83, at 1096–08; Richards, supra note 102, at 388–90.
157. Taylor Lorenz et al., We Live in Zoom Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/style/zoom-parties-coronavirus-memes.html
[https://perma.cc/AE3Z-L6CE]; Cohen, supra note 83, at 1096–08; Richards, supra note 102, at
388–90.
158. St. John, supra note 64.
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devices to communicate, whether through text messaging, phone calls,159
video calls, and more. In early April, Verizon reported an average of 800
million wireless calls a day during the week—more than double the
number of calls usually made on Mother’s Day (often one of the busiest
days of the year for phone calls).160 In the same time period, internet
traffic rose twenty to twenty-five percent more than typical for the
time.161
Increased use of phones, home internet connections, mobile devices,
and Voice Over IP programs means an increase in risk exposure for
consumers in regard to the privacy risks associated with these
technologies. For example, the privacy risks associated with phone calls
include potential for wiretapping and upstream surveillance from telecom
providers as well as governments, who have many avenues of access to
phone data.162
The pandemic has also caused a shift in interpersonal privacy, the
privacy that exists within social relationships. Social distancing has
meant that more socialization has shifted to the online space, including
gatherings of friends and family. Additionally, remote technologies have
been used for dating and romantic relationships. In a time when people
have been encouraged to stay at home and to maintain physical distance
from others when outside the home, many have turned to online chat,
SMS, voice, and video chat to engage in romantic activities.163 The
159. Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html
[https://perma.cc/N3LT-H344]; Return of the Phone Call: Why Talking Beats Texting When You’re
in
Isolation,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/mar/17/return-of-the-phone-call-why-talkingbeats-texting-when-youre-in-isolation [https://perma.cc/DT2G-58YT].
160. Kang, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., It's Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz,
Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 9–10 (2016) (finding that as
encryption tools become more sophisticated and readily available, law enforcement will likely resort to more invasive tactics in order to obtain access to phone calls and texts and that the metadata
they discover may reveal even more about suspects’ private lives than their communications alone).
163. Olivia Carville & Nate Lanxon, How to Date Online in the Age of Covid-19, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-20/online-dating-in-apandemic-coronavirus-keeps-singles-apart [https://perma.cc/T5BG-8NXV]; Vijai Nathan, Date
Lab:
Our
First
Virtual
Date,
WASH.
POST
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/date-lab-our-first-virtualdate/2020/05/05/95f1aaca-7e5c-11ea-a3ee-13e1ae0a3571_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6478RTNZ]; Frances Perraudin & Sarah Marsh, Coronavirus Is Icebreaker for Online Daters—But
Meeting
Has
to
Wait,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
20,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/coronavirus-icebreaker-online-daters-meetingwait [https://perma.cc/Z6AK-WF2U]; Melissa Schorr, Blind Date: ‘She Looked Like She Had
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simple fact that more people are using these technologies for these
purposes creates greater risk for abuse—including legally unprotected
forms of sexual harassment,164 stalking, nonconsensual pornography,165
sexual deep fakes,166 and more. It is also possible that individuals less
versed in the dangers of online platforms in romantic contexts may now
be using those platforms, leading to greater potential for harm.
Danielle Citron has theorized a right to sexual privacy, the privacy
concerning not only sexual information and sexual activities, but also the
privacy necessary to create room for human intimacy and intimate
relationships.167 It is important to understand sexual privacy in light of
remote technologies, particularly in the midst of a pandemic that
discourages in-person contact. Many of these technologies lack legal
protections for privacy aside from the minimal U.S. sector-specific
privacy protections. As Citron argues, current privacy laws do not
adequately protect sexual privacy interests. Citron calls for legal reform
to protect sexual privacy, including potentially the creation of new
legislation dedicated specifically to sexual-privacy rights.168 The need for
sexual privacy protections is even more clear, as the pandemic has
accelerated the adoption of new technologies for use in romantic
contexts.
Finally, the context collapse of a world suddenly pushed to work,
study, live, and love all online causes a loss of privacy for all involved.
The increased use of communications technologies further erodes the
boundaries of the home, once a bastion of privacy, and what Anita Allen
terms “the center for the experience and enjoyment of privacy.”169
2. In-Person Consumer Surveillance
Corporations have also begun surveilling their consumers in physical
spaces, in an effort to limit virus transmission. For example, some movie
Gotten Dressed up for Our Virtual Date,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 8, 2020),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/08/magazine/blind-date-she-looked-like-she-had-gottendressed-up-our-virtual-date [https://perma.cc/23BR-9QSZ].
164. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 658–59 (2012).
165. Citron & Franks, supra note 80; Waldman, supra note 81.
166. Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2019) (discussing the issues
that can arise when videos and images are altered in ways that are highly realistic); Mary Anne
Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions,
78 MD. L. REV. 892, 894 (2019).
167. Citron, supra note 80, at 1875.
168. Id. at 1929.
169. Anita L. Allen, Privacy at Home: The Twofold Problem, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL:
FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 193,
196 (Nancy Hirshmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996).
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theaters have proposed privacy-invasive measures, including temperature
scans and symptom questionnaires at the door.170 Scores of restaurants
across the country have required diners to undergo a temperature check
and brief travel- and symptom-related questionnaires before being
seated.171 In early May 2020, Disneyland Shanghai announced that it
would reopen with enforced social distancing,172 and Disney CEO Bob
Iger has said the company has considered implementing temperature
checks at the door.173 It is possible companies could use technologies,
including drone surveillance cameras, facial recognition, Bluetooth
beacons, and more to enforce measures such as social distancing, mask
wearing, and contact tracing.
Thus, individuals may find themselves the subjects of both government
surveillance and corporate surveillance. While individuals have some
recourse against government intrusions on fundamental rights, it is not so
much the case with corporate surveillance. Thus, attention must be paid
to corporations’ use of consumer surveillance as response to the COVID19 pandemic, as it is likely these surveillance measures will not
immediately disappear once the pandemic has ended.
3. Digital Inequities
Children and young people may have unique experiences with privacy
and technology in this public health crisis. As schools have moved online
and other activities have shut down, minor students have likely been
using computers and mobile devices in an unsupervised capacity at higher
rates than before. Children and young adults have been creative in their
use of Zoom outside of educational uses—using Zoom for dating, parties,
and other social engagements.174 Children could be losing the safety that

170. Gene Maddaus, Texas Movie Theaters Reopen with Health, Temperature Checks,
VARIETY (May 1, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/texas-movie-theatersreopen-coronavirus-1234595569 [https://perma.cc/Q8DP-E9UL].
171. See Lynn Sweet, Temperature Checks on Deck: Reopening Guidelines Usher in New Normal, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 26, 2020, 7:57 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/2020/5/26/21271262/no-shoes-no-shirt-temperature-checks-reopening-guidelines-usher-newnormal-illinois-chicago [https://perma.cc/9ZX9-6XCW]; Roni Caryn Rabin, Fever Checks Are No
Safeguard Against Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/health/covid-fever-checks-dining.html [https://perma.cc/LTP5-R67T].
172. Sarah Whitten, Shanghai Disneyland Will Offer Disney a Blueprint for How to Reopen Its
Other Theme Parks, CNBC (May 6, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/shanghaidisneyland-will-offer-a-blueprint-for-reopening-other-parks.html
[https://perma.cc/UZ8FMBXW].
173. Jill Goldsmith, Disneyland Could Start Temperature Checks When Parks Reopen, Bob
Iger Says, DEADLINE (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:06 PM), https://deadline.com/2020/04/disneylandtemperature-checks-coronavirus-reopen-plans-1202903111 [https://perma.cc/PS45-ZDXX].
174. Lorenz, supra note 157.
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comes with having adult supervision by parents or teachers in some of
their use of these technologies.175 This raises greater potential for abuse,
including
privacy
harms
like
harassment,
cyberstalking,
cyberbullying,176 child targeting, nonconsensual pornography,177 and
other privacy violations, including sexual-privacy violations.178
Privacy harms related to communication via online or remote
platforms are often worse for women and girls,179 LGBTQ people,180
people of minority status (based on race, religion, or other), disabled
people, and other individuals who come from marginalized groups.181
Algorithmic harms are often worse for many marginalized groups, as the
effects of artificial intelligence (AI) bias reflect the systemic biases in
society. The increased use of technology, including privacy-invasive
technology and AI-based systems, will likely have an unequal impact on
privacy for different groups.
The lack of free, accessible remote communication technologies has
not only disparately harmed the poor and people in rural communities,
but it also disproportionally harms incarcerated people and their loved
ones. Incarcerated people already have few of the communication
abilities people in the free world enjoy. As prisons have locked down
visits, some facilities have also limited the ability for incarcerated people

175. See Press Release, John Walsh, New Research Reveals Risky Internet Behavior Among
Teens, but There Are Encouraging Signs of Improvement with Increased Involvement of Parents
and
Guardians
(May
10,
2007),
http://www.cox.com/wcm/en/aboutus/datasheet/takecharge/archives/2007-risky-behavior.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GHG-BZ9C] (discussing how teens whose parents talk to them about internet
safety are less likely to engage in some risky online behaviors).
176. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of Cyberharassment,
71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 433–35 (2017) (defining cyberharassment as repeated online expression
targeting a person and cyberbullying as that which is directed from youth-to-youth).
177. See Citron & Franks, supra note 80, at 346 (“Nonconsensual pornography involves the
distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent.”); Waldman, supra
note 81, at 987 (“4 percent of US Internet users—nearly 10.4 million people—have been threatened
with or victimized by the nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit images in which they are
identifiable, a phenomenon commonly known as ‘revenge porn’ or ‘nonconsensual
pornography.’”).
178. See Citron, supra note 80, at 1880–81 (discussing how sexual privacy encompasses the
management of the boundaries of one’s intimate life and other people's access to information about
one’s body, sexuality, and intimate activities).
179. Allen, supra note 79, at 1178. See also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR
WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 123–52 (1988) (discussing privacy harms that women face in the
public sphere including sexual harassment, the public display of pornography, and losses of
informational privacy).
180. Waldman, supra note 81, at 987–89.
181. See Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, supra note 24, at 2067–79
(discussing disparate outcomes in privacy-related lawsuits for individuals from marginalized
groups versus privileged individuals).
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to access phones and computers (or in some cases, any shared spaces).182
As remote videoconferencing technology explodes in usage elsewhere,
the same cannot be said for jails and prisons. Incarcerated people already
have few expectations of privacy, but here, better videoconferencing
technologies could help restore human dignity to incarcerated people and
their loved ones in the free world.
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Consumer Privacy
The law offers legal protections for communications privacy,
including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.183 The increased
use of landlines and mobile telephone calls highlights the need for
privacy protections over telephone communications, in addition to the
protections needed for online communications.
However, the use of remote technologies highlights problems related
to technology platforms, including those used for communication in a
time of social distancing. One area of interest is intermediary liability, or
the immunity protections certain internet platforms receive regarding
some areas of liability. The increased use of remote working technologies
that include photo, audio, or video also create greater content moderation,
speech regulation, and online harassment concerns for tech platforms. In
particular, the increasing importance of technology platforms in this
public health crisis raise issues of platform governance, including issues
of online harassment, speech, and liability (or immunity from liability),
aiding the greater trend of tech platforms becoming what Kate Klonick
has named “the New Governors of online speech.”184
In the United States, many internet intermediaries are protected by
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), a law that
provides immunity for certain platforms against some types of claims
based on user-generated content on the platform.185 Section 230 has been
the subject of much debate among scholars, policymakers, and courts.
Some argue that section 230 is the law that “created the Internet we know
today,”186 while others argue that the law allows for critical harms to

182. Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of More
Solitary
Confinement,
NPR
(June
15,
2020,
4:53
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdowns-sparkfear-of-more-solitary-confinemen [https://perma.cc/LB3U-TGWK].
183. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23.
184. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602–03, 1628–29 (2018).
185. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
186. JEFF KOSSOFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 8 (2019).
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privacy and civil liberties.187 Congress amended section 230 in 2018 with
the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017
(FOSTA),188 leaving an opening for further erosion of section 230
protection for platforms. While it remains to be seen how section 230
protections will fare in the future, the myriad problems with technology
platform power have become a pain point for many policymakers,
particularly as momentum has built against the technology industry
(referred to some as the “techlash”).189
To regulate technology platforms, a privacy-forward approach must
balance two competing privacy interests: the interests of individuals to
protect their data from others, and the interests of individuals in being
able to access a space that allows them the privacy to develop their own
identities and pursue their intellectual and social interests.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC
There exists a long literature in bioethics and health law on concepts
of privacy and individual rights in healthcare, from the concept of
informed consent (far beyond the norms of notice and consent in privacy
theory)190 to questions of ethics in medical research and medical practice.
Under the American sector-specific privacy law regime,191 a smattering
of laws governs health privacy and health technology, including

187. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 (2017) (arguing that section
230 allows for harassment to occur that inhibit the free speech and privacy rights of others); CARRIE
GOLDBERG, NOBODY’S VICTIM: FIGHTING PSYCHOS, STALKERS, PERVS AND TROLLS 44–47
(2019).
188. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2017) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230).
189. Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e
[https://archive.is/9tr0l];
Eve Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlashagainst-amazon-facebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do [https://perma.cc/68F3-YY2U].
190. Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 1505, 1517–28 (2019) (arguing that patients’ meaningful consent to privacy
policies in healthcare is a myth).
191. Unlike in some other nations, the United States lacks omnibus privacy regulation. Instead,
privacy law is governed by an amalgamation of different laws and regulations for specific sectors,
including particular types of data, particular types of data subjects, and particular industries.
Constitutional privacy rights also come not from a clear constitutional provision, unlike in other
nations, but from a “penumbra” of privacy rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–
85 (1965) (stating that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights have penumbras, and that
precedent recognizes a penumbra for privacy rights).
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HIPAA192 (and the Privacy Rule and HITECH193), GINA,194 FTC
consumer protection laws,195 and state privacy laws. Additionally,
scholars like Khiara Bridges have explored privacy in healthcare and the
degrees to which different people are afforded different privacy
protections based on race, income, gender, and more.196
This part examines public health responses to the COVID-19
pandemic, namely: testing, immunity passports, telehealth, medical AI,
and healthcare robots. While many of the technologies used for public
health pandemic response are not new,197 the specific pressures of the
COVID-19 pandemic create a unique lens through which to examine the
use of technology for public health responses.
A. COVID-19 Testing
Since the beginning of the pandemic, states have raced to increase their
testing capabilities, in the hopes of stopping or slowing the spread of the
virus.198 Testing of any kind generates data, some of it potentially
identifiable or traceable to a specific person. Different public and private
testing bodies have tackled testing—including public health agencies,
private clinics, employers, and education institutions. Some have argued
that there may be a moral duty for individuals to donate data for public
health purposes in this time.199 The rapidly increased scale of testing
around the world creates an increase in potential harms related to data
collection, use, and transfer. To understand the privacy dimensions of
viral testing, it is first necessary to establish a baseline understanding of
the tests and the parties involved in testing, before turning to privacy
implications.

192. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
193. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (2009),
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009).
194. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008).
195. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 147, at 585–90; see generally CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016).
196. See generally KHIARA BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017).
197. See Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV.
L.J. 722, 723–24 (2013) (discussing the lack of advancement and disruption in health information
technology).
198. Umair Irfan, The Case for Ending the Covid-19 Pandemic with Mass Testing, VOX (Apr.
13, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/13/21215133/coronavirus-testing-covid-19tests-screening [https://perma.cc/8DK2-2HRB].
199. Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in Digital Epidemiology?, LIFE SCI.,
SOC’Y & POL’Y (May 9, 2018), https://lsspjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40504018-0074-1 [https://perma.cc/ZTX6-Y7NA].
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1. Taxonomy of COVID-19 Tests
There are three types of COVID-19 testing that have come to the
forefront in pandemic response: polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR),
antigen testing, and antibody tests.200 Each of these forms of testing
produce biological samples—primarily mucus or blood.
PCR tests are the most common and accurate tests for determining if a
person has an active COVID-19 infection.201 These tests are performed
by a healthcare provider using a long thin swab to collect a mucus sample
from an individual’s throat or nose.202 The sample is then sent to a lab
(external or in-house, if the clinic or hospital has the requisite facilities)
to determine if the sample contains COVID-19 genetic material—a
process that may take a number of days to yield results. 203 The transport
between testing location and lab may take up to twenty-four hours, and
the test itself may take six hours to complete (though processing time
varies by lab).204
Antigen tests (or rapid diagnostic tests) detect the presence of antigens
(viral proteins) of the COVID-19 virus. These tests are significantly faster
than PCR tests, producing results in approximately fifteen minutes,
according to the CDC205 (thirty minutes according to the WHO206), and
are relatively simple to perform.207 Dr. Deborah Birx, the former White
200. Overview of Testing for SARS-CoV-2, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/testing-overview.html [https://perma.cc/5XUV3XD7] (Mar. 17, 2021); Coronavirus Testing Basics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/140161/download [https://perma.cc/S8ND-UV8M]; Eric Levenson &
Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus Tests, CNN
(Apr. 29, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigenantibody/index.html [perma.cc/7LSS-ZECJ].
201. See sources cited supra note 200 (discussing accuracy of various types of tests).
202. A. Pawlowski, Coronavirus Test: What Is It Like to Get the Nasal Swab for Detecting
COVID-19?, TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.today.com/health/coronavirus-testwhat-it-get-nasal-swab-detecting-covid-19-t176271 [https://perma.cc/FPH4-SS6N].
203. Levenson & Azad, supra note 200; Overview of Testing for SARS-CoV-2, supra note 200.
204. Julie Appleby, Why It Takes So Long To Get Most COVID-19 Test Results, NPR (Mar. 28,
2020, 12:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/28/822869504/why-it-takesso-long-to-get-most-covid-19-test-results [https://perma.cc/MWJ9-NRAN].
205. Interim Guidance for Antigen Testing for SARS-CoV-2, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/lab/resources/antigentests-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/62AW-SVXK].
206. Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-onthe-use-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/PUJ5-N5XQ].
207. Eugene Wu, Antigen Tests for Covid-19 Are Fast and Easy—and Could Solve the
Coronavirus Testing Problem Despite Being Somewhat Inaccurate, CONVERSATION (May 29,
2020, 8:29 AM) https://theconversation.com/antigen-tests-for-covid-19-are-fast-and-easy-andcould-solve-the-coronavirus-testing-problem-despite-being-somewhat-inaccurate-137977
[https://perma.cc/B9R2-B9VK].
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House coronavirus response coordinator, said in April that antigen tests
may be the “breakthrough” needed to test large numbers of people in the
United States, given that antigen tests are simpler and faster than PCR
tests.208 However, accurate antigen tests can be difficult to produce and
may be more likely to miss active infection.209
Antibody tests (or serological tests) “measure the amount of antibodies
or proteins present in the blood when the body is responding to a specific
infection, like COVID-19.”210 Antibody tests can determine whether a
person has previously been exposed to a particular pathogen211 by
detecting whether the person has developed antibodies in their immune
system that would suggest a prior immune response to the novel
coronavirus in the body.212 However, antibody tests cannot differentiate
between patients with active and past infections.213 Antibody tests can be
performed by collecting blood samples from individuals. In April 2020,
Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide COVID-19
antibody testing program.214 The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH)
also embarked on a program to test 10,000 U.S. volunteers for
antibodies.215
At this time, it is still uncertain how strong immunity might be or how
long it might last.216 There have been cases of people testing positive
208. Arman Arzad, Antigen Tests: The Coronavirus ‘Breakthrough’ That a Top White House
Official
Says
We
Need,
CNN
(Apr.
28,
2020,
1:16
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/27/health/antigen-tests-coronavirus-breakthrough/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K8QG-LF65].
209. Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, supra note
206 (noting that the sensitivity of these tests can vary from 34% to 80%).
210. Press Release, Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin.,
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Serological Tests (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-serological-tests
[https://perma.cc/J4FU-WCU7].
211. Serology Testing for COVID-19, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR HEALTH SEC. (June 23, 2020)
https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/resources/COVID-19/COVID-19-fact-sheets/200228Serology-testing-COVID.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J5B-HFDD].
212. Levenson & Azad, supra note 200.
213. Gagan Mathur & Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a
Screening Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AM. J. OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1, 1 (May
15, 2020).
214. Rob Schmitz, Germany Is Conducting Nationwide COVID-19 Antibody Testing, NPR
(Apr.
21,
2020,
9:50
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/04/21/839594202/germany-is-conducting-nationwide-covid-19-antibody-testing
[https://perma.cc/CW2L-CRU4].
215. Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go Back to
School or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/
health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html [https://perma.cc/47H8-7JBC].
216. Levenson & Azad, supra note 200; Mandavilli & Thomas, supra note 215; Heidi Ledford,
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twice (likely due to having higher levels of antibodies when first tested
and lower level of antibodies when tested later), seemingly not
developing immunity to the virus.217 Antibody tests may also have a
problem with accuracy,218 especially because the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has issued a policy allowing developers of some
serological tests to bring to market their tests without prior FDA
review.219 In April 2020, the WHO recommended against the use of
antibody tests as diagnostics for patient care, but encouraged their use for
“disease surveillance and epidemiological research.”220
Some have suggested the use of antibody tests to “reopen” society as
the pandemic slows.221 These tests could be used to determine or prove
immunity to the virus, a form of validation that could then be used for
“immunity passports” that could allow individuals to do certain types of

COVID Reinfections Are Unusual—But Could Still Help the Virus to Spread, NATURE (Jan. 14,
2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00071-6 [https://perma.cc/B93A-7QSQ]
(proposing the immunity lasts several months).
217. John Bacon, Can You Get Infected with COVID-19 Twice? Experts Say Possibility Is
‘Certainly Real’, USA TODAY (July 16, 2020, 3:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/health/2020/07/16/covid-19-can-you-get-infected-twice-herd-immunity/5429012002
[https://perma.cc/EKY4-K77Z].
218. Mathur & Matur, supra note 213 at 1, 2; Mandavilli & Thomas, supra note 215.
219. Hahn, supra note 210 (noting that so long as certain conditions are met, tests can be brought
to market without prior FDA review).
220. Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, supra note
206.
221. See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Bryce Nesbitt, The ‘Certified Recovered’ from Covid-19 Could
Lead the Economic Recovery, STAT (Apr. 6. 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/thecertified-recovered-from-covid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery
[https://perma.cc/B3NJ987T] (suggesting that antibody test could identify “certified recovered” individuals who could fill
essential roles in the labor force with lower risk); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, We Can Safely Restart the
Economy
in
June.
Here’s
How.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/SW2W-9MXJ] (“States should use blood tests to certify people who . . . could
then work in hospitals or other areas where being risk-free would be a benefit.”); Veronika
Hackenbroch, Große Antikörperstudie Soll Immunität Der Deutschen Gegen Covid-19 Feststellen,
DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosseantikoerper-studie-soll-immunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd7348c17c1bad23 [https://perma.cc/L63K-MD4H] (explaining a German study that could issue
certificates to those with antibodies exempting them from restrictions on work); Jason Horowitz,
In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirus-antibodies.html
[https://perma.cc/6GZF-QBQH] (Apr. 10, 2020) (discussing a debate in Italy over using antibody
testing to determine who can return to work); Carolyn Y. Johnson, Testing Coronavirus Survivors’
Blood Could Help Reopen U.S., WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2020, 12:35 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serology-blood-tests
[https://perma.cc/UWZ3-8EQF] (discussing various reopening plans that include antibody testing).
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work, travel, or do other higher risk activities.222 These immunity
passports (and related proposals) come with a host of privacy, algorithmic
accountability, and digital inequity issues,223 as discussed later in this
paper. However, it is uncertain if antibody tests can be used as an
effective screening tool to allow reopening of schools or businesses in
areas with high prevalence of COVID-19,224 regardless of how immunity
passport proposals develop.
2. Taxonomy of Testing Actors
When discussing privacy, it is always critical to determine which
actors are involved in collecting, using, sharing, and storing data. As the
pandemic progresses, a number of agents have become involved in
testing. The public-private divide may be a less useful distinction here, as
many testing programs have developed as public-private partnerships
(which itself raises a number of issues in terms of regulatory oversight).
For example, the controversial data analytics company Palantir
Technologies225 partnered with the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Center for Disease Control, with the technology
company offering “data tools . . . to ‘clean’ and ‘harmonize’ the
information flowing in from local hospitals, states and other sources
related to the virus.”226
Some nations have implemented national testing campaigns for public
health. For example, in April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s
first nationwide COVID-19 antibody testing program.227 At the time, the
U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) also embarked on a much more
limited program to test 10,000 U.S. volunteers for antibodies.228 Across
the United States, states, counties, and cities have developed testing

222. Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered
Public, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020, 4:34 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodiestests-general-public-immunity-certificates-1494934 [https://perma.cc/F4T7-MGNU].
223. Henry T. Greely, Covid-19 ‘Immunity Certificates’: Practical and Ethical Conundrums,
STAT (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/10/immunity-certificates-covid-19practical-ethical-conundrums [https://perma.cc/6YYJ-YQV7].
224. Mathur & Matur, supra note 213, at 2.
225. Palantir remains a divisive company due to its secrecy, reputation, and some of its known
projects, including working with U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. See Michael Steinberger, Does Palantir See Too Much?, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/21/magazine/palantir-alex-karp.html [https://perma.cc/CVM8-2VQ9] (discussing mistrust of Palantir’s work on COVID-19 based in part on its relationship with ICE).
226. Jackson Barnett, Inside Palantir’s Work with the CDC, HHS to Synthesize COVID-19
Data, FEDSCOOP (April 2, 2020), https://www.fedscoop.com/palantir-covid-19-coronavirus-datacdc-hhs [https://perma.cc/D5ZL-A6X4].
227. Schmitz, supra note 214.
228. Mandavilli & Thomas, supra note 215.
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campaigns, some as public programs and some as public-private
partnerships.229
In the absence of, or perhaps in addition to, federally driven nationwide
testing in the United States, this mishmash network of testing programs
has created a fairly large cast of characters—parties that could be
considered data controllers or processors230 for data generated from
COVID-19 related testing.231
The parties involved at the primary point of collection include private
companies (particularly in technology and healthcare industries),
universities and research centers, hospitals and healthcare providers,
governments, and—in the case of distributed or open data projects—
potentially the public. Many of these would fulfill a data controller-like
role. FTC privacy regulation would also apply to many testing actors
collecting data or performing testing.232
Third parties that may obtain or have interest in COVID-19 testing data
include relevant health and technology companies and organizations, as
well as (potentially) downstream commercial actors, including data
brokers and unrelated companies that may wish to use the data for other
purposes (e.g., marketing health products). Additionally, government
actors may have or may obtain access to COVID-19 testing data—both
for direct COVID-19 response purposes as well as potentially other
purposes, including government surveillance and law enforcement.
Finally, no system is ever fully secure, so with any collection of
COVID-19 testing data, there will always be the threat of bad actors
accessing or obtaining data. Some have reported a rise in cyberattacks on

229. See, e.g., HHS Extends COVID-19 Testing Public-Private Partnership, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. (June 30, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/30/hhsextends-covid-19-testing-public-private-partnership.html
[https://perma.cc/9PH8-K2SE]
(providing more access to COVID-19 testing).
230. See What is a Data Controller or a Data Processor?, EUR. COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-andorganisations/obligations/controller-processor/what-data-controller-or-data-processor_en
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V8ZL-DLG5] (explaining that in EU data protection law,
most notably in the General Data Protection Regulation, a data controller determines the purposes
for which and the means by which personal data is processed, while a data processor processes the
data on behalf of a controller).
231. See Jones & Kaminski, supra note 47, at 112 (noting that while the U.S. does not generally
use the data controller versus processor framework for privacy regulation, it can be a useful metric
for understanding the roles of different actors in the data lifecycle of COVID-19 testing).
232. For example, private companies conducting testing would likely fall under FTC
jurisdiction regarding unfair and misleading practices involved with testing and promises made to
consumers. See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 195, at 585–90 (discussing the FTC’s
enforcement of privacy clauses in consumer contracts through its jurisdiction over unfair and
misleading practices enforcement).
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hospitals and other healthcare institutions with access to patient data.233
These bad actors could potentially include foreign state actors, leading to
national security concerns.234
It is useful to understand which actors are involved throughout the data
lifecycle of data obtained from or generated by COVID-19 testing,
particularly for regulators and policymakers who wish to govern these
practices and actors, as well as for individuals to later seek legal or other
recourse.
3. Taxonomy of COVID Data
There are many types of data relevant to a privacy analysis of the
COVID-19 testing process. It is beyond the scope of this paper (and not
useful, perhaps) to attempt to define every type of data in every possible
taxonomy. However, here are a few important categories of data to
consider when thinking about privacy and COVID-19 testing.
COVID-19 testing, be it polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR),
antigen testing, or antibody tests,235 involves collecting biological
samples—primarily mucus or blood. These samples are then analyzed to
determine if a person has been exposed to the virus or has a current viral
infection. Different forms of data are generated by COVID-19 testing.
These include the biological samples or specimens, of course, but also
more data collected and generated throughout the process.
Consider, for example, the health data connected to the patient that is
collected when individuals enter the primary point of collection (e.g.,
testing center, hospital, research center). If a patient signs in at the front
desk of a hospital, that is data that could potentially be linked to data
generated by the person’s testing process. Data collectors (e.g., hospitals
and researchers) may ask additional questions (e.g., asking for symptoms)
during the testing process, and individuals may offer additional data (e.g.,
demographic data). Other biological samples may also be taken for
analysis of other factors that are not directly related to COVID-19 viral
presence. The analysis phase (where biological samples are analyzed by
labs) can produce more data, including but not limited to data determining
COVID-19 exposure.
233. Karen Weintraub, A Game of ‘Cat and Mouse’: Hacking Attacks on Hospitals for Patient
Data Increase During Coronavirus Pandemic, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/07/12/hospitals-see-rise-patient-data-hacking-attacks-duringcovid-19/5403402002/ [https://perma.cc/7RQN-G7QC] (July 13, 2020).
234. Danny Palmer, Hackers Have Leaked the COVID-19 Vaccine Data They Stole in a
Cyberattack, ZDNET (Jan. 13, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/hackers-haveleaked-the-covid-19-vaccine-data-they-stole-in-a-cyberattack/ [https://perma.cc/7T4J-T2DT].
235. Levenson & Azad, supra note 200.
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A non-exhaustive list of types of data that may be generated throughout
the COVID-19 testing lifecycle include:
• Biological samples (including samples used for COVID-19
detection as well as other samples)
• Genetic data (obtained from biological samples or from other
sources)236
• Health data (obtained throughout the process)
• Other personal data, broadly defined237
Health data is a broad category, and different laws define categories of
data that merit special protection. For example, HIPAA protects
“protected health information” (PHI), which is defined as “individually
identifiable health information” that is “transmitted by electronic media;
maintained in electronic media; or transmitted or maintained in any other
form or medium.”238 HIPAA does not cover the protection of healthrelated information that is not transmitted through the statutorily defined
means or the protection of health information that may be arguably
nonidentifiable and does not protect other categories of information
related to health. For example, Mason Marks has also identified
“emergent medical data,” data from social media and other sources, that
could effectively provide the same insights as traditional health data.239
This is a category of data that is not covered by existing U.S. laws on
health privacy.
Genetic information is defined in (among other places) the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), one of the leading genetic
data laws in the United States. GINA defines genetic information as, with
respect to any individual, “information about (i) such individual’s genetic
tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii)
the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such

236. For example, 23andMe’s study relied on its existing databank of genetic information
collected previously. See Megan Molteni, Why Does Covid-19 Make Some People So Sick? Ask
Their DNA, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-does-covid-19make-some-people-so-sick-ask-their-dna [https://perma.cc/DS28-2MYQ].
237. The distinction between personally identifiable data and data deemed to not be personally
identifiable has not been found to be useful in practice, as many forms of data can be re-identifiable.
See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1738 (2010) (noting that even anonymized health data can
be used to reidentify patients). But cf. Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2011) (discussing the importance of broad accessibility to data, which is
currently constrained by data privacy laws).
238. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021).
239. Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial
Intelligence, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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individual.”240 GINA defines a genetic test as a “an analysis of human
DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes,” excluding “(i) analysis
of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes, mutations, or
chromosomal changes; or (ii) an analysis of proteins or metabolites that
is directly related to a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological
condition that could reasonably be detected by a healthcare professional
with appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine
involved.”241
HIPAA also includes genetic information as potentially falling under
the umbrella of protected health information. HIPAA’s genetic
information definition includes the categories of information covered
under the definition of genetic information under GINA as well as “any
request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical
research which includes genetic services, by the individual or any family
member of the individual.”242
Some of the data collected or processed in the testing data lifecycle
might qualify as genetic data—or might deserve the special protections
afforded to genetic data. Genetic data is particularly important to protect
due to the importance genes have to our conceptions of identity and self.
Alondra Nelson has described the “special status afforded to DNA as the
final arbiter of truth of identity”243 and has called DNA “the ultimate big
data.”244 The unique sensitivity of genetic data is also important to keep
in mind in the debate over immunity passports based on antibody tests.
Additionally, health privacy laws often fail to recognize nonhealth
information that is also at risk with health information disclosures. Other
personal data may include demographic data, data on social or personal
habits that may not be health-related in nature, as well as data that could
appear on first glance to be unrelated to the COVID-19 testing lifecycle.
Disclosure of nonhealth data can also lead to privacy harms. For example,
one coronavirus outbreak in South Korea was traced to a nightlife area
that included many clubs popular with the local LGBTQ community. In
disclosing the source of the outbreak, health authorities potentially

240.
241.
242.
243.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)(16).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg–91(d)(17).
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021).
ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE GENOME 4 (2016).
244. Id. at 8.
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jeopardized the safety of the LGBTQ people who had frequented the
district in secret.245
It is important to understand which types of data are being collected
and processed throughout the COVID-19 testing lifecycle, because
different types of data sometimes need different legal and regulatory
protections. For example, health data and genetic data merit special
protection under different laws and regulations in the U.S. sector-specific
privacy regime. Personal data not directly related to health or genetics
also merits protection, particularly personal data that is easily
identifiable. Biological samples or specimens may need different security
protections than digital data. Other data that does not fall easily into any
of the above categories should not be excluded from protection either,
particularly given the ability for downstream data aggregators to amass
large data sets that could then lead to reidentification.
4. Understanding the COVID-19 Testing Data Lifecycle
To understand the data flow and lifecycle of data generated from
testing, start at the beginning.
First, a person gives a sample (biological or data, as in survey
responses) to a primary data collector. This first phase—the primary point
of collection—may involve multiple primary data collectors. For
example, a person may go to a drive-through testing center, jointly
managed by the state government, a local hospital, and private testing
companies. Thus, at the primary point of collection, a number of parties
may have control over the data and qualify as data controllers as
traditionally understood.
The primary data collection from COVID-19 testing takes place at a
number of points of collection: traditional healthcare settings (e.g.,
hospitals, primary care practices), new testing facilities (e.g., COVID-19
specific drive-through testing centers),246 public and private research
settings (e.g., 23andMe’s genetic study247 and UCSF’s citizen science
245. Steve Borowiec, How South Korea’s Nightclub Outbreak Is Shining an Unwelcome
Spotlight on the LGBTQ Community, TIME (May 14, 2020, 9:04 AM),
https://time.com/5836699/south-korea-coronavirus-lgbtq-itaewon
[https://perma.cc/M7HANF86]; Dasl Yoon & Timothy W. Martin, ‘What If My Family Found Out?’: Korea’s Coronavirus
Tracking Unnerves Gay Community, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2020, 2:04 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-coronavirus-efforts-spark-privacy-concerns-in-gaycommunity-11589306659 [https://perma.cc/U6L8-JKQV].
246. Governor Cuomo Opens the State’s First Drive-through COVID-19 Mobile Testing Center
in New Rochelle, N.Y. STATE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-opens-states-first-drive-through-covid-19-mobile-testing-center-new-rochelle-0
[https://perma.cc/82QX-5RNN].
247. Molteni, supra note 236.
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epidemiology app248), and distributed or open networks.249 In early May
2020, the FDA approved the first at-home saliva test for COVID-19,250
following its emergency authorization for the first at-home nasal swab
testing kit in April 2020.251 For this emergency authorization, the FDA
relied on the public health emergency powers given to it under Section
564(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.252 Thus, an
individual’s home setting may also be a location for primary collection
of samples and data, and an individual (or friends or family) may be the
primary collector of the sample.
The second phase of the data lifecycle for testing data is analysis of the
sample. In this phase, the primary data collector either (1) conducts
analysis itself or (2) transfers the data for analysis by another party. For
example, a drive-through testing center could transfer the biological
samples to a lab for analysis. Alternatively, a hospital may have the
resources to both collect a sample and analyze it in an in-house lab. An
individual using a home testing kit could send in the kit to the lab. In this
analysis phase of the COVID-19 data lifecycle, data may be accessed,
stored, and shared by parties that may be data processors or may be both
processor and controller.253
The first two phases of the COVID-19 testing data lifecycle are
relatively clear. However, as with all data collection, it is difficult to fully
predict the flow of data the further downstream you get from the primary
point of collection. Results of tests may be transferred to other entities,

248. Jeff Norris, New COVID-19 ‘Citizen Science’ Initiative Lets Any Adult with a Smartphone
Help to Fight Coronavirus, UCSF (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ucsf.edu/news/
2020/03/417026/new-covid-19-citizen-science-initiative-lets-any-adult-smartphone-help-fight
[https://perma.cc/Z62K-SHC7].
249. Citizen Scientists: Submit Your COVID-19 Symptoms (Or Lack Of Them), SCI. FRIDAY
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/citizen-science-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/Z62K-SHC7]; Paul Sisson, Door Knobs, Trash Cans, Gas Pumps: Citizen
Scientists Search for Coronavirus on Everyday Surfaces, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 14, 2020,
4:45 PM); https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/health/story/2020-05-14/door-knobstrash-cans-gas-pumps-citizen-scientists-enlisted-to-help-find-coronavirus-on-everyday-surfaces
[https://perma.cc/3M7H-TE9Z].
250. Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Andrew Brooks,
CEO Infinity BiologiX (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137773/download
[https://perma.cc/98MN-PAH8]; Sheila Kaplan & Natasha Singer, FDA Clears First Home Saliva
Test for Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/08/health/fda-coronavirus-spit-test.html [https://perma.cc/8ZJ5-4T9D].
251. Katie Thomas & Natasha Singer, FDA Authorizes First In-Home Test for Coronavirus,
N.Y. TIMES, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/health/fda-in-home-test-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/9LLZ-QXZX] (May 8, 2020).
252. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–3 (“Authorization for Medical Products for Use in Emergencies”);
Hinton, supra note 250.
253. Jones & Kaminski, supra note 47, at 115.
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either by the individual who was tested, or by any of the testing data
processors, data collectors, or data controllers. The transfer may be done
intentionally or unintentionally, for the purposes specified at point of
collection or not. This may include releasing information to the public
about people who may have been infected with the virus. For example,
places of business may post notices if an employee tests positive, or local
governments may post information about large events an infected person
had visited. Data from various sources may eventually find its way to data
aggregators, who may repackage the data with data from many sources,
increasing the chances of reidentification and potential harm (including
algorithmic harms) to data subjects.
Understanding the lifecycle of testing data is key for identifying the
points at which regulation can have the greatest impact on protecting
privacy.
5. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Testing Data Privacy
It is helpful to break down the legal and regulatory landscape by
identifying at which points law might apply to protect privacy rights. This
includes identifying which actors the law can regulate, as well as
identifying which actions or settings the law can govern. While testing
for disease is not new, the scale at which testing has progressed is new
and arguably not contemplated in current privacy laws.
The American privacy regime lacks a comprehensive federal privacy
regulation. However, the United States has a number of sector-specific
privacy laws and regulations that would likely pertain to the type of
testing done for COVID-19 response.
a. Regulating by Data Type
For the types of data gathered in testing, we can look to regulations
and legal protections for health data, genetic data, and other data. There
are a number of laws that create special protections for health information
as well as genetic information (sometimes separately, sometimes
categorized as health information).
The United States also has federal laws specifically protecting privacy
for health information. HIPAA,254 the HIPAA Privacy Rule codified in
2002,255 and 2009’s HITECH (the Health Information Technology for
254. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
255. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182
(Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2021)); see also Health Insurance Reform:
Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164
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Economic and Clinical Health Act, particularly important for tightening
legal protections in HIPAA)256 award special protection to personal
health information. HIPAA includes protections for electronic health
information transmission, primarily through the Privacy Rule and the
Security Rule found in Section II.
However, these protections are quite limited. First, the regulations only
apply to “covered entities” and, to some extent, their “business
associates.”257 Covered entities often include hospitals and clinics, but do
not include many other actors that might be data collectors in the COVID19 testing process. Under HIPAA, the covered entities that must comply
with HIPAA obligations include healthcare providers (e.g., doctors,
clinics, psychologists, dentists, nursing homes) that transmit information
in an electronic form in connection with a transaction for which HIPAA
applies.258 Covered entities also include healthcare clearinghouses
(entities that process health information from other entities) as well as
health plans (e.g., health insurance companies, HMOs, company health
plans).259 For example, if there are no covered entities involved in the
data lifecycle of a particular testing program, actors like university
research centers would likely be able to evade HIPAA regulation, as
would private companies like 23andMe. This could easily happen, if
noncovered entities engage in their own testing or data collection
programs. These programs then would lack the protections awarded
under a HIPAA-compliant regime.
Second, HIPAA only awards protections to data that is electronically
transmitted from a covered entity or business associate.260 While the
regulation includes security requirements (under the Security Rule),261
there is little protection against more distributed downstream uses of data,
which would be difficult to enforce. For example, the law does not
include enforcement mechanisms for improper transfer of data by a third
party who receives information from a business associate of a covered
entity. Finally, HIPAA is a consent-based regime. That is, under HIPAA,
(2021)); HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8,390 (Feb. 16, 2006)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2021)); Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security,
Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5,566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2021)).
256. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (2009),
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009).
257. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021) (defining “covered entity” and “business associate”).
258. Id. (defining “transmission”).
259. Id. (defining “covered entity” and “business associate”).
260. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2021).
261. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 A, C (2021) (known collectively as the Security Rule).
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covered entities and their business associates are free to collect, use, and
share data as long as individuals provide their consent to such
practices.262 Many scholars have noted the flaws of notice and consent
regimes,263 and these flaws are readily apparent in the COVID-19 testing
context. Furthermore, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) relaxed some of these HIPAA restrictions, given the medical
needs raised by the pandemic.264
In the United States, genetic data is given increased protections
through genetic nondiscrimination laws like GINA and some state laws
that protect information including genetic information. GINA, however,
is quite limited, only regulating health plans and employers and only in
the context of discrimination in health insurance coverage or
employment.265 Many have argued for expansion of legal protection for
genetic information, potentially including new laws on genetic privacy266
and genetic discrimination.267 For example, Ifeoma Ajunwa has called
for the creation of a new tort of genetic information disclosure as well as
more rigorous informed consent guidelines for genetic testing.268 Ajunwa

262. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2021).
263. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1894 (2013) (referring to the flaws collectively as the “consent dilemma”);
Tschider, supra note 190, at 1505 (summarizing why consent is an imperfect privacy protection).
264. COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties During
a Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 2020)
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/692Y-R87M]; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote
Communications During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergencypreparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/95NQABUG] (Jan. 20, 2021); FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public
Health
Emergency,
U.S.
DEPT.
HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVS.
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSZ7-DYXN]
(last visited Mar. 14, 2021); COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics,
Other First Responders and Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4TP-U68X] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021); Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-bulletin-3-28-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/S73J-66BG].
265. Title I of GINA covers health coverage discrimination, while Title II covers employment
discrimination. Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1635 (2021).
266. Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-geneticprivacy-nih [https://perma.cc/9SBA-QCUJ]; Megan Molteni, The US Urgently Needs New Genetic
Privacy Laws, WIRED (May 1, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-urgently-needs-newgenetic-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/A2GU-2MDB].
267. Marks & Li, supra note 266; Molteni, supra note 266.
268. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1225, 1242–43 (2014).
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has also called for strengthening GINA to add a disparate impact cause
of action addressing gaps in the antidiscrimination law.269
Another key law for genetic privacy in this context is the 21st Century
Cures Act, which gives research subjects certain safeguards over their
genetic information in the context of federally funded research.270 The
21st Century Cures Act includes, for example, that certain researchers
“shall not disclose or provide any other person not connected with the
research the name of [patient or test subject] or any information,
document, or biospecimen that contains identifiable, sensitive
information about such an individual and that was created or compiled
for purposes of research.”271 However, disclosure of the protected types
of information is still allowed under certain conditions, including “for the
purposes of other scientific research that is in compliance with applicable
Federal regulations governing the protection of human subjects in
research,”272 as well as if the disclosure is “made with the consent of the
individual to whom the information, document, or biospecimen
pertains.”273 It is also important to note that the privacy protections for
research subjects, patients, and data donors under the 21st Century Cures
Act includes a limitation on the use of “identifiable, sensitive
information” in legal process, including preventing such information
from being admissible as evidence.274
Thus, if genetic information is collected as part of the coronavirus
testing data lifecycle, there are a few specific contexts where genetic
privacy legal protections would apply. However, with GINA and the 21st
Century Cures Act, as with HIPAA, consent is a qualifying exception that
can eliminate privacy protections in many cases. It is quite possible that
a research subject (e.g., person getting a COVID-19 test as part of a larger
medical research study) could sign away their rights without fully
understanding the scope of their consent. Furthermore, these laws protect
against discrimination and against specific types of data transfer. They do
not protect broader privacy rights.
Outside the U.S. federal context, other jurisdictions also often create
special regulations for health data, biometric data, or genetic data. For
example, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation regards health
data as a special category, thus necessitating special protections for

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 79 (2016).
42 U.S.C. § 201.
§ 241(d)(1)(B).
§ 241(d)(1)(C)(iv).
§ 241(d)(1)(C)(iii).
§ 241(d)(1)(E).
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collection and processing.275 A number of U.S. states also have particular
laws that govern biometric and health information, including the Illinois
Biometric Information Protection Act (BIPA).276 BIPA is currently one
of the strongest biometric privacy laws in the United States. Under BIPA,
businesses that collect biometric information must receive written
consent from individuals before data collection, and they must provide
notice on policies for data usage and retention.277 Critically, BIPA allows
for a private right of action.278 Other states are also considering similar
legislation.279
b. Regulating by Actor and Setting
Some data processors and controllers in the testing data lifecycle
would be considered covered entities under HIPAA, GINA, or other laws
and regulations. Many public institutions, particularly public health
institutions, would find themselves regulated by one or more of these
laws and regulations. However, as noted, many health-privacy laws have
gaps—the most glaring of which is the lack of accountability for private
actors, especially actors that are not traditionally healthcare providers.
For private data controllers and data processors, the FTC has broad
authority over privacy practices.280 The common way the FTC has held
companies to account over privacy violations has been to note where
companies have failed their publicly stated obligations and promises to
consumers, thus falling under the FTC’s purview to enforce rules on
unfair or deceptive practices.281 Data collectors like 23andMe and private
research or health companies could be subject to FTC jurisdiction and
thus enforcement in this way. The FTC also has broad enforcement
authority over companies that engage in unfair, misleading, or fraudulent
activity, which would include any testing actors that misrepresent their
testing capabilities or other abilities, in addition to and including privacy
or security practices. State attorneys general also have authority to bring
275. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, Recital 35.
276. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2020).
277. Id. at 14/15.
278. Id. at 14/20.
279. See Kimberly Gold et al., Biometric Privacy: The Year in Review and Looking Toward
2020, REEDSMITH (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2020/01/privacy-dataprotection/biometric-privacy-the-year-in-review-and-looking-toward-2020/
[https://perma.cc/K4R6-BAEJ] (discussing the similar legislation).
280. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 147, at 585–86.
281. See, e.g., Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were
False, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were
[https://perma.cc/M5G3-9TWA] (demonstrating companies that make misrepresentations to
consumers risk FTC action).
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actions against companies for privacy violations as well as unfair
practices or misleading or fraudulent activity.
No system is perfectly secure, and every actor in the data lifecycle
could potentially suffer a data breach. If this were to happen, state data
breach laws would likely apply. In case of a data breach, companies could
be found to have violated their obligations under HIPAA’s Security Rule
and Breach Notification Rule, as well as their obligations to act in ways
that are not misleading or unrepresentative of their stated practices (thus
triggering FTC enforcement under the agency’s section 5 authority).282
For organizations not covered under HIPAA, the FTC Health Breach
Notification Rule requires compliance with notification procedures in
case of data breach related to health information.283 Additionally, other
parties involved in the data lifecycle may have a claim against the
breached party, on the basis that the breached party failed in its
contractual obligations to other parties.
Many of the harms from COVID-19 testing relate to downstream data
usage. Here, the law provides far less protection.284 On a fundamental
level, it is difficult for individuals to know exactly where their data goes,
past the initial point of collection, or to grasp the full extent of potential
data harms—making it next to impossible for individuals to knowingly
consent to all the downstream privacy harms that could occur.285 Data
may be shared, sold, or rented with third parties that could include other
actors within the testing ecosystem as well as unrelated parties, like other
research centers for related and unrelated projects, as well as commercial
actors, like companies seeking to profit from tailored marketing and
behavioral advertising,286 and government actors, like law enforcement
agencies seeking to use genetic information to identify suspects.287
282. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 147, at 587.
283. 16 C.F.R. § 318 (2021).
284. For example, while HIPAA arguably should apply to business associates and business
associate subcontractors, in practice, the law is rarely enforced against any actors that are not
qualified entities. Direct Liability of Business Associates, DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV.
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/businessassociates/factsheet/index.html [https://perma.cc/N5DD-N3GU] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020); but see
Tschider, supra note 190, at 1515 (“Many organizations, especially those creating new technologies
and those that do not receive insurance payment for services, usually will not be regulated by
HIPAA as a Covered Entity or a Covered Entity’s Business Associate or be bound under traditional
confidentiality obligations, as might be obligated under a fiduciary relationship.”).
285. Tschider, supra note 190, at 1525.
286. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 278–79 (2012).
287. Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED (June
1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-withdna [https://perma.cc/L5J7-Y5FM].
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Law enforcement can access data, even health and genetic data, stored
in private or public collections, through various means, including simply
buying data outright. Data collectors or data holders may also sell or
freely share data with law enforcement, which could lead to greater
surveillance and related harms, particularly important for marginalized
communities. Genetic information is particularly interesting to mention,
as the genetic information of any one person could potentially be used to
identify many people in their genetic family line. In numerous cases, law
enforcement have been able to identify potential suspects by matching
DNA samples with DNA data of distant relatives.288 There are few laws,
or even proposed laws, that would protect against these downstream
privacy harms.
Few laws even contemplate data brokers—aggregators who buy data
from multiple sources, package that data together, and then resell to other
parties. The privacy harms of data collection are amplified by the process
of aggregation (through what Daniel Solove has called “the multiplier
problem”289), as data becomes more identifiable with more data from
other sources.290 For example, a company like 23andMe could collect
symptom information from its consumers, match that with the genetic
information from its database, and sell that to a third party data broker.
That data broker could purchase the data and resell it to insurers who
could then identify which people, or which groups of people, would be
more likely to contract COVID-19, then increase the rates for insurance
for those people. These downstream data harms are especially
problematic given the likelihood of future connected health technologies,
both public and private, including what Andrea Matwyshyn has termed
the “Internet of Bodies.”291 There are no federal laws, and only a few
state laws and proposals, that deal with data brokers specifically. U.S.
laws do not protect against these downstream, distributed harms.

288. Id.
289. Daniel Solove, Why the Law Often Doesn’t Recognize Privacy and Data Security Harms,
TEACHPRIVACY (July 9, 2014), https://teachprivacy.com/law-often-doesnt-recognize-privacydata-security-harms [https://perma.cc/YZZ7-SLMF].
290. Solove, supra note 263, at 1889 (discussing how even nonsensitive data can be aggregated
to reveal sensitive information about an individual).
291. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 81 (2019).
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B. Immunity Passports and Vaccine Verification Systems
A number of people have proposed using immunity passports or other
verification systems that would indicate someone has developed antibody
resistance to COVID-19, either through having contracted the virus or
through vaccination.292
In April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide
COVID-19 antibody testing program.293 Researchers at the Hemholtz
Centre for Infection Research in Braunschweig proposed a project which
would include mass testing for antibodies as well as immunity certificates
that would allow people certain exceptions from COVID-19 restrictions,
e.g., limitations on travel or nonessential work.294 Scientists in Italy also
proposed similar programs, as did New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo.295
As the pandemic progressed and vaccines became increasingly
available, many countries, states, and corporations have discussed the use
of vaccine verification systems.296 These can be as simple as an NBA
team’s plan to ask fans to show paper records as vaccine proof297 to the
state of New York developing the Excelsior Pass, in partnership with
IBM, to function as a vaccine verification app.298
Immunity passports or certificates come with many issues, including
privacy concerns. Immunity verification requires either verification of
vaccination or testing to determine the presence of antibodies that could
imply immunity (temporary or permanent). As discussed above, testing
in general generates a host of privacy issues, regardless of which party is
collecting, processing, sharing, or controlling the data. Requiring or
encouraging immunity verification for employment, housing, education,
or even for entering a movie theater or shopping center could lead to an
increase in testing, and thus compounding the privacy harms related to
testing. Electronic transfer of immunity-related data (including vaccine
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See sources cited supra note 221.
Schmitz, supra note 214.
Smith, supra note 222.
Horowitz, supra note 221.
Baobao Zhang et al., Building Robust and Ethical Vaccination Verification Systems,
BROOKINGS: TECH STREAM (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/building-robust-and-ethical-vaccination-verification-systems/ [https://perma.cc/UQ29-VQ4P].
297. Assoc. Press, Miami Heat to Open Vaccinated-Only Sections for Fans on April 1, ESPN
(Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/31123421/miami-heat-open-vaccinatedonly-sections-fans-april-1 [https://perma.cc/6Y3G-Z9B7].
298. Allison Aubrey, Would You Use an App to Verify Your Vaccine Status? The Idea Is Here
to Stay, NPR (Apr. 12, 2021, 12:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021/04/12/985927333/would-you-use-an-app-to-verify-your-vaccine-status-the-idea-ishere-to-stay [https://perma.cc/BA8E-VK3J].
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verification data) also raises privacy risks, which may necessitate new
guidelines around HIPAA and other laws that govern health information
(potentially including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
limitations for employee data as well). Regulations have already been
relaxed during pandemic.299
Encouraging testing for immunity verification can lead to individuals
feeling compelled to take tests, regardless of their concerns over privacy
or other issues. People may feel compelled to participate in testing,
particularly if testing is necessary for immunity verification that can lead
to employment. This lack of control over personal health data could be
harmful for privacy, or at least to a person’s perception of their own
control over personal privacy. Normalizing this form of widespread
testing and sharing of private health or genetic data with multiple
corporate and government interests could also create change in our
society’s expectations of privacy, with harmful consequences for future
privacy norms and laws.
Conditioning employment, housing, education, travel, or other rights
and privileges on immunity verification could have dangerous
consequences. Immunity passport or verification programs could create a
lasting shift in social norms, laying the groundwork for future programs
that use genetics or health status as conditions for accessing certain rights
and privileges. On the extreme end, this line of argument could be used
to justify programs that edge close to eugenics,300 privileging some based
on health, physical ability, or innate genetic characteristics. Normalizing
immunological discrimination could pave the way for a loosening of
discrimination laws and practices generally, particularly related to health
discrimination, as well as for certain sectors, like employment.
These problems with immunity passports have historical antecedents.
Kathryn Olivarius has written about the complex interplay between
health and capital in the “immunocapital” economy of the Yellow Fever
epidemic of the early 1900s.301 Connecting the past immunity economy

299. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 264 (summarizing the various relaxation of regulations).
300. Godwin’s
Law,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin’s_law
[https://perma.cc/75ZB-9GGM] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
301. Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124 AM.
HIST. REV. 425 (2019).
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to the proposed immunity passports of the COVID-19 era, Olivarius
writes:
Immunity on a case-by-case basis did permit the economy to expand,
but it did so unevenly: to the benefit of those already atop the social
ladder, and at the expense of everyone else. When a raging virus
collided with the forces of capitalism, immunological discrimination
became just one more form of bias in a region already premised on
racial, ethnic, gender and financial inequality.302

Widespread immunity verification programs could effectively create
the “immunological discrimination” Olivarius describes, leading to
discriminatory effects on marginalized and disadvantaged groups. For
example, if some jobs are conditioned on immunity verification, people
might be willing to voluntarily infect themselves with COVID-19 in order
to gain the immunity, and by proxy, the immunity verification needed for
employment. This particular risk to individual health would likely be
greater for the unemployed and underemployed, and other people who
would find the financial incentive strong enough to overcome the risks to
their own health. As Olivarius notes, the use of immunity verification as
condition for employment shifts the burden on the working classes to
become “acclimated” to the virus, not on those in power to invest in
societal infrastructure.303
Additionally, immunity testing and verification may not be available
equally to all people. For example, people who lack medical insurance
(particularly in countries like the United States, without free or low-cost
public healthcare) may be unwilling or unable to get the testing needed
to receive immunity verification based on antibody testing. Globally,
early vaccine rollout in late 2020 and early 2021 strongly favored wealthy
nations.304 Even within the United States, racial disparities in vaccine
access have resulted in vaccine inequity among different communities,
primarily disadvantaging Black and Brown populations, as well as low
income and rural populations.305 Thus, if immunity verification were to
302. Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html
[https://perma.cc/4PG7-K5RC].
303. Id.
304. Tom Randall, The World’s Wealthiest Countries Are Getting Vaccinated 25 Times Faster,
BLOOMBERG EQUALITY (Apr. 8, 2021, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-09/when-will-world-be-fully-vaccinated-pace-is-2-400-faster-in-wealthy-countries
[https://perma.cc/3CGS-2P9W].
305. Adriana Diaz, Early Data Shows Racial Disparity in Coronavirus Vaccine Recipients,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 29, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/racial-disparity-coronavirus-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/8G4Y-BMM6]; White House Addresses Disparity in Vaccine Distribution, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 12, 2021, 1:51 PM), https://news.yahoo.com/white-house-speakscovid-19-185143500.html [https://perma.cc/B986-LEZG].
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become a standard, already disadvantaged people would not be able to
access the same benefits from immunity verification that others would.
Black people, indigenous people, and people from other marginalized
groups may have greater resistance to enrolling in any public health
database or government data collection program without strong
assurances that their data will not be used against them and their
communities, given historical examples of the law enforcement
overreach. For example, some may fear that their genetic material will be
accessible by law enforcement, as has been shown through government
use of commercial DNA databases,306 which could result in threatening
consequences for groups who already disproportionately suffer from the
effects of institutional and structural racism in public health and policing.
Undocumented people may fear that their genetic data will be used to link
them to other undocumented people, thus leading to harmful immigration
consequences for themselves and their loved ones.307 They, too, would
not be able to benefit from immunity verification.
Using immunity verification as a limiting factor for fundamental rights
like employment, education, and travel could raise constitutional issues
as well, though it is arguable that the government’s compelling interest
in protecting public health in the middle of an active pandemic could
outweigh many potential concerns at least for limited, short-term
programs. However, as the legal and regulatory landscape surrounding
immunity passports is extremely bare, it would be difficult for anyone to
challenge an incorrect immunity verification and defend their rights. This
difficulty in contestation would be especially pronounced for those who
lack the resources and access to legal support. Furthermore, it is likely
that any programs developed during pandemic response will have lasting
effects on laws and norms for the future.
Current U.S. discrimination law likely does not prevent the use of
immunity verification programs like immunity passports. GINA protects
individuals against discrimination based on genetic information, but this
law is limited to two sectors: health insurance and employment. GINA
prevents health insurers from denying coverage to individuals based on
genetic predisposition and prevents employers from using genetic

306. Marks & Li, supra note 266.
307. Megan Molteni, How DNA Testing at the US-Mexico Border Will Actually Work, WIRED
(May 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-dna-testing-at-the-us-mexico-border-willactually-work [https://perma.cc/SBG6-6YU4]; DNA Tests at Border: DHS to Start Testing to Catch
People
Posing
as
Families,
CBS
DENVER
(May
2,
2019),
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2019/05/02/dna-tests-border-department-homeland-security
[https://perma.cc/EC78-7RF7].
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information for hiring, firing, promotion, and related employment
decisions.
While it might seem that GINA would protect genetic privacy in the
context of testing and immunity passports, this may not be the case.
GINA does not protect employees from employer surveillance of their
genetic information, potentially including information related to
coronavirus testing or immunity verification. Furthermore, GINA allows
employers to request, require, or purchase genetic information of
employees in certain circumstances, including to comply with
certification requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act and other
leave laws and policies and to comply with genetic monitoring programs
required by law, as well as data from sources that are commercially and
publicly available and data that an employee voluntarily consents to
giving. While employers are generally prevented from sharing or
exposing genetic information, they are allowed to do so under certain
circumstances.308 Additionally, it is unclear if immunity information
would fall under the scope of GINA, as the information included in an
immunity verification passport could potentially exclude genetic
information.
Particularly important is the fact that GINA does not include a cause
of action for genetic discrimination based on disparate impact, a failing
Ifeoma Ajunwa has noted. Ajunwa argues that such a clause should be
added to GINA because
(1) the addition of a disparate impact clause is in line with the precedent
set by prior employment discrimination laws;
(2) the EEOC has declared that proof of deliberate acquisition of genetic
information is not necessary to establish a violation of GINA, and,
similarly, proof of intent to discriminate should not be required to
demonstrate genetic discrimination;
(3) ease of access to genetic testing and the insecurity of genetic
information has increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination in
employment; and
(4) real world instances of genetic testing have shown that facially
neutral testing may result in racial disparities.309

Adding a disparate-action clause to GINA would protect against most
of the genetic discrimination harms raised by the use of genetic
information in the modern, Big Data era, outside of the limited contexts
GINA currently governs.

308. Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1635 (2021).
309. Ajunwa, supra note 269, at 79.
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With the greater scale of testing data, the insecurity of genetic
information has likely increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination,
particularly enhanced by the concept of conditioning employment on
immunity verification. Adding a disparate impact clause would be in line
with prior precedent, and past EEOC declarations remain current.
Perhaps most importantly, there is historical precedent for the racial
disparities and discriminatory impact of genetic testing based on
immunity.310
If GINA—the law specifically concerning genetic discrimination—
might not fully protect genetic privacy rights for individuals in the
context of immunity passports, one might wonder if the ADA would
serve. The ADA protects against discrimination in many contexts,
including employment.311 However, here again, the ADA is insufficient
to protect individuals from the discriminatory harms of enforced
immunity-verification programs. The ADA allows employers to screen
out individuals by applying qualification standards, which could include
the requirement “that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”312 Employers are
also allowed to conduct “voluntary medical examinations, including
voluntary medical histories” and “make inquiries into the ability of an
employee to perform job-related functions.”313 In fact, the EEOC in May
released guidance on interpreting ADA protections in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and suggested that employers may institute testing
of employees for exposure to the virus.314
To address the harms of genetic discrimination raised by COVID-19
testing and immunity-verification proposals, we must strengthen
protections in GINA and the ADA. This can come through new geneticprivacy laws,315 through genetic-privacy provisions in a future national
privacy law, or perhaps in genetic data specific provisions in future
algorithmic accountability or discrimination laws.

310. Olivarius, supra note 301; Olivarius, supra note 302.
311. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 1, 104 Stat. 328 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
314. What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other
EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-youshould-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws
[https://perma.cc/KFP5-4JKW] (Dec. 16, 2020).
315. But see Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetic Exceptionalism: Do We Need
Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 673 (2001) (arguing for more comprehensive
protections in the law that extend beyond genetic information).
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C. Contact Tracing
In addition to testing for coronavirus exposure, states have also turned
to contact tracing programs as key parts of pandemic response. Contact
tracing in this context refers to the practice of tracing the contacts of a
person identified as having been exposed to COVID-19, in an effort to
halt the further onward spread of the virus.316
Contact tracing attempts to quickly track and stop the spread of
COVID-19 by starting with each person who tests positive for the virus.
When a person is infected with a virus like COVID-19, the infected
person is contagious for a period of time. During this time, the infected
person is able to infect others with the virus. People who come in close
physical contact with that person (“contacts”) thus have a higher risk of
infection. Contact tracing attempts to identify these people quickly so that
the contacts of the infected person can take steps to also get tested and to
practice social isolating, to prevent potentially infected contacts from
spreading the virus further.
1. Contact Tracing Principles
Contact tracing starts with confirming a person has or had a COVID19 viral infection. Contact tracing is then implemented to study and stop
the further spread of the virus by alerting the infected person to isolate
and by alerting all people who may have been in contact with the infected
person to also monitor their own symptoms and isolate if needed.
The World Health Organization breaks down contact tracing into three
basic steps: (1) contact identification, (2) contact listing, and (3) contact
follow-up.317 In contact identification, steps are taken to identify all the
individuals that may have been in contact with a person who had the
COVID-19 virus during the period of potential viral transmission. In
contact listing, contacts are informed of their contact status as well as
steps they should take to protect their own health and the health of others.
In contact follow-up, contact tracing program administrators follow up
with contacts to monitor for symptoms and test for signs of infection.
Different types of contact tracing programs have emerged in response
to the novel coronavirus pandemic: human contact tracing and digital
contact tracing. Digital contact tracing has come in two primary
316. Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020, 8:57 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/8CYG-UX38]; Infection Control: Contact Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May
9, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/2UYD382G].
317. Infection Control: Contact Tracing, supra note 316.
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conceptions: Bluetooth-based, “decentralized” contact tracing, and
centralized contact tracing, often through cell phone location data or also
through Bluetooth-based data. Each of these forms of contact tracing
programs has its own portfolio of privacy concerns, and different states
have implemented one or more of them. Thus, it is necessary to discuss
each form of contact tracing program in order to attempt to grasp a
holistic overview of the privacy issues raised by contact tracing in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Contact tracing is not a new concept but rather an accepted and tested
process used in a variety of epidemiology and public health contexts.
However, the technologies used for digital contact tracing are new and
relatively untested at scale, and these new technologies raise interesting
societal issues. The clash between human and digital contact tracing also
brings to light debates regarding automation and the ability to use
machines to replicate or replace human work. Additionally, the privacy
and security problems with digital contact tracing proposals reflect the
changing nature of our society’s relationship with digital privacy, and the
ways in which Big Data and the increasingly imbalanced nature of the
data economy have shaped consumer expectations of privacy.
2. Human Contact Tracing
Governments around the world have implemented mass contacttracing programs. For example, the state of Massachusetts created a
statewide contact-tracing program, hiring 1,000 new contact tracers as
part of human contact-tracing programs.318 The city of San Francisco
launched a program training 150 volunteers to add to the existing contacttracing programs from their city public health department.319
Human contact tracing, or manual contact tracing, refers to contact
tracing done through manual identification of contacts through
nonautomated means, as well as contact listing and contact follow-up
done through manual, nonautomated means. However, with this global
pandemic in an age of increasingly digitized services, contact tracing
through automated technologies has emerged as a contender, for better or
worse.

318. Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contacttracing.html [https://perma.cc/SJP3-PNYX].
319. Kristen Sze, EXCLUSIVE: San Francisco Launches Initiative to Trace Every Single
COVID-19 Case and Contact, ABC7 NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://abc7news.com/san-franciscocontact-tracing-coronavirus-tracnig-bay-area-lockdown-shelter-in-place/6090943
[https://perma.cc/V46X-EULJ].
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a. Human Contact Tracing Data Lifecycle
Human contact tracing describes a process that has been used in
epidemiological and public health contexts prior to but also including the
COVID-19 pandemic. The process begins when a confirmed infected
person speaks to a contact tracer, a person fulfilling a contact tracing
role.320 In this conversation, the contact tracer asks questions of the
infected person, with an eye toward identifying contacts.321 These
conversations often take place in a one-on-one setting over the phone.322
For example, a contact tracer from a state health department could call a
person who tested positive of COVID-19 and ask for a list of everyone
the infected person had come into contact with in the last two weeks.
Contact tracers can be healthcare professionals, public health workers,
or dedicated contact tracing staff.323 In Massachusetts, which launched a
robust human contact tracing program, this identification stage is done
through one-on-one calls between the infected person and a contact tracer
(hired by the state program, in partnership with a medical nonprofit,
Partners in Health).324 Contact tracers receive information about infected
persons through state databases that store results of coronavirus tests.325
The contact tracer then calls the infected person by phone and creates a
list of all people the person had been in contact with in the forty-eight
hours before the person’s symptoms began.326
Second, contact tracers will call or otherwise notify all contacts that
they were exposed to someone who tested positive of COVID-19,
informing these contacts of their risks as well as how to protect
themselves and others from the virus and its effects. 327 Contact tracers
may suggest that contacts perform such actions as monitoring their own
symptoms, self-quarantining, or trying to get their own tests for viral
infection.328 In the Massachusetts contact tracing program, contact
tracers attempt to call each contact, calling three times in succession “to
signal the call’s importance.”329 If the contact picks up the phone, the
contact tracer then informs them that they may have been exposed to the
virus, walks them through common symptoms and quarantine
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Simmons-Duffin, supra note 316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barry, supra note 318.
Id.
Id.
Simmons-Duffin, supra note 316.
Id.
Barry, supra note 318.
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recommendations, and explains where they can get further help if needed.
These conversations can take up to thirty or forty minutes.330
In an ongoing final stage of the process, contact tracers follow up with
contacts to monitor symptoms and spread of the virus. 331 This can be
done informally or through rigorously monitored programs. In South
Korea, for example, contact tracers follow up with contacts on a routine
basis and request or mandate that contacts track and submit their
symptoms to a government database.332
Human contact tracing has its benefits and drawbacks when compared
to digital contact tracing programs. Finding out that you may have been
exposed to the virus can be a frightening or worrying experience, and it
can be helpful to have a human there to guide that first conveying of
information. Public health officials, taking lessons from contact tracing
sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, have learned “to talk to
people in a way that’s not stigmatizing and will encourage people to get
on board with the request to self-isolate or share their contacts,”
according to Jeff Engel, senior advisor for COVID-19 to the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists.333 It is likely that an automated
process cannot duplicate the social and emotional benefits of human
contact tracing, perhaps similar to the same issues we see with the use of
care robots in times of crisis.
It is difficult to calculate the social benefit of having human contact in
the contact tracing process. However, it is possible to calculate the
financial costs of contact tracing programs, which some governments
may find too expensive.334 On the other hand, hiring unemployed
individuals to serve as contact tracers could create an economic stimulus
in a time when unemployment is high. Perhaps the greatest flaw of the
human contact-tracing programs isn’t the cost but the difficulty of scaling
a personal, one-to-one approach to a global pandemic.
b. Human Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact
For a holistic analysis of the privacy issues related to human contact
tracing, we can start once again with the types of data that are collected

330. Id.
331. Simmons-Duffin, supra note 316.
332. Max S. Kim, South Korea is Watching Quarantined Citizens with a Smartphone App, MIT
TECH. REV. (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/06/905459/coronavirussouth-korea-smartphone-app-quarantine [https://perma.cc/225E-YGUE] (discussing a smartphone
app that is able to monitor those in quarantine and help with contact tracing).
333. Simmons-Duffin, supra note 316.
334. Barry, supra note 318.
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and processed, as well as the different actors involved with contact
tracing.
Contact tracers receive information about the infected person to
facilitate the contact identification stage (e.g., phone interviews). This
information can include name, phone number, address, as well as health
information (at the very least, a positive COVID-19 test result). During
the identification conversations, infected persons may share the names
and contact information of potential contacts, as well as other
information, including information about the infected person’s activities
and locations in the days prior to the start of their symptoms. As these are
phone calls between two potentially unpredictable human beings, any
number of other types of information could be shared in the identification
stage. Similarly, in the contact listing stage, which consists of
conversations with contacts, many types of data may be shared—
including identifying information.
Some of the information collected during human contact tracing can
include health information, as defined in HIPAA and state laws. Contact
tracers may be acting on behalf of entities that would be governed under
HIPAA, including healthcare providers, which could mean that
transmission of health information would have to comply with HIPAA
and similar regulations. Contact tracers may also be acting through state
and municipal public health departments, which would not necessarily be
covered entities that have to comply with HIPAA restrictions on health
information. However, most of the entities conducting COVID-19 tests
would likely qualify as HIPAA covered entities; thus, organizations
receiving health information would likely have to at least comply with
the requirements for business associates under HIPAA.
There are some risks to privacy and security that come with human
contact-tracing programs, particularly during a pandemic in which many
would work from home. The more people have access to any data
(including health information), the more risk there is that data may be
exposed, even inadvertently. As it is likely many contact tracers may
work remotely, it may be difficult to monitor whether contact tracers are
practicing strong cybersecurity hygiene in protecting information. For
example, it is difficult to know if any contact tracers are separately
recording or writing down information from conversations, or if there are
other people in the room while the contact tracer is working. It is possible
that digital contact-tracing programs could have less of this form of
distributed risk, as well as less room for human error contributing to
privacy and security risks.
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3. Digital Contact Tracing
In the COVID-19 pandemic, digital contact tracing has emerged as a
public health response tool, for perhaps the first time on such a large
national and global scale.335 In contrast to human contact tracing, digital
contact tracing relies on digital, often automated, “contact tracing apps”
that aid in identifying potential contacts of infected individuals. Digital
contact tracing can also include digital, sometimes app-based, means of
informing contacts of their potential exposure and the associated risks
and recommendations. The follow-up capabilities of digital contact
tracing programs are various and can include simple email reminders to
required enrollment in apps that track symptoms.
Two primary forms of digital contact tracing have become popular:
first, a centralized approach, often utilizing cell phone location data;
second, a decentralized approach, often using a short-range Bluetooth
standard.336 Both types of digital contact-tracing programs have their
benefits and drawbacks, not the least of which relate to privacy impacts
of individuals and groups.
a. Decentralized Digital Contact Tracing
While each proposed digital contact-tracing application is different,
generally, decentralized contact-tracing apps use short-range Bluetooth
technology to determine proximity between individuals at certain points
in time.337 The concept involves individuals (ideally a high percentage of
the populace) downloading the app.338 Some of these apps would run on
background, and some would need to be active on a person’s mobile
device to be useful. If a person tests positive for COVID-19, that person
335. Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A Flood of Coronavirus
Apps Are Tracking Us. Now It’s Time to Keep Track of Them., MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker
[https://perma.cc/U7WW-JKDJ].
336. Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing: World Split Between Two
Types of App, BBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028
[https://perma.cc/H44R-CNXZ].
337. See, e.g., Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Principles for Technology-Assisted Contact-Tracing, AM.
C.L. UNION (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-principles-technologyassisted-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/6R5S-9K7V] (discussing the use of Bluetooth Low
Energy beacons to interact with neighboring phones); Kylie Foy, Bluetooth Signals from Your
Smartphone Could Automate Covid-19 Contact Tracing While Preserving Privacy, MIT NEWS
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-contact-tracing-0409
[https://perma.cc/V27P-GPL3] (noting the new system of contact tracing uses short-range
Bluetooth signals to trace the spread of COVID-19).
338. Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us
Out of Lockdown, OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-oflockdown [https://perma.cc/KK63-YM4X].
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would update their status with the app (or, in some cases, another entity
could update the app). The decentralized digital contact-tracing apps
would then utilize a record of anonymous key codes exchanged between
phones to determine which other individuals (who had the app installed
or active) had been in proximity with the infected person during the
contagious period.339
Decentralized contact-tracing apps have been called “privacypreserving.”340 These privacy-preserving proposals include the
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) project,341
the East Coast342 PACT,343 the West Coast PACT,344 and TCN.345
European states and researchers have supported the Pan-European
Privacy-Preserving
Proximity
Tracing
(PEPP-PT).346
These
decentralized digital contact-tracing apps all have similarities in their
protocol design.347 Some researchers involved with these apps have
suggested solutions for increasing interoperability, allowing solutions to
develop in parallel and potentially exchange information (e.g., users of
multiple apps would be pinged if they were found to have been in
339. Foy, supra note 337.
340. For example, the ACLU released a white paper on digital contact tracing that specifically
noted DP-3T, East Coast PACT, and TCN as privacy-preserving proposals. Gillmor, supra note
337.
341. Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing, GITHUB, https://github.com/DP-3T
[https://perma.cc/M72S-WWDS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
342. Informal differentiation suggested by the team behind the “East Coast PACT,” upon noting
the accidental similarity in acronym. See Ronald L. Rivest et al., The PACT Protocol Specification,
PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocolspecification-ver-0.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9HF-2C96] (“One could disambiguate by calling this
reference the ‘West Coast PACT’ and the current paper the ‘East Coast PACT’”.).
343. PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing, PACT, https://pact.mit.edu
[https://perma.cc/T6VF-JBQZ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021); Ronald L. Rivest et al., PACT: Private
Automated
Contact
Tracing,
PACT
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://pact.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/MIT-PACT-ONEPAGER-2020-04-07-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VHM8X8J]; Rivest et al., supra note 342.
344. See Justin Chan et al., PACT: Privacy-Sensitive Protocols and Mechanisms for Mobile
Contact
Tracing,
ARXIV
2
(May
7,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03544.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCF5-A8ZV] (defining privacy sensitive
protocols and mechanisms for mobile contact tracing by a West Coast research group).
345. TCN Coalition and LFPH Have Merged, LINUX FOUNDATION PUBLIC HEALTH,
https://www.lfph.io/tcn-coalition/ [https://perma.cc/6KZD-UADC] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021)
(discussing how the TCN Coalition has merged into the Linux Foundation Public Health).
346. See Natasha Lomas, An EU Coalition of Techies is Backing a ‘Privacy Preserving’
Standard for COVID-19 Contacts Tracing, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 1, 2020, 4:16 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/01/an-eu-coalition-of-techies-is-backing-a-privacy-preservingstandard-for-covid-19-contacts-tracing/ [https://perma.cc/3237-E5TL] (describing the European
decentralized contract tracing initiative and its privacy-preserving approach).
347. See Rivest et al., supra note 342 (noting the East Coast PACT’s similarities to other
decentralized contract tracing projects).
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proximity with an infected person), aiding widespread adoption and
use.348
Perhaps the leading commercial proposal is an approach developed by
Apple and Google in partnership.349 Through the joint effort, Apple and
Google launched a “comprehensive solution that includes application
programming interfaces (APIs) and operating system-level technology to
assist in enabling contact tracing.”350 An API is a computer-programing
interface that defines interactions between software components or
applications, allowing applications to call and request data. The Apple
and Google proposal performs a different function than the other
decentralized digital contact-tracing proposals, in that it provides an API
that can be used to allow communication between other applications, as
opposed to releasing an application that can stand on its own. Google and
Apple specify this as an “Exposure Notification system,” rather than a
contact-tracing application,351 perhaps for that reason.
Some nations and states have deployed contact tracing apps. However,
these apps have not reached a high percentage of the population in most
regions where the apps have launched. For example, as of July 2020, only
14.4% of the population in Germany downloaded the state-developed
“Corona-Warn-App,” and only 3% of the population in France have
downloaded the similar “StopCovid” app.352 It appears likely that digital
contact tracing will not be a large factor in solving the coronavirus
pandemic. However, with the launch of these apps, it is likely that the
next major epidemic will involve digital contact tracing. Thus, it is
important to understand how these apps function in this crisis, to better
prepare for the next one.
b. Centralized Digital Contact Tracing
Centralized digital contact-tracing apps diverge from decentralized
apps in relying on a central database or central authority for the contact-

348. Ellie Daw et al., Contact Tracing Interoperability Recommendations, TCN COALITION 4
(May 1, 2020), https://tcncoalition.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/tcncoalition_interoperability_
recommendations_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C78A-M7N5].
349. Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, GOOGLE BLOG
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/apple-and-googlepartner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology [https://perma.cc/4GC8-H9HM].
350. Id.
351. Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/covid19/
contacttracing [https://perma.cc/5PV5-3XBH] (last visited Feb. 228, 2021).
352. Gabriel Geiger, Europeans Aren’t Really Using COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, VICE
(July 21, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/akzne5/europeans-arent-reallyusing-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps [https://perma.cc/5X6L-XT3Z].
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tracing data and process.353 For example, Singapore’s Trace Together
app collects all data from individual devices in a national government
database.354
Centralized contact-tracing app proposals have involved a variety of
data sources, primarily Bluetooth data and cell phone location data. For
example, a Bluetooth-based decentralized app would infer proximity
through anonymous key exchange device-to-device; but a Bluetoothbased centralized app could infer proximity through keys stored on a
central database, with data collected from each device and results pushed
back to devices.
The chief privacy concern with centralized contact tracing is that these
programs would enable governments to collect and use data as part of
large-scale surveillance, with few limits on what governments could do
with the data.355 With centralized digital contact tracing, a central
authority has control over all data that is collected, used, shared, and
stored. There are few protections against misuse of data collected by these
apps. Thus, the privacy of users of centralized contact-tracing apps
depends on the trustworthiness of the central authority.
However, as Helen Nissenbaum noted on Twitter, “[t]here’s no loss of
privacy as long as data is appropriately channeled. Trade off language
sets up false dilemmas; we can enjoy gains without privacy
casualties.”356 Using Nissenbaum’s influential contextual integrity
framework,357 we can certainly envision a scenario in which privacy
rights are protected for the specific contexts raised by the contact-tracing
process. In fact, centralized contact-tracing apps could arguably be more
secure or privacy-protective, in that one central source stores all private
information, making it potentially easier to govern the flows of data.
353. Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID19 Pandemic, OSF PREPRINTS 1, 2 (Dec. 8, 2020), https://osf.io/9wz3y [https://perma.cc/TCK3QR6W].
354. See Gerard Goggin, COVID-19 Apps in Singapore and Australia: Reimagining Healthy
Nations with Digital Technology, 17 MEDIA INT’L AUSTL., 61, 63–64 (Nov. 2020) (describing how
Singapore’s TraceTogether app works in cooperation with the government’s contract tracing
efforts).
355. See Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact
Tracing, LAWFARE (May 1, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equitycontact-tracing [https://perma.cc/96W5-MSQL] (“[O]nce in place, apps created even for beneficial
purposes are sometimes retooled for purposes far less sanguine. . . . History tells us that increased
[government] surveillance and punitiveness will disproportionately harm people already struggling
with poverty, as well as African Americans, Latinx, immigrants, and non-English speakers.”).
356. Helen Nissenbaum (@HNissenbaum), TWITTER (May 13, 2020, 3:13 PM),
https://twitter.com/HNissenbaum/status/1260649364407545856 [https://perma.cc/M6FJ-66XY].
357. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
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c. Digital Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact
One issue with digital contact tracing apps, whether decentralized or
centralized, is that they require a high percentage of the population to
download and use the apps in order for the apps to actually be effective
in tracing contacts and stopping or slowing the spread of disease.358
However, early research surveying public perception on various digital
contact-tracing apps revealed mixed results,359 suggesting that it may be
difficult to convince some populations (e.g., certain nations or regions) to
adopt the apps at a high enough rate to be efficacious. Indeed, as of July
2020, few if any nations that have rolled out voluntary apps have seen
app adoption at rates necessary for effective contact tracing.360 Some
nations, like India,361 have gotten around this by mandating citizens
download and use the app.
Several scholars and advocates have expressed concerns about the
privacy and civil liberties harms contact-tracing apps might cause.
Woodrow Hartzog noted that, although the Google and Apple proposal
358. See Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease
Us Out of Lockdown, U. OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-0416-digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-oflockdown [https://perma.cc/NJ57-MM5K] (noting that around half of a country’s total population
would need to use the app to be effective).
359. See, e.g., Monica Anderson & Brooke Auxier, Most Americans Don’t Think Cellphone
Tracking Will Help Limit COVID-19, Are Divided on Whether It’s Acceptable, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/16/most-americans-dont-thinkcellphone-tracking-will-help-limit-covid-19-are-divided-on-whether-its-acceptable
[https://perma.cc/DT27-A8SJ] (reporting American public opinion poll results on location tracking
apps along with public health officials responses); Eszter Hargittai et al., Covid-19 Study on Digital
Media and the Coronavirus Pandemic, WEB USE PROJECT, http://webuse.org/covid
[https://perma.cc/XWH9-VT69] (Jan. 12, 2021) (including a graph of survey results on likelihood
of respondents installing a COVID-19 tracking app); Luke Milsom et al., Survey of Acceptability
of App-Based Contact Tracing in the UK, US, France, Germany and Italy, OSF, osf.io/7vgq9
[https://osf.io/7vgq9/] (July 21, 2020, 5:59 AM) (reporting survey responses in five countries to
whether respondents would install a tracking app on their phone); Zhang et al., supra note 353, at
13–14 (concluding that many Americans are reluctant to use digital contact tracing apps); Lucy
Simko et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences, SEC. &
PRIV. RSCH. LAB U. WASH. 2–3 (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-user-privacy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84Q3-ABVC] (summarizing early public opinions on various contact tracing
technologies). For a publicly accessible, updated list of studies on public perceptions of privacy
and contact-tracing apps see Baobao Zhang, COVID-19 Contact Tracing & Contact Tracing Apps
Public Opinion Studies, NOTION, https://www.notion.so/34e11bad13e34c558f5aa4a4975f6df0?v=
c36d57c8ae5640a49a00b91d79a4cf9c [https://perma.cc/5ZGG-VKVY] (last visited April 1,
2021).
360. See Geiger, supra note 352 (noting low voluntary app adoption rates across several
European countries).
361. Patrick Howell O’Neill, India Is Forcing People to Use Its Covid App, Unlike Any Other
Democracy, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/
1001360/india-aarogya-setu-covid-app-mandatory [https://perma.cc/8JC8-CV8S].

2021]

Privacy in Pandemic

845

might be well-meaning, it would be difficult for the companies to police
the use of app operators to ensure compliance.362 This is not far-fetched.
One need only look at the noncompliance of app developers on the
Google Play Store or Apple App Store, which has been a constant issue
for many app platforms.363 Hartzog argues it would be simple for
governments to abuse even the most privacy-preserving contact-tracing
apps and, crucially, “this technology, once deployed, will not be ‘rolled
back.’”364
Susan Landau and coauthors Christy E. Lopez and Laura Moy have
also argued that contact-tracing apps may also create a false sense of
security, leading some to recklessly put themselves at greater risk of
exposure while relying on a potentially ineffective app.365 Contacttracing apps also raise equity concerns, as highlighted by Landau and her
coauthors, generating more false positives, with worse consequences.366
Additionally, if data collected through these apps is eventually used for
other purposes, including law enforcement, this could have worse impact
on some populations.367 Lucy Simko and others have noted a number of
privacy harms, including the potential for malicious actors to create
intentional false positives, with negative consequences for people or
businesses.368
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions for Contact-Tracing Programs
First, we must accept that we are wading in uncharted waters with
digital contact-tracing applications launched at national or global scale.
It is likely that we will not know what the best solution was until much
later, with the precise view that only hindsight can provide. With that in
mind, because the need is so dire, and the risks of not pushing forth with
a full-fledged approach are hundreds of thousands to millions of deaths,
362. Woodrow Hartzog, Op-Ed: Coronavirus Tracing Apps Are Coming. Here’s How They
Could Reshape Surveillance as We Know It, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-12/coronavirus-tracing-app-apple-google
[https://perma.cc/WX8Q-GBM7].
363. For example, the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal was caused by a rogue thirdparty app exceeding the terms. See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What
You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/F8QH-F3E7] (explaining how a third party app creator working with Cambridge
Analytica violated Facebook’s terms of service in selling data harvested for academic research to
a political consulting firm).
364. Hartzog, supra note 362.
365. Landau, Lopez & Moy, supra note 355.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Simko et al., supra note 359, at 6.
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there is no choice but to throw everything at the problem and see what
sticks.369 Digital contact-tracing applications will not be enough (likely
due to low user adoption), but they can theoretically help supplement or
inform human contact tracing. If nothing else, it is helpful to evaluate
their use in this pandemic to better prepare for the next global health
crisis.
If we are to use or even try digital contact tracing, it is key that
policymakers and other authorities understand the technical details of
these apps, particularly the tradeoffs between centralized and
decentralized digital contact-tracing proposals. This will require
consultation with technical experts, as the relative dearth of technical
experts embedded in government and policymaking roles is a
longstanding problem.
None of these applications can be perfectly precise and without flaws,
including false positives (e.g., people whose devices were in close
Bluetooth proximity but who were physically not with their devices370)
and false negatives371 (e.g., any single person not using the app).
However, it appears that decentralized apps are likely the better choice,
both because they are more privacy-preserving on a technical level and
also because, due to the lack of consumer faith in government privacy
protection,372 they may be the better choice in terms of privacy perception
and likely user adoption.
Governments and other actors seeking to launch digital contact-tracing
programs should encourage the use of decentralized contact-tracing apps
that are interoperable at some level. Additionally, governments should
pass laws that address the use of information collected during the contacttracing process, including during human contact tracing, in order to
protect the privacy of individuals. Regulatory agencies like HHS, the

369. See Tiffany C. Li, Give All My Data to Google and the CDC, SLATE (Apr. 6, 2020, 9:00
AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/google-cdc-data-privacy-covid19.html
[https://perma.cc/WW7C-SYQC] (arguing that data privacy may be subordinate to the moral
imperative of saving lives during the pandemic provided personal data is used for that sole purpose).
370. Ross Anderson, Contact Tracing in the Real World, LIGHT BLUE TOUCHPAPER (Apr. 12,
2020),
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world
[https://perma.cc/98NA-Y8RP].
371. Susan Landau, Looking Beyond Contact Tracing to Stop the Spread, LAWFARE (Apr. 10,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/looking-beyond-contact-tracing-stop-spread
[https://perma.cc/RF97-XUM5].
372. See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack
of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confusedand-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/HT3C-KNBL] (citing American public opinion polls showing distrust of the government’s use of their personal data).

2021]

Privacy in Pandemic

847

FTC, and even NIST373 can also release guidance on privacy protections,
both regarding enforceable mechanisms and best practices for contacttracing programs. Similarly, those who build, implement, and run
contact-tracing programs should also create and agree to industry
standards, in line with what researchers have been doing with
interoperability standards for decentralized contact-tracing applications.
Publicizing privacy protections may aid in restoring user trust, which may
then help increase use of contact-tracing programs, digital or not.
D. Novel Technologies in Healthcare
The pandemic has already changed healthcare, with effects that may
last long after the world recovers. For example, there has been great
growth in telemedicine and telehealth services, as many healthcare
providers have closed their offices or limited in-person visits.374 The
pandemic has brought some medical uses of technology to the forefront,
including telehealth and telemedicine, use of medical artificial
intelligence (AI) in diagnostics and research, and the use of patient-facing
devices and care robots in healthcare settings.
At the same time, the unique dimensions of the pandemic have
changed the use of technology in medicine. The public health emergency
has created the sudden need for a large medical and healthcare workforce,
both in direct response to patients in relation to COVID-19 and associated
medical issues, as well as to replace healthcare workers who may be
indisposed due to exposure to the virus or becoming ill themselves. The
extremely contagious nature of the virus has also made it difficult to treat
patients, necessitating a limitation on physical contact between patients
and healthcare professionals as well as the friends and family who would
otherwise be visiting. Additionally, different groups of people may be
facing disparate health struggles, including exacerbated issues of bias in
medical care.375

373. The NIST is the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a physical sciences laboratory and a nonregulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce. See generally
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/ [https://perma.cc/KH43-XXEJ] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
374. Kathleen T. Jordan, An Unexpected Benefit of the Pandemic: The Doctor Will Virtually
See You Now, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 8:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2020/04/14/telemedicine-virtual-health-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/JYR9-ALZF].
375. See John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, Questions of Bias in Covid-19 Treatment Add to
the Mourning for Black Families, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/
us/coronavirus-african-americans-bias.html [https://perma.cc/R6BZ-ZCEJ] (May 20, 2020)
(explaining the persistent, systemic racial biases in the American medical system that the pandemic
has exacerbated).

848

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

1. Telehealth and Telemedicine
Two unique factors of this pandemic have led to a rise in telehealth,
telemedicine, and teletherapy services. First, the novel coronavirus is
highly contagious, necessitating social distancing.376 Traditional physical
locations where healthcare is provided have been shut down, and inperson house calls raise concerns regarding contagion as well. Second,
the failures in the health systems of many nations in being able to meet
medical needs of both COVID-19 sufferers and others during this time
have led to a need for more medical services. Thus, in a time when more
medical services are needed, and yet medical service providers cannot
physically be near patients, telehealth has become an important part of
healthcare across the world.
Regulators have recognized this need, relaxing some HIPAA
restrictions to allow for more medical providers to more easily offer
telehealth services to patients in need.377 It is possible that these
relaxations of HIPAA may pave the way for future loosening of HIPAA
and related restrictions on transmission and storage of health information.
Telehealth has been beneficial to many, improving access to healthcare
for people in rural areas,378 low-income populations, disabled people, and
more. However, the increased use of telehealth may disadvantage people
without access to stable or strong internet or computer or mobile devices.
What is interesting is not telehealth itself, or HIPAA, but rather the
speed at which HHS was willing to bend HIPAA rules in a state of public
health emergency.379 This speaks to the malleability of HIPAA
protections—and U.S. health-privacy protections generally. While the
pandemic may have been a good reason to loosen these regulations, one
must wonder if the regulations so easily loosened should be restructured
overall to better fit future crises. Perhaps health-privacy regulations
should allow for emergency response and for technological innovation
when needed, while still protecting patient privacy. If the current
regulatory scheme for health privacy does not adequately protect
Americans in a public health crisis, the law must resolve this discrepancy.

376. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
377. See sources cited supra note 264 and accompanying text.
378. Gaby Galvin, Expanded Telehealth Has Provided a Boost for Rural America. Will It Last?,
U.S. NEWS (May 7, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/202005-07/telehealth-a-boost-for-rural-america-during-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/8R4C276R].
379. See Jordan, supra note 374 (contrasting the decades of reluctance to telehealth by federal
regulators with the near-immediate relaxation of these regulations in March 2020).
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2. Medical AI for Research, Diagnostics, and Triage
Artificial intelligence and machine learning tools have also been key
components of the medical and scientific response to the pandemic.
Artificial intelligence describes any form of machine intelligence
designed to mimic the functionality of human intelligence.380 Machine
learning is a process by which a machine is fed a quantity of data, from
which it extrapolates certain predictions based on that data.381
AI is being used in medical research, to search for treatments and
vaccines for the novel coronavirus. For example, one of the most tragic
phenomena of this pandemic has been that the lack of medical resources
has pushed doctors to triage lifesaving equipment, making decisions on
who lives or dies.382 Researchers have adapted or implemented existing
AI technology for use in medical triage for COVID-19 patients.
Researchers in China and the United States reportedly developed an AIbacked tool to predict which newly infected patients would likely later
develop acute respiratory disease syndrome (ARDS), a severe lung
disease that kills fifty percent of patients.383 The idea was that this tool
could then be used by hospitals running low on resources to triage their
patients—e.g., giving ventilators to patients less likely to develop ARDS
(and thus more likely to survive the infection).384 Another AI system
designed to help hospitals triage patients is eCART, a system used by the
University of Chicago Medical Center, to predict which patients will have

380. MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE 9 (2018) (“This book hews closely
to the real mathematical, cognitive, and computational concepts that are in the actual academic
discipline of artificial intelligence: knowledge representation and reasoning, logic, machine
learning, natural language processing, search, planning, mechanics, and ethics.”).
381. See id. at 91–94 (explaining machine learning, its evolving definitions, and how it works).
382. See, e.g., John Chisolm, Opinion, Doctors Will Have to Choose Who Gets Life-Saving
Treatment. Here’s How We’ll Do It, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020, 9:08 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/01/doctors-choose-life-saving-treatmentethical-rules [https://perma.cc/FKF8-3RNZ] (referencing “heart-wrenching” choices made in
Spain and Italy over who gets access to life-saving care); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, James Phillips &
Govind Persad, How the Coronavirus May Force Doctors to Decide Who Can Live and Who Dies,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/opinion/coronavirus-hospitalshortage.html [https://perma.cc/YM9N-D2ST] (citing similar triage choices for admission to both
Chinese and South Korean hospitals in the early days of the pandemic, in addition to Italy’s
equipment shortages); Yascha Mounk, The Extraordinary Decisions Facing Italian Doctors,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/who-gets-hospitalbed/607807 [https://perma.cc/CU68-UXU5] (describing the experiences of medical providers
planning for emergency triage situations in several contexts).
383. AI Tool Predicts Which Coronavirus Patients Get Deadly ‘Wet Lung,’ YAHOO! NEWS
(Mar. 30, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/ai-tool-predicts-coronavirus-patients-deadly-wet-lung184124238.html [https://perma.cc/9G6E-RDDR].
384. Id.
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worse medical outcomes (e.g., which patients will need intubations).385
A Stanford team lead by Ron Li is also evaluating an automated
“Deterioration Index” to identify patients whose medical conditions will
likely deteriorate.386
These AI-enabled tools may be useful in aiding medical staff,
potentially saving time and resources. They may also lift some of the
burdens from physicians and other healthcare workers who would
otherwise have to make difficult decisions on their own that would take
time from their other clinical duties. It is possible that having an AIenabled tool to back up a doctor’s decision could alleviate some of the
burden of this ethical quagmire. Medical AI tools may be able to save
time and resources for health professionals, which could mean saving
lives when in a public health crisis. However, the use of AI in medical
triage is fraught with ethical issues, including concerns raised by
disability advocates that people with disabilities may be at higher risk of
death due to triage plans prioritizing people without disabilities.387
AI systems should be designed with privacy interests in mind. For
example, if patient data is used to train a machine learning algorithm on
predicting which patients may develop which symptoms, it is necessary
that the patient data is deidentified or collected in a nonidentifiable
manner. The use of patient data, potentially including photographs (e.g.,
x-ray scans of lungs to analyze COVID-related damage388), also comes
with privacy risks. Reidentification of data is always a risk, as well as
misuse of patient data. Patients may not realize how their data is used,
and, while proper informed consent is necessary before collecting patient
data for use in these systems, it may be difficult to gain adequate consent
for difficult-to-understand tools and data usage, particularly in
emergency settings. While regulations like the 21st Century Cures Act
may protect patient information used in federal research, some AI

385. Eliza Strickland, AI Can Help Hospitals Decide Which COVID-19 Patients Live or Die,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 17, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificialintelligence/medical-ai/ai-can-help-hospitals-triage-covid19-patients
[https://perma.cc/79E3TDS4].
386. Id. (“[T]he [Deterioration Index] model predicts which patients are likely to need an ICU
transfer, have a cardiac arrest, or die”).
387. See Mike Baker, Whose Life Is Worth Saving? In Washington State, People with
Disabilities Are Afraid They Won’t Make the Cut, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/coronavirus-washington-triage-disabledhandicapped.html [https://perma.cc/CNL7-9ULF] (discussing Washington’s triage plan that may
disadvantage people with disabilities relative to able-bodied people).
388. Scott Lyon, AI Tool Gives Doctors a New Look at Lungs While Treating COVID-19,
PRINCETON UNIV. (May 21, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2020/05/21/ai-toolgives-doctors-new-look-lungs-treating-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/P6Y5-X6HY].
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systems are built by private institutions,389 with fewer regulations on the
collection and use of data. Additionally, the critical emergency nature of
an active global pandemic may necessitate a relaxing of some privacybased restrictions on use of data, including in AI systems.
These AI-based tools are not without their drawbacks. Many scholars
have highlighted problems with bias390 that creep into the design and
implementation of many AI systems. Medical AI systems also suffer
from this problem,391 and the consequences can be literal life or death for
patients.392 While it is understandable that healthcare providers in the
middle of a public health emergency turn to any tools that can help them
maximize their time and resources and help save more lives, it is
troubling that some of these tools may not have been designed with
fairness and equality in mind.
Privacy is an important dimension of the algorithmic-discrimination
problem. Some privacy-protective measures may actually make
algorithmic discrimination worse. For example, by stripping data of some
identifying characteristics (like race, gender, and so on), system designers
389. See, e.g., Baidu, How Baidu Is Bringing AI to the Fight Against Coronavirus, MIT TECH.
REV. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/11/905366/how-baidu-isbringing-ai-to-the-fight-against-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/XM5W-FF2H] (noting the AI
technology that both public and private entities are deploying in the pandemic).
390. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 680 (2016) (“[B]iased training data leads to discriminatory models.”); Joy Buolamwini
& Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 77–78 (2018) (finding that AI facial
recognition tools misclassify individuals based on race and gender); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2014) (“Because human beings program predictive algorithms, their biases and values are
embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the source code and predictive algorithms.”);
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 101 (2014) (“[C]ompanies have utilized Big Data
models to identify and avoid Internet users with low credit scores when posting advertisements for
loans.”).
391. See, e.g., Danton S. Char, Nigam H. Shah & David Magnus, Implementing Machine
Learning in Health Care—Addressing Ethical Challenges, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 981 (2018)
(concluding algorithms that use genetic data to predict health outcomes may be biased if there is a
lack of genetic study in certain populations); W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual
Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 67 (2019) (finding that most medical AI systems are trained in
“high resource settings” which may bias patients in “low resource settings”); Carolyn Y. Johnson,
Racial Bias in a Medical Algorithm Favors White Patients Over Sicker Black Patients, WASH.
POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/10/24/racial-biasmedical-algorithm-favors-white-patients-over-sicker-black-patients
[https://perma.cc/2ZMVJYPR] (describing a medical technology company’s algorithm that disadvantaged black patients’
care relative to white patients).
392. Gina Kolata, Many Medical Decision Tools Disadvantage Black Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/health/many-medical-decision-tools-disadvantage-blackpatients.html [https://perma.cc/TCQ9-XD4P] (July 21, 2020).
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may unknowingly use biased data or data that is not reflective of their
target population. This may also make it more difficult to audit the
algorithms afterward, to analyze if algorithmic discrimination occurred.
It is also possible that privacy laws and regulations may limit the data
available to researchers and designers of AI systems.
Algorithmic discrimination can happen at different points in an AI
systems, including in the designed goals of the system, the selection of
training data, the choice of parameters, and more.393 For example, an AIbased tool that predicts the likelihood a COVID-19 patient will survive
intubation could rely on past data of patients that have had the virus and
either did end up surviving intubation or didn’t. However, the data set of
patient outcomes might not include confounding factors, including race,
gender, socioeconomic class, and more. The data set thus may reflect
biases.
For example, consider a hospital that decides to use an AI triage system
that predicts patient survival based on a data set of past patients and
intubation survival rates. The hospital uses this system to decide which
patients are given priority when allocating ventilators. A system based on
past survival data may seem unbiased and neutral. However, there are a
number of ways bias could creep in. Perhaps patients living in lowincome areas tended to also suffer from lack of access to consistent
healthcare and nutrition, leading to worse health outcomes when
hospitalized. The predictive algorithm, then, might predict outcomes that
reflect those biases, predicting that low-income patients would be less
likely to survive intubation. This would create what many would agree
would be a discriminatory outcome: the AI tool would suggest
disproportionately that low-income patients should not be prioritized. A
hospital using this system would then unintentionally prioritize wealthier
patients, leading to a death disparity.
Of course, human healthcare providers may also not be without their
own biases. Studies have shown that some groups suffer worse outcomes
than others, due possibly to the bias of healthcare workers. 394 For
example, a review of pain management in hospitals found that Black and

393. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 390, at 680–81 (considering that training data may be
biased due to a biased sample of the population); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 681 (2017) (noting that less data on underrepresented populations can lead
to feature selection in medical AI).
394. See, e.g., DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY
IN AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 1–2 (2015) (“[B]y one estimate, 83,570 minority patients die annually
due to health care disparities.”); Leonard E. Egede, Race, Ethnicity, Culture, and Disparities in
Health Care, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 667, 667 (2006) (“[T]here is evidence that racial and
ethnic minorities tend to receive lower quality care than nonminorities . . . .”).
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Hispanic patients were less likely to receive pain-relieving analgesia for
the management of acute pain, implying that healthcare providers had
made decisions based on patients’ race and not on the patients’ actual
need for pain relief.395 Bias may also be playing a role in creating
disproportionate medical consequences for some communities in the
pandemic.396
The law has not comprehensively addressed the risks of medical AI.397
While medical AI tools can be useful in a public health emergency like
the coronavirus pandemic, the law must balance protection of patient
privacy and algorithmic rights versus the need for researchers and
healthcare providers to act and innovate nimbly in times of crisis.
3. Healthcare Robots
One of the myriad difficulties of healthcare in the middle of a highly
contagious viral epidemic is the need to isolate patients from each other,
from healthcare professionals, and from their family and friends. Some
hospitals have also turned to robots to assist,398 especially where it would
be difficult or costly to have humans performing the same tasks. 399 For
example, robots have been used in hospitals around the world to remotely

395. Paulyne Lee et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Management of Acute Pain in US
Emergency Departments: Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review, 37 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED.
1770, 1772 (2019).
396. Ben Crump, For Black Americans, Bias Seen in Coronavirus Response Is Continuation of
Injustice, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2020/04/09/blackamericans-coronavirus-response-continuation-injustice/5120999002
[https://perma.cc/73PMKXZV] (Apr. 10, 2020, 11:04 AM); see Eligon & Burch, supra note 375 (“Acknowledging a
history of implicit bias in medical care, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently
advised health care professionals to be careful not to let bias influence their treatment during this
pandemic.”).
397. Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 389 (2017); Charlotte A.
Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence for Patients of
the Future, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 178 (2018).
398. Mary Meisenzahl, An Indian Hospital Is Using Robots with Thermal Cameras to Screen
Coronavirus Patients—Here’s How They Work, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2020, 6:45 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/india-coronavirus-robot-uses-thermal-camera-to-taketemperature-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/2BJB-4F25]; Robin R. Murphy et al., Robots Are Playing
Many Roles in the Coronavirus Crisis—And Offering Lessons for Future Disasters,
CONVERSATION (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:56 AM), https://theconversation.com/robots-are-playing-manyroles-in-the-coronavirus-crisis-and-offering-lessons-for-future-disasters-135527
[https://perma.cc/AVM3-QEXV]; Cat Wise, How Robots and Other Tech Can Make the Fight
Against
Coronavirus
Safer,
PBS
(May
4,
2020,
5:47
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-robots-and-other-tech-can-make-the-fight-againstcoronavirus-safer [https://perma.cc/YM7Z-ZYRE].
399. See Murphy et al., supra note 398 (“One important lesson is that during a disaster robots
do not replace people. They either perform tasks that a person could not do or do safely, or take on
tasks that free up responders to handle the increased workload.”).
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take temperature readings,400 a task that would otherwise require a human
healthcare provider to get in close physical proximity to the patient.
While the coronavirus pandemic created new needs for robots deployed
in healthcare settings, robots have been frequently deployed in other
disaster and emergency settings.401 Robots can be helpful in emergency
situations where a human presence would be dangerous or inefficient,
including in healthcare emergencies where human proximity is a
potential vector for deadly viruses.
Robotics scholar Robin R. Murphy and the Robotics for Infectious
Diseases team she chairs have been tracking the way robots have been
used during the COVID-19 response worldwide.402 As of April 2020,
Murphy’s team has reported many uses of robots in healthcare settings or
functions as part of COVID-19 response. These uses have included
disinfecting physical spaces (e.g., clinics and hospitals); telepresence
abilities for healthcare workers (e.g., allowing a nurse to check on patient
symptoms virtually); patient intake and visitors; patient and family
socializing; delivery and dispensing of food, prescriptions, or other items;
and testing (e.g., temperature scans).403 As Murphy and her colleagues
predict, the use of robots in COVID-19 response may lead to an increased
use of robots in healthcare or other settings, as well as the development
of new robots.404
400. See Meisenzahl, supra note 398 (noting the use in Indian hospitals of a robot to take
patients’ temperatures); SNUH Uses New Methods to Prevent COVID-19 Infection,
SNUH (Mar. 26, 2020), http://www.snuh.org/global/en/about/newsView.do?bbs_no=5113
[https://perma.cc/SC6S-MK89] (reporting the use in South Korea of robots to collect basic patient
information and take temperatures).
401. See, e.g., ROBIN R. MURPHY, DISASTER ROBOTICS 21–39 (2014) (describing and
analyzing thirty-four disasters and extreme incidents where robots have been deployed); Robin R.
Murphy, International Cooperation in Deploying Robots for Disasters: Lessons for the Future from
the Great East Japan Earthquake, 32 J. ROBOTICS SOC’Y JAPAN 104, 104–05 (2014) (discussing
twenty-nine separate occasions where robots were used in disasters between 2001 and 2012); Robin
R. Murphy et al., Mobile Robots in Mine Rescue and Recovery, 16 IEEE ROBOTICS &
AUTOMATION MAG. 91, 91 (2009) (describing the use of robots in mine rescues).
402. Evan Ackerman, New Consortium Mobilizes Roboticists to Help With COVID-19 and
Future Crises, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:58 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/
robotics/medical-robots/robotics-for-infectious-diseases-consortium
https://perma.cc/2XG9THYP]; Robin Murphy & Vignesh Gandudi, How Robots Are Being Used for COVID-19,
ROBOTICS FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, https://roboticsforinfectiousdiseases.org/how-robots-arebeing-used.html [https://perma.cc/GG9X-2H4D]; see Wise, supra note 398 (citing Murphy’s
team’s work tracking the use of robots deployed during the pandemic).
403. See Murphy & Gandudi, supra note 402 (tracking the various uses of robots to complete
tasks in healthcare settings during the pandemic); see also Ackerman, supra note 402 (citing
Murphy’s work adapting the use of robots during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa to similar uses
in the COVID-19 pandemic).
404. See Murphy et al., supra note 398 (“Hopefully, COVID-19 will accelerate the adoption of
existing robots and their adaptation to new niches, but it might also lead to new robots.”).
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The use of robots in healthcare settings for pandemic response raises
interesting legal questions. Ryan Calo has written extensively on the
“exceptional” nature of robots and the necessity for transforming laws to
adapt to the needs of regulating robots,405 including in the realm of
privacy law.406 Calo notes three unique characteristics of robots that will
require transformations in law: embodiment (i.e., physical presence),
emergence (e.g., the potential for autonomous, independent action), and
social valence (here, the idea that robots “feel different to us, more like
living agents”).407 Other scholars have also noted the distinctive privacy
regulation challenges stemming from these factors.408
While truly autonomous robots that are capable of acting without a
“human in the loop” are still a long way off, the physical embodiment of
robots in healthcare settings and in emergency response creates
interesting challenges for regulating these uses of robots. The types of
robots used in healthcare and emergency response contexts are, as Eduard
Fosch Villaronga puts it, “complex cyber-physical systems.”409 To
regulate their use, the law must address the privacy implications of both
digital data collection and use as well as the privacy harms specifically
created by the physical presence of robots, their movements, and their
physical functions. As Christoph Lutz and his coauthors describe, “[t]he
dimension of physical privacy is affected by the physical nature and
mobility of social robots, while social robots’ data collection and
processing capacities affect users’ informational privacy.”410 While
technologies like medical AI and telemedicine platforms may affect a
person’s informational privacy, healthcare robots used in pandemic
response may affect both informational privacy and physical privacy.
Additionally, the privacy impacts of robots will be influenced by the
social valence of robots and our natural inclination to anthropomorphize
certain robots, ascribing to them characteristics and perhaps legal
405. See Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in
ROBOT LAW 3, 12 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) ( “The sheer variety
of applications that robots can and will be used for will thus put pressure on the legal system in a
wide variety of substantive areas, including tort, contract consumer protection, privacy, and
constitutional law, among others.”); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 513, 537 (2015) (discussing the legal implications of section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 on the manufacturers of robotic platforms).
406. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 187–88 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George Bekey eds., 2012).
407. Calo, supra note 405, at 532.
408. For a scoping study of literature on the field, see generally Christoph Lutz et al., The
Privacy Implications of Social Robots: Scoping Review and Expert Interviews, 7 MOBILE MEDIA
& COMMC’N 412 (2019).
409. EDUARD FOSCH VILLARONGA, ROBOTS, HEALTHCARE, AND THE LAW ii (2019).
410. Lutz et al., supra note 408, at 416.
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protections we ordinarily would give to human beings.411 Many
healthcare robots would likely be designed as social robots, a category
Kate Darling has defined as a robot that is a “physically embodied,
autonomous agent that communicates and interacts with humans on a
social level,”412 often “communicat[ing] through social cues,
display[ing] adaptive learning behavior, and mimic[ing] various
emotional states.”413 Humans often display empathy toward social
robots. One study showed that humans were more likely to hesitate to
strike a robot if the robot had first been given a lifelike story, suggesting
that stories may influence the empathic responses of humans to robots.414
In a healthcare setting, particularly in a dire emergency healthcare setting,
humans may quickly link certain robots with emotional stories or
characteristics. For example, a healthcare robot that regularly delivers
pain-relieving medication to a coronavirus patient may become
associated with positive thoughts.
Both the emotionally intensive experience of being in a critical
healthcare space (for patients, loved ones, and healthcare workers) as well
as the emotionally intensive experience of living through a global
pandemic may contribute to healthcare robots being associated with
emotions, stories, or other human-like characteristics. This increased
anthropomorphization of healthcare robots in a pandemic may have
impacts on privacy, as would the increased emotional connections people
may develop with the robots that function in this space and time. For
example, it’s possible people may experience greater privacy loss,
viewing the robot’s intrusions (physical or otherwise) as similar to that of
a human’s. It is also possible that individuals voluntarily give more data
to robots (for example, answering questions about symptoms), based on
feeling an emotional or quasi-human connection. On the other hand, it is
also possible that individuals feel less privacy impact, particularly if, as
some believe, privacy is most importantly considered a right to be let
alone from the eyes of other humans.415

411. Brian R. Duffy, Anthropomorphism and the Social Robot, 42 ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS
SYS. 175, 179 (2003).
412. Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213,
215 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
413. Id.
414. Kate Darling et al., Empathic Concern and the Effect of Stories in Human-Robot
Interaction, 24 PROC. IEEE INT’L WORKSHOP ON ROBOT & HUM. INTERACTIVE COMMC’N (ROMAN) 770, 772–74 (2015).
415. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194–
95 (1890).
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Protecting the privacy rights of individuals dealing with healthcare
robots during a pandemic can be difficult, as many individuals do not
understand how robots work in practice and how the use of any particular
robot may impact their privacy.416 In fact, some have argued that notice
and consent is not possible with many types of robots used in healthcare,
given the lack of information, amount of new knowledge needed for
many users, and the resulting difficulty of obtaining truly informed
consent.417
People who are ill may have less ability to advocate for themselves and
protect themselves from privacy violations due to the use of robots.
Studies have shown that women, people of color, disabled people, and
other people from marginalized backgrounds already suffer
disproportionately negative outcomes in healthcare, including simply not
having their cares addressed by healthcare workers.418 These people may
be less able to advocate for themselves if they view the use of robots to
be intrusive. (Though it is also possible that healthcare robots may
actually create greater equity in healthcare, depending on one’s
perception of the comparative biases of robots and humans in providing
equal care.) An additional dimension of healthcare in pandemic is the
isolated nature of patients, who are unable to have friends or family visit
them and act as patient advocates. If a coronavirus patient cannot muster
the strength to ask for a robot to be removed, there may be no one around
them who can advocate for them.
The privacy of people dealing with healthcare robots is particularly
important in an emotionally fraught time like a pandemic, especially in
416. Christoph Lutz & Aurelia Tamò Larrieux, RoboCode-Ethicists: Privacy-Friendly Robots,
an Ethical Responsibility of Engineers?, 7 CONF. ACM WEB SCI. CONF. 1, 3 (2015); Min Kyung
Lee et al., Understanding Users’ Perception of Privacy in Human-Robot Interaction, 6 PROC. INT’L
CONF. ON HUM.-ROBOT INTERACTION 181, 182 (2011).
417. Heather Draper & Tom Sorell, Ethical Values and Social Care Robots for Older People,
19 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 49, 63 (2017); Kaminski, supra note 153, at 1136.
418. See, e.g., Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment
Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks and Whites,
113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4296, 4300 (2016), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJM200008243430809 [https://perma.cc/U46Z-J4WN] (“[B]eliefs about biological differences
between blacks and whites—beliefs dating back to slavery—are associated with the perception that
black people feel less pain than do white people and with inadequate treatment recommendations
for black patients’ pain.”); Elizabeth G. Nabel, Coronary Heart Disease in Women—An Ounce of
Prevention, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 572, 572 (2000) (describing how factors contributing to
coronary heart disease and its complications are not well-documented for women as compared to
men); Rachel Rettner, Women Feel Pain More Intensely Than Men Do, SCI. AM. (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/women-feel-pain-more-intensely/
[https://perma.cc/7CAZ-MJDH] (reporting studies showing sex differences in reported pain for
over 250 diseases and conditions, with women reporting an average of twenty percent higher pain
scores than men).
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situations where human lives are on the line. The physical presence of a
robot may feel more intrusive to someone in a heightened emotional state,
or possibly, the presence of a robot may be welcome, given the lack of
other human contact. A person’s expectation of and understanding of
privacy in relation to robots will likely change in this time and setting.
While it may be tempting to argue for laws regulating the use of robots,
as a category, the very different types of robots that are currently used
and the different settings in which they are used require specific
regulation. Particularly in sensitive contexts like healthcare, regulation of
robots must happen in specific forms, with attention paid to each
particular sector and type of use.419
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Changing Privacy Norms
Our expectations of privacy (reasonable or not) are changing. The
overall rise of the digital economy is certainly part of this change, but the
integral role that technology has played in this pandemic has also served
to accelerate changes in privacy norms. While it may be tempting to say
that some of these changes will be limited to the time of pandemic, it is
likely that changes in norms will have longer effects over time.
1. Blurring the Line Between Cyber and Physical Space
The pandemic forced millions around the world to experience the
effects of context collapse, as we faced the slow blurring of the
boundaries between previously segmented social spaces, like work,
school, home, and more. The pandemic pushed life indoors and online.
As work, school, and social life all moved online, society saw a further
erosion in the division between the digital and the physical. Some of the
privacy losses suffered in this pandemic have related to the loss of
physical spaces as well as the privacy loss of context collapse—the loss
of the ability to project or perform a different personal identity for
different contexts of one’s life. Students lost the educational privacy
afforded to them by the physical space of schools and universities.
Employees lost the privacy of their home, as remote employee
surveillance has blurred the boundaries of space. The pandemic has also
caused a crisis in interpersonal privacy, the privacy that exists within
social relationships, as more relationships either play out in a remote,

419. Eduard Fosch Villaronga et al., Did I Tell You My New Therapist is a Robot? Ethical,
Legal, and Societal Issues of Healthcare and Therapeutic Robots 2 (Oct. 17, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Social Science Research Network).
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connected fashion, or are disrupted by the growing use of remote
technologies in the home.
As society becomes increasingly digitized, with many essential
functions of society taking place in the digital realm or through digital
intermediaries, the distinction between digital and physical becomes
increasingly meaningless. We are living through contextual shifts in how
society understands the borders and limits of physical and digital spaces.
Privacy law should attempt to protect cyber space as much as it protects
physical space and digital privacy as much as it does physical privacy.
This shift in norms has been slowly developing over time, and the
pandemic’s focus on remote socialization may have highlighted or
quickened this change.
2. Privacy Is Essential for Public Health
Both public and private actors have used the public health emergency
as a rationale for deployment of privacy-invasive technologies and
technologically influenced programs. Individuals have been asked to
accept more and more privacy-violating technologies, in a number of
spaces. At the same time, both physical and digital privacy have been
threatened, all for the sake of pandemic response. However, there will
always be another emergency. This is particularly apparent, as many of
the technologies used in pandemic response are not entirely new
technologies. What has changed is the shift in scale and the shift in
justification for violations of privacy.
Society must protect the health of its people, but we must remain
vigilant about privacy incursions, because shifts in privacy norms now
will lead to lasting repercussions even after the emergency has ended. We
must also design these systems with purpose limitation for collection, use,
and transfer of data, so that a system that collects data for public health
will not later be used to infringe upon individual rights. Furthermore, for
every technology and technologically influenced response to this
pandemic, there has always been a maximally secure and privacyprotecting version. Both state and private actors should consult with
technologists and advocates in creating and implementing programs for
public health response. Laws must be nimble enough to allow for
flexibility, but with exceptions narrowly tailored to prevent privacy
overreach due to purpose dilution.
Not only can privacy and public health coexist, but privacy is essential
for public health. As seen with the failure in digital contact app adoption,
individuals will not willingly give their data to governments or companies
if they cannot trust that their privacy rights will be respected. This is
problematic because pandemics and public health crises of all sorts
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require new technological innovations and technologically influenced
solutions. To protect public health, we must protect privacy.
B. Law and Policy Recommendations
At the height of the pandemic, Congress considered two competing
bills dedicated to privacy and COVID-19.420 Both bills addressed privacy
protections for the data collection and tracking measures used in public
health response. At time of writing, it appears there will not be enough
political momentum to bring either bill to fruition.421 However, there is
still time to use lessons from this pandemic to solve privacy issues for the
future.
1. Sectoral Privacy Protection Is Not Enough
The pandemic’s privacy impacts reach across areas of law, from
consumer protection regulation to government surveillance law, and
across different industries, from education to healthcare. It is difficult to
grasp the full landscape of privacy in pandemic, due to the everexpanding web of laws and regulations that touch upon privacy and
technology. That difficulty, highlighted by the pressing urgency of the
pandemic, is in itself one of the lessons to be gleaned from analyzing
privacy and technology in this public health crisis. Regulating by data
type and data setting does not work without overarching principles and
cohesiveness between legal protections.
While limiting federal privacy regulation to specific laws for specific
sectors may have been adequate for the early days of the internet and
connected technologies, it is past time for Congress to pass a national
privacy law that would provide cohesive, coherent rules based on core
privacy values, that could then be translated to different sectors,
industries, types of data, and types of data actors. The difficulty of
protecting privacy in coronavirus testing is only one example of when the
various sector-specific privacy laws fail to protect privacy or associated
harms for individuals. The rising use of remote communication
technologies in education is another such example, as even the strongest
amalgamation of FERPA, COPPA, and FTC consumer protection law
would not be enough to protect student or educational privacy. The
sectoral privacy regime creates confusion, and the difficulty of
420. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020); Public
Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020). Both bills ultimately died in
Congress.
421. David Uberti, Coronavirus Privacy Bills Hit Roadblocks in Congress, WALL ST. J. (June
15, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-privacy-bills-hit-roadblocks-incongress-11592213400 [https://perma.cc/D8LH-FSN2].
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compliance with conflicting requirements may hamper innovation and
public health response. Differing state regulations compound that
confusion, with some state laws becoming de facto regulations for the
nation based on difficulty of compliance.422
A federal privacy law will be most useful in creating privacy values
and standards across sectors, while still allowing for sectoral privacy laws
to fill in the gaps. Technologies are constantly changing, as are uses of
technologies, as we have seen with medical AI, telehealth communication
technologies, and healthcare robots. Thus, it is more useful to create laws
that allow for room for innovation and growth of industries, as opposed
to laws that are overly restrictive, particularly in an omnibus regulation
that seeks to govern many industries. For example, instead of regulating
particular technologies, like healthcare robots, a federal privacy law
could instead specifically regulate collection and use of data, as well as
physical privacy violations caused by technologies with physical
presence or embodiment.
2. Health, Biometric, and Genetic Privacy Laws Are Insufficient
The pandemic has highlighted the inadequacies of current laws in
protecting sensitive health information, including biometric information,
genetic information, and more. This is apparent if for no other reason than
that the public health response to this global pandemic has generated the
collection and processing of a vast quantity of data that could be
considered health, biometric, or genetic data.
Any federal privacy law that seeks to govern all sectors must include
protections for health information and other sensitive categories of
information. A federal privacy law could serve to fill in some of the gaps
of HIPAA, GINA, and other laws that govern health information. For
example, a federal privacy law could protect patients when their data is
collected by an actor that is not a HIPAA-covered entity or business
associate (something that has occurred with some of the COVID-19
testing and contact tracing). It would also be wise to include some of the
provisions from state health privacy laws, including biometric
information privacy laws.
In lieu of a comprehensive federal privacy law, the U.S. needs stronger
sectoral privacy laws that would govern health, biometric, and genetic
privacy. Until a federal privacy law comes to pass, attention should be
paid to updating existing laws to address the potential for violations of
422. For example, in managing compliance, organizations may set their standards to match the
strictest state laws, making those state laws the de facto laws of the nation. Additionally, when
creating new laws, policymakers often borrow from other states’ laws.
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health privacy and genetic privacy. We should expand GINA to include
greater protections against genetic discrimination, including protection
against disparate harms as Ifeoma Ajunwa has suggested, as well as
protection against discrimination based on characteristics or health
information that might not be categorized as genetic data. Additionally,
we should expand GINA protections past the currently limited sectors of
employment and health insurance discrimination to include fundamental
rights such as education and housing. Furthermore, genetic privacy rights,
including rights to donate data without fear of law enforcement access,
should be expanded, either through a genetic privacy law or through
provisions in a larger health or biometric privacy law.
Our current health privacy regime is insufficient to protect the privacy
of what is perhaps the most sensitive data for any individual: biometric
data, or data relating to or emanating from the body. Biometric data is
particularly important to protect because such data is not only extremely
identifiable but also intrinsically linked to our sense of selves. There’s a
fundamental difference between a data breach of credit card numbers
versus a breach of face photos. We understand that difference intuitively,
and individuals deserve stronger privacy protections for their sensitive
biometric information, including health information and genetic
information.
3. Privacy Law Must Address Digital Inequities
The pandemic has thrown into sharp relief the digital and economic
inequities of modern life. No privacy law will ever fully protect the
privacy of the people unless it takes into account inequities in privacy and
technology. We should address discrimination as an information privacy
harm, particularly related to algorithmic discrimination, which is based
on information related to individuals. A federal privacy law should
include protections for particularly vulnerable classes, as well as
limitations on discriminatory uses of data (including disparate impact).
These protections should be explicitly built into federal privacy law.
In lieu of a strong omnibus privacy law that includes protection against
discrimination and disparate harm, other legal changes can help serve
similar purpose. Laws that protect against harms that are often gendered
or racialized can be helpful, including specific laws targeting harms like
online harassment, cyberstalking, nonconsensual pornography, and
swatting.423 Additionally, laws that give more rights to data subjects,
423. For example, New York’s nonconsensual pornography law and a similar bill still stalled
in Congress. Vivian Wang, ‘Revenge Porn’ Law Finally Passes in New York, N.Y. TIMES
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including algorithmic rights, can help empower individuals who may
suffer disproportionately from the harms of surveillance and algorithmic
decision-making systems. One example is enforcing transparency and
accountability for algorithms used in sentencing.
4. Privacy Law Should Protect a Right to Educational Privacy
By shifting education to the digital space, and to the private home, the
pandemic has exposed flaws in privacy protections for students and
educators. Privacy law protects children as vulnerable classes under
COPPA and FERPA. However, these protections are limited in types of
data (student records for FERPA) and categories of data subjects and data
controllers. We should reform education privacy laws to include
protections ordinarily afforded to the physical educational space.
Protection of educational privacy should transcend protection of children
as a vulnerable class or school records as a sensitive form of data and
should include instructors, researchers, and others engaged in the
intellectual enterprise of education. Educational privacy protections
should also be applicable to both public and private entities. This is but
one failure in the current sectoral privacy regime, and one example of
how the shifting privacy norms of cyber and physical space should
change the way privacy law regulates.
5. Privacy-Forward Platform Regulation
The question of how to regulate technology platforms has risen to the
forefront in recent years, and both policymakers and the general public
have pressed for reform in a number of ways. The pandemic has exposed
once again the integral role of technology companies and intermediaries
in society, as technologies like remote videoconferencing apps and digital
contact tracing apps have become important in the COVID-19 response.
There are of course more problems with platform regulation than
privacy. Internet intermediaries provide venues for speech to occur, and
potential issues that must be raised for platform regulation include online
speech access and expression, online harassment, election interference,
disinformation, and more. Additionally, perhaps the greatest challenge in
platform regulation today is not privacy or online speech but rather the
power imbalance between increasingly powerful technology companies
and people and governments. Some of this power imbalance is due to the
vast quantity of data many of the large technology companies are able to

(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/nyregion/revenge-porn-law.html
[https://perma.cc/S6HG-K3DQ].
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collect, which has privacy implications but is not necessarily a privacyexclusive issue.
Platform regulation must protect the privacy of individual consumers,
as many have advocated for in calls to reform. However, the pandemic
has also highlighted the gradual social shift of society in increasingly
considering digital spaces as substitutions or supplements to physical
spaces. Thus, it is crucial that intermediary regulation not overly restrict
intermediaries such that they would no longer be able to provide the
privacy of digital spaces that are necessary for identity development,
intellectual exploration, freedom of speech, and more. We must support
privacy-forward platform regulation, separating the regulation of
technology companies as economic actors and the regulation of
intermediaries as venues for speech and connection.
6. Regulating Data Aggregators and Downstream Data Harms
The complex data cycles related to COVID-19 testing and contact
tracing show the difficulty of regulating based on initial point of
collection. Laws do not sufficiently protect against downstream harms,
partly because it is difficult on a technical basis for any one party involved
in a data lifecycle to track all the different places data may go and
different parties who may have access to said data.
It is time for regulation that addresses the compounded privacy harms
of data aggregation. Currently, there are only a few state laws that address
data brokers or data aggregators. A federal law that regulates data
aggregators as an industry has the potential of protecting against myriad
hams. Regulations that target data aggregators can include, but should not
be limited to, enforcing transparency about data sources that aggregators
purchase and collect, as well as rights for individual data subjects to
request access to data collected about them, as well as rights to correct
and delete said data, and rights to opt out entirely from having their data
be included as part of data sets used and sold by data aggregators. U.S.
law includes some of these rights for some types of data aggregation,
including laws allowing individuals to opt out of marketing mail, for
example, as well as laws for algorithmic transparency in financial credit
reporting.424
Many of the downstream data harms relate to the potential of data
being misused as part of machine learning and algorithmic decisionmaking. U.S. law does not generally address rights related to algorithmic
decision-making (with some exceptions), but the law should regulate

424. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 390, at 32.
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situations where algorithmic decision-making can be used to make
determinations that impact on fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article takes the particularities of the pandemic as a lens through
which to gauge the progress of privacy protections across sectors, using
the COVID-19 pandemic as a historical reference point. What is
interesting about technology is not its novelty but its salience. Similarly,
what is interesting about studying privacy in pandemic is not the novelty
of the pandemic itself or the use of technology during these times, but
rather what emerge as salient reflections on privacy, technology, and
public health in society today.
The global COVID-19 pandemic has changed society in myriad ways,
and it will take the long lens of history to understand the ramifications of
this societal crisis. It is certain that developments during this time,
whether or not they relate to privacy and technology, will influence future
directions for society. The data-driven programs developed as COVID19 response, from mass public health testing to consumer communication
technologies, have already transformed the way society interacts with
technology and concepts of privacy. Our privacy norms are changing, and
it is all but inevitable that the pandemic’s effects will be long-lasting, with
unforetold implications for our future society and its relationship with
technology. As we progress toward that future, it is imperative that we
create conceptions of privacy that are beneficial for society, as well as
laws and regulations that protect both public health and civil liberties.
This Article provides a contemporary account of privacy, technology,
and public health at this critical point in time. These situations will
change as the pandemic progresses, comes to an end, and eventually,
diminishes from the public sphere and public memory. As Teju Cole
writes, in an essay on the difficulty of analyzing an in-progress pandemic:
“History’s first draft is almost always wrong—but we still have to try and
write it.”425

425. Teju Cole, We Can’t Comprehend This Much Sorrow, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/18/magazine/covid-quarantine-sorrow.html
[https://perma.cc/L6PT-38TL].

